

BY THE SAME AUTHOR
Process and Unreality
Pragmatism
Pavlov and Freud:
vol. I. Ivan P. Pavlov
vol. II. Sigmund Freud

The FAILURE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

From Freud to Fromm

by HARRY K. WELLS



New York
INTERNATIONAL PUBLISHERS

*In Memory of My Sister
Frances Wells DiSanti*

© by INTERNATIONAL PUBLISHERS CO., INC., 1963

All Rights Reserved

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 63-22622

Printed in the United States of America



ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author is indebted to the following publishers for permission to quote from their publications: W. W. Norton & Co.; Farrar, Straus & Cudahy, Inc.; Harper & Brothers; Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc.; Yale University Press; Hogarth Press; Basic Books; Modern Library; Grune Publishers; International University Press; Beacon Press; Hermitage Press; Alfred A. Knopf; Columbia University Press, and Macmillan.

PREFACE

No contemporary body of thought, with the possible exception of pragmatism, has played a more important part or exerted a more pervasive influence in the shaping of the 20th century American mind than has psychoanalysis.

The United States is now, and for the past fifty years has been, the adopted homeland of psychoanalysis. While Vienna was its birthplace and Zurich its initial proving ground, in America alone did it succeed in permeating not only the psychiatric profession but the entire national culture as well.

At the same time the United States has been the scene of the internal theoretical denouement of psychoanalysis—from its classic formulation to revision, reformation, and reconstruction.

In the present work the author aspires to tell the story of psychoanalysis in our country, to evaluate the various forms it has taken, to determine the nature and extent of its influence, and to present a possible alternative approach to the great problem of the human mind in illness and in health.

HARRY K. WELLS

CONTENTS

| | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| <i>Preface</i> | 5 |
| PART I: FREUDIAN PSYCHOANALYSIS | |
| 1. PSYCHOANALYSIS COMES TO AMERICA | 11 |
| A. A. Brill, 11 | |
| Freud in America, 24 | |
| 2. CLASSICAL PSYCHOANALYSIS: ORTHODOX AND REVISED | 32 |
| Factors Leading to the Revision of Psychoanalysis, 35 | |
| The Revision of Psychoanalysis, 43 | |
| 3. INFLUENCE OF CLASSICAL PSYCHOANALYSIS | 48 |
| American Psychoanalytic Association, 49 | |
| Psychotherapy, 52 | |
| 4. AN ALTERNATIVE TO CLASSICAL PSYCHOANALYSIS | 58 |
| On the Nature of Instincts, 62 | |
| Freudianism and the Nature of Forgetting, 66 | |
| Future of Classical Psychoanalysis, 75 | |
| PART II: REFORMED PSYCHOANALYSIS | |
| 5. KAREN HORNEY | 81 |
| Horney's Critique of Freud, 83 | |
| Horney's Reformation of Psychoanalysis, 96 | |
| 6. ERICH FROMM | 107 |
| Fromm's "Sociological Factor," 108 | |
| Fromm's Reformation of Unconscious Compulsive Motivation, 115 | |

| | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| Fromm's Interrelation of Psychological and Sociological Factors, 127 | |
| Fromm's "Sane Society," 130 | |
| 7. REFORMATION OF PSYCHOANALYSIS | 135 |
| Influences Leading to the Reform Movement, 140 | |
| The Primary Contradiction within Reformed Psychoanalysis, 142 | |
| 8. TWO ASSUMPTIONS OF REFORMED PSYCHOANALYSIS | 148 |
| Capitalism as Universally Irrational and Destructive, 148 | |
| Motivation as Universally Irrational and Compulsive, 158 | |
| PART III: RECONSTRUCTION OF PSYCHOANALYSIS | |
| 9. PSYCHO-PHILOSOPHY OF LOVE | 171 |
| Fromm's Theory of Love, 171 | |
| Fromm's Theory of Alienation, 174 | |
| Critique of Fromm's Theory of Alienation, 175 | |
| Critique of Fromm's Theory of Love, 179 | |
| 10. PHYSICIAN OF THE SOUL: THE MERGING OF PSYCHOANALYSIS WITH RELIGION, EXISTENTIALISM AND ZEN BUDDHISM | 190 |
| Philosophy and Theology Turn to Analysis, 191 | |
| Fromm's Contribution to the New Theology, 194 | |
| Fromm's Transformation of Psychoanalysis into Religion, 203 | |
| 11. HUMAN POTENTIALITY: AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE PSYCHOANALYTIC UNCONSCIOUS | 211 |
| The Acquisition of Primary Skills, 214 | |
| Special Skills and Society, 218 | |
| The Power to Reason, to Imagine, and to Love, 223 | |
| The Powers of Man, 233 | |
| REFERENCE NOTES | 237 |
| INDEX | 245 |

PART I

FREUDIAN PSYCHOANALYSIS

Chapter 1

PSYCHOANALYSIS COMES TO AMERICA

The introduction of Freudian psychoanalysis into the United States is in large part the story of the late A. A. Brill. In some ways that story parallels the course of Freud's life in Vienna, and indicates why Brill was only the first of a legion of young neurologists, psychologists, psychiatrists, and social workers to turn to psychoanalysis to fill the void in their professional lives.

A. A. BRILL

After graduating from the College of Physicians and Surgeons, the young Dr. Brill in 1903 entered the New York State Hospital service. He studied neuropathology and psychiatry at the New York Psychiatric Institute under Dr. Adolf Meyer, generally credited with transforming the city's insane asylums into mental hospitals. Dr. Meyer gave him a thorough grounding in the classical organic approach to mental illness and introduced him to the works of the German psychiatrists—Emil Kraepelin and Karl Wernicke.

After two years of study and internship he was put in charge of the acute reception service of the Central Islip State Hospital where he received and examined all the new admissions from Manhattan and the Bronx. At the time, this initial physical and neuropsychiatric examination, reported in ten to 16 typewritten pages, was the most important thing that happened to the hospitalized mental patient. It determined the diagnosis and the assignment to an appropriate ward where further procedure was a matter of watching, waiting, and note-taking with dosages of sedatives or stimulants administered to counteract excessive activity or

depression, as prescribed in accordance with the Vanderbilt Clinic Formulary, *Mixtures for Diseases of the Nervous System*. Little or nothing could be done for the patients, and after two years Brill was bored and impatient. As he put it, "Everything was quite hopeless, and hence, uninteresting."¹

There was an additional reason for his impatience with hospital routine and clinical frustration. He had found the girl of his choice and wanted to be married, but since neither the pay nor the housing facilities at Central Islip were adequate for newlyweds, he decided to enter private practice. In this decision his life followed the pattern of Freud's, and like Freud he was faced with the problem of how a neurologist-psychiatrist, trained solely in the diagnosis and treatment of organic mental illness as found in hospitals, could treat the type of functional cases that come to private office practitioners.

In the opening years of the century functional mental illness was classified on the basis of symptoms into three types: hysteria, psychasthenia, and neurasthenia. The latter was the so-called "ref-use can" of mental medicine for it included just about everything that could not be explained on an organic basis. Once the diagnosis of neurasthenia was made, the patient was more often than not discredited as a malingerer and treated by means of placebos, or "jollies," as the practitioners called them. Therapy was the same for functional as for organic illness: hyoscine, morphine, chloral, paraldehyde, and hydro and electro-therapy, administered as occasion demanded in hospital or clinic.

Dr. Brill had had sufficient experience at the State Hospital to convince himself of the general futility of all such treatments. In addition, they were not particularly suited to office treatment of the ambulatory "neurotic" patients he would meet in private practice. Faced with this dilemma, his mind naturally turned in the course of time to reports of new psychotherapeutic methods, particularly to hypnotic suggestion, again as in the case of Freud himself.

This experience seems to have been almost universal among neurologists and psychiatrists. It was a pattern initiated by Freud and Pierre Janet and repeated over a period of 20 or 30 years by

countless thousands of practitioners in all the advanced countries of the world. Physiology, pathophysiology and medicine had no answer to the problem of neurosis, neither as to cause, nature or treatment. Thus the private practitioner was forced to seek elsewhere for clues. He had to find some means of treating his patients. He could not simply wait for other sciences to furnish the necessary knowledge, as could be done in fields where the alleviation of human suffering was not at stake. Thus the Kantian pragmatic reason was of necessity brought into play: when knowledge is lacking but action must nevertheless be taken (as in the case of a physician treating his patient), then the most expedient means available must be employed. At the turn of the century, very few means of treatment were available to psychiatry as a whole, and almost none for the private office practitioner. In the United States psychotherapy as a specialized discipline was non-existent and there were as yet no trained psychotherapists.

Medical practitioners for two thousand years had used *verbal* therapy as an auxiliary to medical treatment. In the closing decade of the last century a great impetus had been given to psychotherapy by the adaptation of hypnotic suggestion to the treatment of mild forms of mental illness. In Europe J. M. Charcot, August Forel, and Lowenfeld had reported remarkable if not miraculous results obtained through its use. In our country Morton Prince and Boris Sidis employed hypnotic suggestion and wrote on its effectiveness as a psychotherapeutic technique.

When Brill was preparing to open his private office for treatment of ambulatory neurotics, there was thus only one strictly psychotherapeutic method available, hypnotic suggestion. The patient was put into an hypnotic sleep and then commanded, as a post-hypnotic task, to "cease and desist" whatever the particular symptom happened to be. Brill reports a case in point. The patient had been suffering for some time from loud, tic-like belchings which, once started, continued for hours. "After I had reasoned with this simple individual for about an hour," Brill says, "he looked puzzled and continued to belch as loudly as ever. I then became irritated at what I considered his stupidity, and tried hypnotism to which he readily succumbed. It was then quite

easy to remove his symptoms by direct command. I ordered him to stop belching and when he continued, I just yelled, 'Shut up!' and he finally did; I then commanded that he must never do it again."² By this means Brill produced some startling successes. But, as Freud had discovered before him, the dazzling immediate results often concealed long-range failures. "Cures" were at best highly temporary, and at worst impossible because many patients simply would not succumb to hypnotism.

Brill at first thought, as Freud had before him, that his inability to hypnotize a large proportion of his patients was due to his lack of knowledge and skill. Under this impression he read everything he could find on the technique of hypnosis. Finally, he read in a newspaper that a certain Dr. John D. Quackenbos was practicing hypnotic suggestion in New York City and had worked miraculous cures. Brill paid him a visit to discover how to become proficient enough to hypnotize all his patients. "Dr. Quackenbos," Brill reported, "was a fine-appearing, cultured gentleman, more or less of the Svengali type. He listened to me smilingly as I recited my shortcomings as a hypnotist, and then led me to a good-sized room which was divided into cubicles and there I saw patients stretched out on cots, fast asleep and snoring. I said to him admiringly, 'How do you do it?' He then informed me that at first he had experienced the same difficulties that I had encountered, but that he had solved the problem by giving up the idea of putting patients to sleep solely by verbal suggestion. He said, 'If they don't succumb to suggestive sleep, I just give them a stiff dose of paraldehyde and they soon go under!'" This was disillusioning for Brill and, as he put it, "The doctor's Svengalilike figure suddenly underwent a marked shrinkage in my sight."³

Still, with all the difficulties, hypnotic suggestion remained the primary possibility as a psychotherapeutic measure. The only alternative apparently was to reason with the patient and so attempt to reeducate him. A book by a Dr. Dubois of Paris, *The Psychic Treatment of Mental Disorders*, published in 1905, proclaimed this method to be the most effective and took issue with hypnotic suggestion because of its transitory efficacy and its superficial relief of symptoms, while leaving their causes intact. Brill

was impressed with Dr. Dubois' arguments but found the so-called "rational psychotherapy" ineffective against the "irrational" emotional beliefs, attitudes, and conflicts of his neurotic patients. It did, however, plant a serious doubt in his mind about the validity of the hypnotic method, a doubt which led him eventually into the fold of psychoanalysis.

In the meantime, in his search for mastery of the hypnotic technique, he made a thorough study of Jean Martin Charcot's *Lectures* on the subject and as a result determined to go to the Salpêtrière in Paris.

In 1905, on a European junket, Brill first heard Freud's name mentioned. "Accidentally," he recounts, "I met an Austrian artillery lieutenant in Belgium during a visit to the exhibition in Liege. We happened to sit at the same table in a restaurant and thus became acquainted. We then travelled together for a few days and when we parted expressed the hope of meeting again some day. I remarked that I expected to visit Europe in 1907-08 and that I would probably go to Paris. He thereupon said, 'Why don't you come to Vienna and study with Freud?' When I asked, 'Who is Freud?' he answered, 'Oh, he must be somebody; else he would not have so many opponents.'"⁴

Brill obtained a leave of absence from the hospital and in 1907 went to Paris and the Salpêtrière. By that time Charcot himself had been dead some 15 years. Brill's visit came 22 years after Freud had made a similar pilgrimage for much the same reason: to improve his technique of hypnosis. Now, however, Brill was deeply shocked and chagrined to find that the followers of Charcot had lost respect for and interest in hypnotic suggestion and had espoused a modification of the American Weir Mitchell rest cure called "isolation." He had come to Paris imagining that he would find all the psychotherapeutic knowledge that he wished as a final preparation for private practice. His disillusionment plunged him into despair. He was ready to give up psychiatry, for where, if not in Paris, could he find the answers he sought? He had to have a technique which would allow psychotherapeutic, that is *verbal*, treatment of ambulatory neurotics in an office. Either he had to find such a therapeutic technique or give up psy-

chiatry and go into nose and throat work, as he actually considered doing. In his desperation he wrote to the man who had been instrumental in his choice of psychiatry as a specialty, Dr. Frederick Peterson, then chairman of the New York State Commission on Lunacy (now the Department of Mental Hygiene). Dr. Peterson encouraged him to remain a psychiatrist and advised him to go to the Burghölzli Clinic at Zurich, where "they are testing Freud's theories by applying them to the psychoses which I think will interest you."⁵ Brill followed the advice and went to Zurich. It was a major event in his life for it converted him to psychoanalysis and gave him the missionary task of bringing Freud's teachings to America.

Only six months prior to Brill's visit, the Burghölzli Clinic, under the directorship of Eugen Bleuler and his chief assistant, C. G. Jung, had undertaken to apply Freud's theories to psychotic patients. This marked the first real breakthrough for psychoanalysis and at the same time heralded the end of what Freud called his "lonely period" of discovery. Bleuler and Jung welcomed Brill and granted his request to join them at the Clinic.

The first staff meeting attended by Brill was an experience he never forgot. Knowing nothing about psychoanalysis, it was a puzzling and at the same time spellbinding experience to hear the cases discussed. The puzzlement came from the clash between the psychoanalytical approach on the one hand and his entire medical and psychiatric training on the other. He had been trained in the classic tradition, stemming from Benjamin Rush, that the brain is the organ of the mind and that any pathological mental disturbances must be the effect of cerebral malfunctioning, whether somatogenic or psychogenic. Within this tradition neurotic and psychotic symptoms were carefully noted, not with regard to their verbal or symbolic meaning, but in order to discover what areas of the brain had been affected and how, so that steps could be taken to remedy the difficulty. This was the *classic theory*. On the whole it worked well in cases of *organic* mental illness, those in which there was actual damage to the brain due to disease or injury. The difficulty arose in those cases where there was no discoverable physical lesion of any kind in the *structures* of the brain. Before

these *functional* types of mental illness, the neuroses and certain of the psychoses, psychiatry stood almost completely helpless, without adequate facts on which to base theories, and was therefore reduced to prescribing pragmatic methods of treatment solely on a trial and error basis.

Brill's spellbound exhilaration as he sat in for the first time on a staff meeting at the Burghölzli Clinic stemmed from what appeared to be a full release from the dilemma of modern psychiatry. The two horns of that dilemma, the principle that the brain is the basis of mental illness and the failure of science thus far to discover the cerebral basis of functional mental illness, were bypassed. The principle was not only annulled but, in the case of neuroses and psychoses, transformed into its opposite. Not the brain but the mind itself was now said to be the source of functional mental illness. With this, the search for cerebral malfunctioning as the basis of neuroses and certain psychoses was no longer theoretically required and was thereupon abandoned.

The dilemma is dramatized by that time in Brill's life when he was ready to abandon psychiatry altogether because of deep-seated and ever-recurrent frustration in finding answers to his questions about the neuroses. Neither in New York nor in Paris could he sense even a glimmer of light on the subject. Then he went to Zurich and all at once the problem, if not solved, was dissolved. The dilemma was neatly circumvented. Brill was exhilarated by release from an intolerable situation. His case was typical of literally hundreds and thousands of neurologists and psychiatrists the world over. Freud had undergone much the same experience, with the difference that he had not found the mode of release ready-made, but had had himself to construct it out of bits and patches gleaned from here and there. For Brill in 1907 on the other hand, "Psychoanalysis was, practically speaking, a finished product when I first became acquainted with it."⁶

The way out of the dilemma was found by repudiating medical psychiatry and cerebral physiology and turning instead to *pure* psychology, the study of the mind in sickness and in health without reference to the organ of which it is a function. It was this "way out" which so elated Brill when he first encountered it in

the staff meeting at Zurich; "I was puzzled and spellbound by what I saw and heard there,"⁷ he recorded.

The first case Brill heard discussed at the Burghölzli Clinic can serve to illustrate the gulf between the traditional scientific approach and the "new" purely mental one developed by Freud. In the presentation of the case the symptoms and their development were hastily sketched, taking only a very few minutes. Thereafter several hours were spent describing and accounting for the symbolic content of the patient's speech and actions. The classical medical and physiological approach was, and continues to be, to observe the disturbances in speech and behavior which would indicate malfunctioning of higher nervous processes, and from such symptoms to try to determine the precise nature of the cerebral imbalance. In general, the principle is that disturbed behavior is the result of disturbed nervous activity, caused by either somatogenic or psychogenic factors, or by a combination of the two.

The purely mental psychoanalytical approach that Brill was about to embrace, on the other hand, viewed the disturbed behavior and speech in and for themselves, analyzing the hidden meaning of the verbal images and the behavioral activity. The techniques for making such an interpretive analysis of the subjective content of the disturbed behavior were supplied by Freud, and constituted perhaps his greatest gift to the office neurologist-psychiatrist. By means of the interpretation of dreams, fantasies, free associations, symptomatic actions, slips of tongue, witty quips, and jokes, the private practitioner dug deep into the most personal life of the patient attempting to discover why the latter employed these particular images rather than others in his dreams and fantasies.

For Brill it was a whole new world opening up, one that was in the sharpest contrast with his scientific training. "In the Burghölzli," he wrote later, "it was quite different: instead of diagnosing this or that form of dementia praecox, which could be done at sight after a little experience, we focussed our interest on the particular expressions of the patient. Instead of simply saying that the patient had hallucinations of hearing, we wished to know why

he heard these particular voices, for following Freud, we invariably found that these particular hallucinations could be perceived only by this particular patient. They told the struggles of his wrecked individual mental life."⁸ To discover why a patient heard these particular voices or saw those specific pictures was a time-consuming project, a full-time task for an analyst even if he gave all day, every day, to it. Freud had established the practice of giving one hour a day to each patient, and under such circumstances never completed a single analysis even though many of them continued for several years.

Brill had been at the Burghölzli for two months during which time he had read the then available basic works of Freud, including *The Interpretation of Dreams*, *The Case of Dora*, *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex*, and the *Psycho-pathology of Every-day Life*. One Sunday afternoon while off-duty he had a chance to test Freud's theories on himself. He was reading a case history and it reminded him of a case he had treated at the Islip State Hospital. He started to make a marginal note to that effect when suddenly he could not remember the name of his former patient. Here was a case of a slight lapse of memory. According to Freud, a name is forgotten because it carries with it something painful or disagreeable, so now Brill had to search for the painful reason why he had forgotten the name. He tried associations, and associations on associations, letting his mind wander as it would, freely from one to another no matter how remote, irrelevant or shocking they might be. Hour after hour, far into the night and on into the early morning he freely associated, filling pages of closely written records of each and every association, but to no avail. He went to sleep for four hours and when he awoke he carefully recorded his dreams and the free associations on them, but not even this helped. The name still remained forgotten.

Now it was becoming all important. No longer was it simply a matter of finding the forgotten name, but rather it had become a test of the entire Freudian approach. Finally, just when he was ready to conclude that there was nothing to the theory, he remembered that Freud had prescribed not only dream analysis and free association but also symbolic interpretation of the imagery

of the dreams and associations. "Being inexperienced," he wrote, "I overlooked the very thing that Freud stressed, namely, disguised and symbolic expressions."⁹ After several hours of symbol-reading Brill at last recalled the name some 18 hours after he had begun the search. The test had been passed, Freud was vindicated, and Brill was convinced. "It would be impossible to describe," he reported, "the great pleasure and satisfaction I experienced on discovering this name at about 5 A.M. I could hardly wait for the staff meeting to report it to my colleagues. 'Now,' someone said, 'you'll be a Freudian.' And I have been one ever since."¹⁰

In reading through the case histories at the Clinic, Brill was at first alarmed at finding Freudian mechanisms and symbols which struck familiar chords in his own mental life. "But I soon discovered, he says, "that what I found in a patient, even while deciphering obsessions or delusions, was only an exaggerated or distorted expression of that which exists in every normal person."¹¹ He had in fact encountered one of the chief results of the abandonment of reliance on knowledge of the brain and its functioning or malfunctioning. In the Freudian purely mental approach the line between health and illness melts away, and the latter becomes merely an "exaggeration" of the former. Neurotic symptoms, according to this view, are not an expression of disturbed cerebral activity, but rather are due to painful memories which had been repressed and now return to consciousness in exaggerated and distorted forms.

Freud's great contribution, Brill maintains, consists in furnishing the techniques by means of which unconscious repressed memories can be brought to consciousness—dream interpretation, free association, transference phenomena, and the other lesser aids in the process of symbol translation and analysis. Together they are said to constitute a microscope for psychological research. "But we all felt," Brill writes, "that Freud gave us the microscope with which to examine the mind." By its means, "We now searched for the threads that led directly from the symptoms to something in the patient's former life that determined or gave origin to the symptoms."¹²

As a simple example, he cites a case analyzed in the Clinic. The patient suffered from a tic-like upward sweep of his arms. By means of the dream, free-association, symbol-translation microscope, the Freudian analysts, including Jung and Bleuler, came to the conclusion that this senseless motion represented an effort of the patient to ward off an idea, an obsessive notion that God might get into him. Tracing this thought back into his past life, by means of the same microscope, they reconstructed a traumatic scene in which this religiously puritanical man had been forced by crude companions to witness a canine copulation on the street. The key to the obsessive idea was then said to lie in the fact that "God" read backwards is "dog." The tic-like upward sweep of the arms was then viewed as an attempt to ward off the "god-dog" in order to keep him from "getting into" the patient. The mental dynamics of this case was said to lie in the repression into the unconscious of the memory of sexual intercourse, which latter, highly charged with psychic energy, formed circuitous and disguised entrance into consciousness in the form of the tic-like motion and the obsessive idea of warding off God.

In addition to satisfying intellectual curiosity, this kind of tracking down the sources of mental determinations was supposed to relieve the patient of his symptoms by bringing the originally repressed memory to consciousness in undistorted form. This is the heart of the therapeutic theory of psychoanalysis. The trouble, according to Freud, is that the tracking down of specific sources of given symptoms, while it *may* relieve the latter, still leaves the original character of the patient intact. The result often is that he develops other symptoms in its place. Thus Freud speaks of hypothetically perfect "interminable analyses" in which the object would be to trace all the main thoughts, emotions, and attitudes of the patient and in this way bring about a basic change in his character.

Such an approach applies equally well to the healthy and to the ill mind. Character analyses, in fact, form the basis of the training of psychoanalysts. Free association on dreams and the interpretation of the alleged symbolic meaning of the images divulged was from the beginning the Freudian royal road to knowledge of

the mind. Throughout Brill's stay at the Burghölzli Clinic he submitted his dreams to Jung and Bleuler for interpretation and throughout the remainder of his life he made it a daily habit to analyze his own dreams, often sending his dream case-histories to Freud or Sandor Ferenczi or some other trained analyst for "objective" evaluation. "It was found best," Brill says, "to study psychoanalysis through the analysis of one's own dreams."¹³

In the Clinic the spirit of Freud hovered over everything. No one could make a slip of any kind without immediately being called on to evoke free associations to discover the concealed psychic mechanisms. There was also a psychoanalytic circle which met every month under the chairmanship of Carl Jung. To Brill and others on the staff Freud was known as Allah and Jung as his prophet.

While still at the Clinic, Brill analyzed a patient and wrote up a case history that firmly established him in the Freudian "inner circle." The case involved a complicated series of symbol-translations to which Jung raised objections. Finally Jung sent the Brill report to Freud asking for a definitive decision. Freud then wrote Brill: "Your work has interested me much. I have exchanged views about it with Jung. Your interpretation seems to me correct; I presented it to the gentlemen of Wednesday Evening (including Ferenczi and Alfred Adler) and they accepted it." A few days later Jung wrote Brill a note: "As to your case-history, I can give you the information, which will surely please you, that Freud perfectly approves of your interpretation and fully agrees with it." Allah had spoken and his prophet fell in line, a hard thing for the proud and ambitious Jung to do. For Brill, on the other hand, it marked a signal victory and the beginning of a life-time personal relationship with Freud. "Having received," he wrote, "the approbation of 'Allah and his Prophet' as we were then in the habit of referring to Freud and Jung, as well as of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, I was more than pleased, and published the report."¹⁴

Soon thereafter Brill visited Freud in Vienna and arranged to translate a number of his books and papers into English. He also attended a meeting of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society and

there met the closely knit group of original disciples collected around Freud as he began to break out of his "lonely period."

Back at the Burghölzli, Brill arranged also to translate Jung's book, *Psychology of Dementia Praecox*, which had established him as a pioneer psychoanalyst.

Finally in the spring of 1908 Brill returned to New York, a devoted missionary consecrated to the task of spreading the Freudian gospel among the heathens of America. He came bearing great crates of psychoanalytic literature collected during his sojourn at Zurich. Full of enthusiasm about the prospects of psychoanalysis in the human sciences, not only psychotherapy but also psychology, education, child development, anthropology, mythology, and sociology, he started at once in conversations and lectures to convince his fellow countrymen of the value of the new science which, he maintained, was going to transform large sections of American thought.

At first he was listened to with interest but then opposition arose and became increasingly strong. As Freud's translator and expositor, Brill was attacked on the ground of being obsessed with sex and with dealing in obscenity and pornography. Brill's defense was to subject his defamers, as Freud had done earlier, to psychoanalytic interpretation. By hurling invectives "they in a way disburden their own repressed sexuality."¹⁵ It got so bad that when he heard such charges at meetings or dinner parties, he challenged the speaker to tell where Freud or himself had said it, and offered \$100 to any charity if the particular statement could be found. As time went on, he became increasingly more bold and raised the stake to \$500 and even more. He found this mode of repartee to be most effective among his professional colleagues against the wild tales of Freud's ideas on sex. There was, however, no such simple method of countering the barrage leveled in the popular press and magazines. These early days were full of difficulties, not least of which was the charge made by his old teachers and fellow students that he was just an "enthusiastic youngster blindly following a false prophet."

Soon after arriving in New York Brill opened his private office and announced that he was ready to treat patients by the methods

of Freudian psychoanalysis. For the first few years he was the only psychiatrist employing psychoanalysis in the entire United States. The nearest colleague was to be found in Toronto, Dr. Ernest Jones, later to move to London and to become the official biographer of Freud. Jones came often to the United States to give lectures and thus helped Brill prepare the ground for the biggest event in the history of psychoanalysis and a fateful day in American psychology and psychiatry, among other disciplines.

FREUD IN AMERICA

On August 27, 1909, Freud and Jung, whom he now called his Crown Prince, arrived in New York. He had been invited to give a series of five lectures at Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts, on the twentieth anniversary of its founding. Brill was on hand to meet him and to show him the sights of the city, including a moving picture, the first Freud had seen. From New York the party proceeded by boat to New Haven and thence by train to Boston and on to Worcester. Freud stayed in the home of the University's president, G. Stanley Hall, the founder of experimental psychology in the United States. It was Hall who had invited him to lecture, a step requiring considerable temerity in view of the general ostracism of Freud and psychoanalysis in scientific and intellectual circles in England and on the European continent. Prior to this invitation no institution whatever, either hospital, university, or professional society, had recognized him. He and his teachings had been held in utter contempt.

In New England, however, the ground had been carefully prepared. Ernest Jones in 1908 had held two or three colloquiums at which was present, among other notables, J. J. Putnam, well-known professor of neurology at Harvard University. Putnam was won over to psychoanalysis and became the first "big name" to back Freud in America and the world. Putnam and Jones gave several lectures in the year prior to the Clark celebration, including the presentation of two papers at an important congress held in New Haven, provoking heated discussion. So Freud's lectures were well heralded and awaited with considerable eagerness and curiosity.

The lectures, beginning on September 6 and running for five days, were delivered in German before one of the most distinguished audiences ever assembled to hear a discussion of psychology.* Present, in addition to Hall, Putnam, Jung, Jones and Brill, were Willam James, the foremost American psychologist and philosopher, E. B. Titchener, Franz Boas, Adolf Meyer, Sándor Ferenczi, E. B. Holt, and a host of other well-known psychologists, psychiatrists, and neurologists. At the close of the ceremonies Freud was presented with an honorary Doctor of Laws degree to which he responded with a little speech which began, "This is the first official recognition of our endeavors."¹⁶

At Clark in 1909 the American academic world, through a number of its most distinguished representatives, sat solemnly to hear the master himself discourse on such conjectured structures as the two innate infantile sexual phases, cannibal-oral and sadistic-anal, and the predetermined nexus of the Oedipus complex with its fatally ordained male castration-anxiety and female penis-envy. Freud told the assembled scientists and philosophers that his method of arriving at these psychical structures and dynamic mechanisms was in the first place the analysis of dreams and their interpretation by means of the translation of stereotyped symbols, inherited biologically from primitive tribal man. Never before had scholars and scientists even so much as accorded Freud a hearing. On the continent he had been dismissed for the most part as a fool, a dilettante or a charlatan, a judgement inferred from his writings, especially *The Interpretation of Dreams*. But here in America the cream of the intellectuals sat through five lectures and were impressed. Although only a handful retained their interest in psychoanalysis, the very presence and

* The lectures were translated by a Fellow in psychology at Clark University, Harry W. Chase, later to become Chancellor of New York University, and were published and read widely in the United States and throughout the world. The little book called, *Five Lectures upon Psychoanalysis*, is now considered a Freudian "classic" and millions of copies have been sold in this country. In the lectures Freud discusses the main concepts of his system: the unconscious, repression, instincts, reaction formation, sublimation, and the infantile sexual theories, among others.

forebearance of the rest lent a stamp of academic respectability to it.

William James and Freud went for a walk together during the Clark conference, in the course of which James had a slight heart attack. Speaking of "the lasting impression" made on him by James, Freud says, "I shall never forget one little scene that occurred as we were on a walk together. He stopped suddenly, handed me a bag he was carrying and asked me to walk on, saying that he would catch up with me as soon as he got through an attack of angina pectoris which was just coming on. He died of that disease a year later; and I have always wished that I might be as fearless as he was in the face of approaching death."¹⁷

At least one historian of psychology, A. A. Roback, felt that a great moment was lost by this heart attack: "On this occasion, no doubt, the two intellectual giants were to find out how close they stood to one another in their outlook. Alas, however . . . the opportunity was gone, and the following year James died."¹⁸ At the level of general psychological outlook the two should have agreed wholeheartedly—both viewed *instincts* as the decisive factor in mental life, both were "instinct" psychologists. James' pedestrian bourgeois instincts of private property, collection, aggression, and gentlemanliness were, however, pale and undramatic compared with the underworld forces with which Freud endowed the unconscious id. Perhaps it was in recognition of this difference in potential popular appeal that James, as reported by Ernest Jones, patted Freud on the back as they were taking leave of one another, and said, "The future of psychology belongs to your work."¹⁹

In letters written shortly after the Clark University congress, James was not so sure of either Freud or psychoanalysis. In one of them he wrote, "I hope that Freud and his pupils will push their ideas to their utmost limits, so that we may learn what they are. They can't fail to throw light on human nature; but I confess that he made on me personally the impression of a man obsessed with fixed ideas. I can make nothing in my own case with his dream theories, and obviously 'symbolism' is a most dangerous method." In another, he says simply and straightforwardly, "I

strongly suspect Freud, with his dream-theory, of being a regular halucine."²⁰

Regardless of his private opinions, however, James, the dean and peer of American psychology as of philosophy, never took public issue with Freud. On the contrary, he adopted a safe noncommittal position while at the same time his presence at Clark University and his remark to Freud, plus favorable references in lectures and articles, served to give semi-expressed approval of the Freudian theories. The objective effect was that James' great intellectual stature was lent to psychoanalysis at a time when the need was desperate.

"In Europe," Freud wrote, "I felt as though I were despised; but over there (in the U.S.) I found myself received by the foremost men as an equal."²¹ Among these was, of course, the Harvard professor emeritus, James Putnam. Freud referred to him as the man "who in spite of his age was an enthusiastic supporter of psychoanalysis and threw the whole weight of a personality that was universally respected into the defence of the cultural value of analysis and the purity of its aims."²² Five years after his Clark lectures, Freud wrote that Putnam "recommended it (psychoanalysis) to his countrymen and his colleagues in a series of lectures which were as rich in content as they were brilliant in form," and continues, "The esteem he enjoyed throughout America, on account of his high moral character and unflinching love of truth was of great service to psychoanalysis and protected it against the denunciations which might otherwise have early overwhelmed it." Freud concludes that, as of 1914, Putnam "remains the chief pillar of the psychoanalytic movement in his native land."²³

If Putnam was the pillar, Jones and Brill were the movers and shakers spreading the psychoanalytic word throughout the land. "For the further spread of this movement," Freud says, "Brill and Jones deserve the greatest credit; they achieved this by repeatedly with self-denying assiduity bringing to the notice of their countrymen in their writings the easily observable fundamental facts of everyday life of dreams and neuroses."²⁴ In the field of psychiatry Brill and Jones were first supported notably by Adolf Meyer

and Morton Prince and later by S. E. Jelliffe and W. A. White, all respected psychiatrists. Dr. Morton Prince concretely demonstrated his support by opening the pages of his *Journal of Abnormal Psychology* to Freud and psychoanalysis. Jelliffe was a leading figure in American psychiatry and managing editor of the *Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease* and its monographs; White was psychiatrist-in-chief of St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington. Both were effective champions of psychoanalysis in the first decade of its penetration into the new world.

G. Stanley Hall and E. B. Holt were leading academic psychologists of the experimental school and thus their endorsement of Freud's teachings was an important step in opening America to psychoanalysis. Holt, a professor at Harvard, wrote a book called *The Freudian Wish*, the first of a number of attempts in this country to combine behaviorism with Freudianism.

After Freud's visit to Worcester, the members of his audience, joined each year by more and more colleagues, formed the advance phalanx of the psychoanalytic movement in America. At first they established important beachheads in neurology, psychiatry, and psychology, and then in the years that followed fanned out to engulf not only these disciplines but also most of the life-sciences and cultural fields.

In 1910, James Putnam had the audacity to present a laudatory paper on "Personal Experience with Freud's Psychoanalytic Methods" at the meeting of the then unsympathetic American Neurological Association, specifically for the convenience of those champions of Freud who lived beyond the Metropolitan district. Putnam was the first president and Jones the secretary. The New York members also belonged to the national organization which met annually in various cities until its form was changed in 1932. By the latter date all the major cities had their own psychoanalytic societies and the national association became a formal symbol of unity without independent functions.

After 1915 psychoanalysis gained momentum rapidly, as practitioners in ever-increasing numbers found it advantageous to use the method and as patients clamored for it. In the 20 years between 1915 and 1935 psychoanalysis was integrated into medical

schools across the country. Universities like Columbia and Chicago established special psychoanalytic institutes, while mental hospitals, clinics, and foundations, including among the latter the Judge Baker Guidance Center in Boston and the Menninger Foundation in Topeka, were won over to the new therapy. The Freudian terminology permeated psychiatric case reports and literature and became part of the popular language. America was rapidly becoming the proving ground of practical psychoanalysis.

Contrary to the story of psychoanalysis in Europe where it was practically excluded from universities, hospitals and clinics, in the United States it rapidly became institutionalized. In Europe, the chief practitioners were lay-analysts, since the medical profession as a whole scorned and rejected what was felt to be an unscientific upstart, a revival of the medieval "witches" theory of mental illness. On the continent, therefore, psychoanalysis was limited to the peripheral veins of culture, while in the United States it entered directly into the main arteries and thereby permeated the entire body of American life and thought. The extent of its influence and popularity is indicated by the fact that a bookstore in New York in 1925 carried nearly 200 popular books on the subject. Around the same time, the Columbia University humorous magazine, *The Jester*, quipped, "Let's unshackle our libido, loaf half dressed upon the lido."

During these years American neurologists and psychiatrists flocked to Vienna for *didactic* or *training* analyses with Freud and others of the Vienna circle. The pilgrimage grew to such proportions that special lectures and courses were organized to process the American pilgrims. These trainees returned to the States full of new zeal and ideas, and of course increased the hold of psychoanalysis on the psychiatric profession. Already by 1919, this grip was so firm that a leading American psychiatrist could cry out at a meeting that "the time has come to free American psychiatry from the domination of the Pope in Vienna"—a proposal that was psychoanalyzed as "strongly reminiscent of the universal and ineradicable Oedipus relationship and the dethronement of the father."²⁵

With the rise of Nazism and eventually with the annexation of Austria, there was a mass migration of foreign analysts, some to England, including Freud himself, but most to the United States. After the second World War there was no question whatever about it: America, and especially New York, was the capital of psychoanalysis. The two post-war presidents of the International Psychoanalytic Society were Americans, all previous officers had been European. More than half of the membership in the International Society are now Americans. The tremendous influence of psychoanalysis on psychiatry and medicine in the United States today can be measured by the fact that over 500 of the 800 psychiatric doctors who are members of the American Psychoanalytic Association are now teaching psychoanalytical principles and practices in leading medical schools and training institutes across the nation. In addition, there are thousands of social workers, and especially psychiatric social workers, together with untold numbers of "psychologists" or "psychological consultants"—there are some 200 of the latter listed in the New York City Classified Telephone Directory alone. They are the American counterpart of the European lay analysts. It might also be mentioned that modern centralized primary and secondary schools, both public and private, have psychiatric consultants who in most cases are imbued with the psychoanalytic viewpoint. Likewise there are on the college campuses some 500 psychiatrists giving full or part time psychoanalytic assistance to students in their "tensions, anxieties, depressions and fears."²⁶ Then there are also all the untold numbers of psychiatrists, psychologists, and special social workers attached to shops, plants, factories, department stores, large corporations, and government offices the nation over, most of them of a more or less psychoanalytic persuasion.

The extent of the influence even on a far removed field is indicated by the fact that upon the occasion of Freud's 80th birthday in 1939, *The American Journal of Sociology* devoted the entire November issue to articles dealing with the influence of psychoanalysis on sociological topics, contributed by professors of sociology from the leading universities in the land. This

permeation is true not only of sociology but holds also for a number of other fields. What Brill said in 1938 is even more true today: "I am happy to say . . . that psychoanalysis in this country is firmly established not only in medicine, but also in psychology, sociology, pedagogy, and anthropology. It has not only permeated and transvalued the mental sciences, but indirectly also *belles lettres* and the cultural trends of the last generation."²⁷ Lionel Trilling, Columbia University professor and well-known critic, wrote in 1955 that "Freud's ideas have established themselves firmly in our culture—psychiatry is chiefly based upon them. They have had a decisive influence upon our theories of education and of child-rearing. They are of prime importance to anthropology, to sociology, to literary criticism; even theology must take account of them. We may say that they have become an integral part of our modern intellectual apparatus." He adds, "There is scarcely a play on Broadway that does not make use of some version of some Freudian idea, which the audience can be counted on to comprehend."²⁸

Although psychoanalysis had succeeded, after the first ten years, in overcoming organized and institutionalized opposition, still there were individual voices raised against anything and everything Freudian as a pseudo-science more akin to astrology than to psychiatry. Leading neuro-psychiatrists like Dr. Foster Kennedy of Cornell, Dr. Charles W. Burr of the University of Pennsylvania, and Dr. Bernard Sachs of New York seldom missed a chance to launch an attack on Freud's theories and methods. But the *articulate* opposition was small indeed, with many scientists and professionals preferring to maintain a discreet silence.

In the 50 odd years since Freud's dramatic 1909 appearance in Worcester, psychoanalysis has become deeply entrenched in American institutional life as well as in the popular mind. Scorned and outcast in most of the world, Freudianism found a home in the United States.

It has not, however, remained unchanged during its career in America, but has undergone a course of internal development ranging from orthodoxy through revision and reform to existential and religious reconstruction.

Chapter 2

CLASSICAL PSYCHOANALYSIS

Orthodox and Revised

The version of psychoanalysis brought to America by Brill was orthodox Freudianism. It was a closed, self-consistent, organic system of thought in which the elements were internally related and mutually dependent. The whole formed an architectonic structure built of theoretical bricks, one resting on another, each as important structurally as the next. The bricks, however, were of two kinds, laid in such a manner that one type always underlay and supported the other. There were, that is, two sets of theories, one concerned with the elements of the individual unconscious and the other with the components of the racial unconscious. These were paired in such a way that each element of the individual unconscious rested on and drew support from the corresponding component of the racial unconscious.

The innate drives and taboos held to be characteristic of the individual unconscious of modern man were said to be biologically inherited from the primal horde episode in the dim past of human evolution. The drive toward incest and the taboo on incestuous relations, for example, allegedly had their source in the revolt of the sons against the tyrannical father in which the father was murdered and the sons took the mothers and sisters as sexual objects. The resulting chaotic conflict led to a pact among the brothers outlawing incest. The two basic elements of the Oedipus complex were thus theoretically rooted by Freud in the myth of the primal horde, and derived their irrepressible psychic power from that remote source.

The same was held to be true of each and every one of the innate features of the individual unconscious. All were said to be the individual embodiment of the features of the racial unconscious. The racial unconscious was allegedly the repository of the primitive experience of man as he evolved from the animal state. The individual destiny was to recapitulate the story of this evolution. The racial unconscious, immanent in each individual, contained the predestined phases and patterns, in the form of innate memories, prescribing the course of development through which each child must pass before he can become an adult.

The evolutionary, phylogenetic course was a process of repression of primitive hordal drives. Civilization was said to be the product of such sexual repression together with the sublimation of the libidinal energy into productive and creative channels. The developmental ontogenetic course followed the same line. Infants and children were said to be little, unrepressed, primitive hordal beings with the prehistoric drives of incest and oral and anal sexual phases predominant. They were said to be dominated in emotion and behavior by the immanent primitive man who lived unchanged in each child. Adulthood was achieved only at the expense of repression of what was in fact too powerful to be repressed. Infantile sexual drives, incestuous and homosexual, had to be repressed by the child between the ages of one and three. He had likewise to repress primitively predestined fears of castration at the hands of his father, and jealousy and death wishes directed against the father. These were formidable if not hopeless tasks for a small child of one or two or three. For what he had to repress was nothing less than the racial story of mankind as it existed contemporaneously in his own little unconscious id.

The manner in which the child accomplished the feat was said to predetermine the course of his adult life. So impossible was the task that universal neurosis was held to be the inevitable result. The repressed, primal horde man forever battered against the gates of consciousness and found expression in circuitous and disguised routes such as anxiety dreams and neurotic symptoms.

The central feature of the orthodox Freudian system of thought was the one-to-one correlation between the elements of the individual unconscious and the components of the racial unconscious. The latter furnished the source of power and inevitability for the former. A corollary of this feature was the doctrine of recapitulation by each person of the racial story. Together the two levels of theory formed a logically coherent, beautifully synchronized interrelation between individual and racial "mind."

Built into the system was an impregnable defense. Any resistance to its acceptance was inescapably characterized as resistance to the primitive man in the critic's own unconscious. It was an impressive and overpowering theoretical achievement. Its symmetry and compelling force was almost a thing of beauty.

The orthodox Freudian system of thought was wholly free of internal contradiction. It was a monument to the creative consistency of its author. The internal logic, power, and symmetry of the theory, however, was achieved through disregard of large portions of established human knowledge. It was purchased at the expense of contradiction of such sciences as biology, physiology, medicine, anthropology, sociology, history, and experimental psychology. The most obvious and blatant contravention of science was the doctrine of the racial unconscious with its myth of the primal horde. Under the concerted attack of scientists, especially anthropologists, the American psychoanalytical theorists were forced to beat a hasty retreat. They abandoned that entire half of Freudian thought which furnished the sources for the individual unconscious drives, memories, phases, and taboos.

This initial capitulation gave rise to an internal contradiction within the system itself. On the one hand innate drives, memories, phases, and taboos were still said to be the central features of the id, while on the other, their sources were denied. To overcome the conflict with science, the racial unconscious, the first line of defense, was sacrificed. But the analytical theoreticians in full retreat regrouped their forces behind their second line of defense. The inborn, unconscious mental structures were to be defended at any cost, for without them there would be no Freud-

ianism. The Oedipus complex, the infantile sexual phases, and the like were said to belong to the individual id alone, albeit as innate features. This internal contradiction in psychoanalytic theory is the essential feature in revised Freudianism which led psychoanalysis eventually into the more advanced phase of reform. The reformists, Karen Horney, Harry Stack Sullivan and the early Erich Fromm, succeeded in making psychoanalysis once more self-consistent as a theory—but at the sacrifice of what orthodox and revisionist analysts considered to be the heart of Freudianism, the innate memories, structures, and predeterminations.

The transition from orthodox to revised psychoanalysis was produced by the external contradiction with science and resulted in a weakened structure built of only one type of theoretical blocks. The process of extracting the racial unconscious components left stresses, strains, and cracks which threatened eventually to topple the edifice. Toward the end of his life Freud, while applauding the popularity of his system in the United States, complained bitterly that it had been seriously "watered down."

FACTORS LEADING TO THE REVISION OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

In spite of the difficulty of identifying and assessing the many factors at work over half a century leading to the revision of psychoanalysis, it is possible to classify them under four headings: (1) the practical experience of analysts; (2) academic experimental psychology; (3) experimental investigation of psychoanalytic postulates, and (4) comparative anthropology.

1. *The practical experience of analysts.* Whereas in Vienna Freud had treated primarily the upper leisure class, particularly the nobility, and drawn his theoretical inferences from that experience, in this country the analysts from the beginning were confronted predominantly by representatives of a busy and practical middle and professional class, and even by the upper echelons of the working and white collar classes. The impractical, highly esoteric, intellectualized and pessimistic features of Freudianism were in sharp contrast to the practical outlook, optimism, and common sense of many patients. Something more than an

endless pursuit of infantile memories and primal scenes was in many instances required to satisfy demands. Many concessions were forced on the grounds of practical exigency.

The search for unconscious motives by means of such techniques as dream interpretation and free association had on occasion to give way to direct and rational *conscious* communication. Concrete problems centering around jobs, civic responsibilities, marriage, children, and competitive pressures often forced a certain amount of attention to be focused on present life rather than exclusively on the remote experiences, memories, associations, and dreams of early childhood. Insistent demands for speedy recovery of full working capacity rather than patience with Freudian perfection in tracing down all symbolic leads, tended to water down the classical psychoanalytic standards. Freud had insisted on five sessions a week, but in our country this was sometimes cut to four, three, two, or even one a week. Such practical experiences of analysts played no insignificant part in their readiness to make theoretical concessions.

2. *Academic experimental psychology.* The first half of the 20th century saw an extensive development of experimental psychology in university laboratories across the nation. In this experimental work, concentration was on sensory-motor activity and the process of learning. According to Freud's system and terminology, experimental psychology was concerned with the "secondary processes of the ego." Freud himself largely ignored the sensory-motor and learning functions and limited himself to theories of the dependence of such functions on the primary processes of the id, namely the innate drives and repressed impulses and memories based on them. The ever-growing mass of experimentally derived facts and theories streaming out of the academic departments of psychology and having a strong practical effect on such diverse fields as education and advertising, could not long be ignored by psychoanalysis. The result was a tendency to put far greater stress on the secondary or ego functions than had Freud himself. With this emphasis on sense-experience and learning, there was inevitably a concomitant lessening of exclusive concern with innate activity and its vicis-

situdes. The walls were thus breached and psychoanalysis was ripe for an unending revision and reformation along the lines of stress on ego secondary processes, including such un-Freudian functions as rational thought and knowledge of the external world.

Sensory-motor activity and the learning process, thought, and knowledge implied a growing concern with the environment and its influence on mind and human nature, an emphasis largely foreign to psychoanalysis. This in itself was a strong influence in producing a culturally-oriented reform movement which repudiated the Freudian instinct theories. Recognition of the importance of sense experience, learning, reason, and knowledge led also ultimately to a stress on current life problems as opposed to the all but exclusive concern with genetic or childhood factors so characteristic of classical psychoanalysis. Academic experimental psychology, therefore, exerted a highly important influence leading to revision and reform of Freudianism, and eventually to its repudiation on the part of some analysts.

3. *Experimental investigation of psychoanalytic postulates.* Academic experimental psychology played yet another role in undermining the foundations of psychoanalysis. It brought the basic Freudian postulates to the laboratory for scientific investigation. This was not an organized test, but rather was carried on by individual psychologists and laboratories from coast to coast. The results of these independent investigations were compiled and put in book form in 1942 by Robert Sears, professor of child psychology at the University of Iowa.¹ The various component studies had, of course, been published over a period of some 30 years and therefore had individually exerted influence prior to 1942. The publication of the Sears volume, however, was a momentous event in the realm of psychology and exerted a profound if incalculable influence toward further revision, reform, and ultimate rejection of classical psychoanalysis.

Professor Sears' general conclusion was that "By the criteria of the physical sciences psychoanalysis is not a *good* science." The experiments indicate, he says, that "few investigators feel free to accept Freud's statements at face value." "The reason

lies," he continues, "in the same factor that makes psychoanalysis a bad science—its method. Psychoanalysis relies upon techniques that do not admit of the repetition of observation, that have no self-evident or denotative validity, and that are tintured to an unknown degree with the observer's own suggestions. These difficulties may not seriously interfere with therapy, but, when the method is used for uncovering psychological facts that are required to have objective validity, it simply fails."² This is a stinging indictment of psychoanalysis and its claim to status as a science. It is the more cogent since the conclusion is the result of careful reporting and analysis of hundreds of experimental investigations of the basic Freudian concepts.

On specific concepts the Sears Survey was equally devastating. With respect to Freud's theory of the inborn infantile drives—oral-cannibalism, anal-sadism or aggression, and the genital phases together with their sequential relationships, fixations, and regressions—Professor Sears concluded from the experiments that "In any case, genital and pre-genital behavior occur with sufficient profusion to support, but not critically, almost any hypothesis involving a positive relationship between them." And he goes on to state flatly, "So much of the nature of sex development is a function of the kinds of rewards and punishments given, of tutelage and stricture, that *no* such generalizations as Freud gives can be considered correct." Up-bringing and education, not innate drives, tendencies and phases, are, according to the experiments reviewed by Sears, decisive.

Freud defied logic as well as accepted scientific procedure by positing universals on the basis of a few samples subjectively investigated. "Freud's tendency to rely on cultural universals which do not exist," Sears says, "has led him to postulate universal attitudes and complexes that can only be demonstrated in but a part of the population."³ The conclusion in regard to Freud's theory of infantile sexuality was that there is no experimental evidence supporting the generalizations, while there is plenty of support for the fact of infantile sexual activity. This activity, however, is determined primarily by environmental factors rather than by biologically preordained sequential phases, which latter

is, of course, the heart of the Freudian theory of infantile sexuality. Here it is clear that the existence of given phenomena constitutes no evidence whatever in support of particular explanations of the phenomena.

On the crucial question of the Oedipus complex, extensive observations indicated, according to the Survey, that "Taking the population as a whole, there is no support for the theory that the cross-sex parent is favored and that powerful jealousy reactions are developed toward the same-sex parent." Sears remarked that "these data again argue against any universal pattern and re-emphasize the point that obtrudes itself time and again in the examination of such studies as these—that the structure of the little societies in which people grow up are too varied as to detail ever to permit of the kinds of generalizations that Freud has made concerning the role of specific members of the family." He concluded from the experiments and systematic studies that "Object choice is essentially a function of learning and what is learned is a function of the environment in which the learning occurs." Thus Freud's basic concept of an inborn and therefore universal Oedipus drive and situation finds no support in experimental psychology. On the contrary, all evidence points to the environment rather than to biological heredity as the determining factor in inter-familial relations. Professor Sears summed up on this point by characterizing Freud's notion of the universal Oedipus complex as "a sharply etched grotesquerie."⁴

Professor Sears' study led to serious questioning of the Freudian instinct theory, the cornerstone of psychoanalysis, with its two main concepts, the infantile sexual phases and the Oedipus complex. Can the superstructure Freud erected on the basis of this "disproven" instinctual foundation continue to exist? In particular, can the Freudian theories of repression, fixation, regression, dream interpretation, and neurosis have validity independent of their supposed instinctive roots? The Sears Survey summarizes the experiments designed to test these specific concepts but their frame of reference is so speculative and subjective that no objective investigations appear effective or even possible. Professor Sears concluded that "until some new conceptual or-

ganization of the facts from which these processes are inferred can be devised, progress in their investigation by non-analytic techniques must be slow," and that "further analysis of psychoanalytic concepts by non-psychoanalytic techniques may be relatively fruitless so long as those concepts rest in the theoretical framework of psychoanalysis." His positive recommendation, growing out of his conclusion that psychoanalysis is a "bad science," is that objective experimental psychology develop its own science of personality instead of leaving the field to psychoanalysis by default. Thus he says, "The greater efficacy with which non-psychoanalytic techniques deal with behavioral processes has already been sufficiently emphasized. It would seem desirable, therefore, that future research by such methods should be designed to aid in the development of a science of personality that is not structured along the same lines as psychoanalysis, but has a systematic structure of its own based on the triumvirate of influences loosely defined as *growth, learning, and the social milieu.*"⁵

The Sears review of 30 years of objective studies of psychoanalytical concepts was a powerful influence pressing toward revision of the Freudian approach to human nature.

4. *Comparative anthropology.* While experimental psychology, through both its extensive work on the learning process and its laboratory investigation of psychoanalytic concepts, was directly confronting Freud's theory of instincts with an impressive array of stubborn facts, comparative anthropology was staging a flanking attack which very nearly dealt the *coup de grace*.

From the beginning Freudianism was deeply involved with anthropology. Freud himself had sought the biological basis of his system in the spurious anthropological doctrines of British so-called evolutionary anthropology, especially the theories of Robertson Smith. There he found a rationale for six fundamental concepts, all essential to the strictly psychoanalytic approach to human nature:

(1) *The primal horde myth* on which Freud based his theories of the id and of the super-ego and hence of society.⁶

(2) *The doctrine of phylogenetic memories* which maintains

that remote primitive experiences such as the original patricide, incest, fear of castration, remorse, guilt, and taboos against incest and patricide become biologically hereditary memories existing in each and every modern child and adult.

(3) *The concept of biologically innate infantile sexual phases* through which every child must pass between birth and the age of five or six. These phases are said to center around erotogenic zones and to be expressed in innate drives—the mouth and its oral cannibalistic drives; the anus and its anal-sadistic-aggressive drives, and the primary sexual organs and their genital drives. It is maintained that the manner in which the child passes from one to another of these phases, or remains fixed in or regresses to them, determines in large part the future character, personality, criminality, normalcy, and relative health or illness of the adult.

(4) *The biologically predetermined Oedipus complex* in which the child of two to four or five years finds a sexual object for his infantile sexual drives in the parent of the opposite sex. The manner in which the child resolves the Oedipus complex determines much of his future life. Phylogenetic memories of fear of castration, elicited by current threats from the father, and penis envy are said to play decisive roles in the masculine and feminine solution of the complex.

(5) *A primordial language composed of archaic symbols in the form of imagery* is held to be a biologically hereditary feature of human nature, a legacy from primal horde and tribal man. It is that symbolic racial language which allows the analyst or the anthropologist or student of folk lore to translate and interpret dreams and other alleged phenomena of the unconscious.

(6) *A biologically inherited racial unconscious* is posited which is the repository of all the phylogenetic memories, infantile sexual phases, and Oedipus drives and taboos against them, as well as of the primordial symbolic language. This unconscious is said to be passed down from generation to generation and thus to belong to the race rather than the individual. The latter is merely the transmitter to future generations. It is this racial unconscious with its irresistible drives and impulses and memories and taboos which dominates the mind and nature of man.

In view of the anthropological character of these six basic doctrines, it was inevitable that anthropology had sooner or later to come to grips with such root notions of psychoanalysis. The process began in the 'twenties and continues to this day. By now, however, there has developed a common front of anthropologists on the essential questions of the six tenets. Regardless of whether other aspects of psychoanalysis are accepted or rejected, all anthropologists, excepting only such strict Freudian armchair speculators as Geza Roheim, completely repudiate the biologically hereditary and therefore universal character of all six. Some may retain one or another specific feature if in doing so it can be maintained that the feature is not biologically but rather is *culturally* determined. Innumerable field studies of American Indian tribes, South Sea Island communities, Australian Bushmen, and other ethnic groups demonstrated that Freud's so-called biological universals were neither biologically determined nor universal, but were, if existent at all, variables dependent on social organization and cultural development.

The list of those anthropologists who have come to grips with the Freudian claim to the biologically hereditary universality of the six doctrines and rejected them includes such illustrious names as Franz Boas, Bronislaw Malinowski, W. H. Rivers, Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead, Abram Kardiner, Cora DuBois, Ralph Linton, James West, and Clyde Kluckhohn. It must be stressed that it is the innate biological aspect, the instinctive feature, that has been repudiated by the anthropologists. Some, as already noted, still accept certain psychoanalytic concepts when they have been transplanted from a biological to a cultural framework.

The repudiation by anthropology of the biological basis of psychoanalysis in the form of the six basic doctrines constituted a decisive blow to the Freudian instinct theories. The anthropologists thus played a vital role in forcing revision of orthodox Freudianism.

The combination of the watering-down effect of the practical experience of the analysts in the United States, the influence of academic experimental psychology, the adverse findings in the psychological testing of Freudian concepts, and the repudiation

by the anthropologists of the psychoanalytic biological-anthropology appear to have been the prime factors in forcing concessions from the orthodox followers of Freud.

The actual history of the period from 1909 to the present, including two world wars, socialist revolutions, and the Great Depression, could be said to constitute a determining factor in the movement away from an instinct-centered psychology toward one more in keeping with the series of world-shaking *objective* events. An environmental-cultural psychology and psychotherapy were clearly closer to real life than infantile sexual phases, the Oedipus complex, and racial memories. At the same time, sociology and history, confronted and goaded by the stupendous events of the half-century, made rapid progress, much of which took sharp issue with the inverted Freudian approach. A special influence, the result of successful socialist revolution and construction, was brought to bear in the form of the continued development of Marxist thought and influence. This latter factor is seen both in its overt effect on the reformist and reconstructionist movements within psychoanalysis itself and, far more important, in the forces gravitating toward total repudiation of Freudianism. Thus in addition to the psychological and anthropological factors, there were, and are, the concrete historical and social scientific developments. These latter, while they may well be more powerful than the other factors in total effect, are at the same time incalculable in detail.

THE REVISION OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

Among the leading theoreticians of revised psychoanalysis are Franz Alexander and his "Chicago" school, Karl A. Menninger of the Menninger Clinic in Topeka, Kansas, and Abram Kardiner of Columbia University. For the purposes at hand, it is neither necessary nor particularly illuminating to examine these, or any of the myriad other "schools" of revised psychoanalysis. It is far more enlightening to investigate two trends originating abroad but having at once a profound effect and a general acceptance in the United States. One is the revision of Freud's theory made by his daughter, Anna Freud in England, and the other is

the change initiated by Heinz Hartmann of Germany. Both are concerned with aspects of the so-called "secondary" or "ego" functions; and both point in the direction of the later *reformation* of psychoanalysis.

Freud himself had placed primary emphasis on the id with its innate drives and mental constructs, and had neglected the ego. Since 1936, however, the ego has come into greater prominence in psychoanalytic literature and has been the subject of extensive and intensive study. The outcome has been a revision of orthodox Freudianism in which a much larger role has been assigned to the ego while still retaining the instinct theories of sex and aggression. Work on the ego concept has taken two directions. The one develops a suggestion by Freud concerning *mechanisms of defense* as a function of the ego. The leader in this direction is Anna Freud. The other is concerned with developing the *secondary functions* of the ego, those concerned with rational thought and action, perception, attention, cognition, memory, and the like. A leader in this direction is Heinz Hartmann along with E. Kris, R. Lowenstein and D. Rapaport.

Until the last few years of his life Freud had maintained that the sole defense against painful, unwanted, and unacceptable sexual and aggressive drives and impulses was repression, that is, expelling them from consciousness or behavior, or preventing their entrance in the first place. In his final decade, however, he came to the conclusion that the ego employed many mechanisms by means of which to defend itself against threats from the id, repression being only one of them. Freud did not develop this notion nor did he distinguish the various mechanisms. Thus for orthodox psychoanalysis, therapy remained a matter of discovery and release of repressed instinctual drives. In 1936, however, three years before Freud's death, his daughter Anna published a little volume entitled *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense*.⁷ In this book she views the ego as a structure developing in the course of life rather than as a creation of biological inheritance. Thus the ego of the child is formed in the early years, she maintains, during which period it is confronted by dangers from within and without, from instinct drives and from the external

world, and develops its own peculiar mechanisms of defense against them. Among these mechanisms are listed in addition to classical repression: *reaction formation*, exaggeration of the opposite tendency; *isolation*, the dangerous threat is admitted to consciousness but insulated against associative connections; *undoing*, in which a second act nullifies the first in such a manner that neither is considered to have taken place; *denial of reality*, denial of existence of a threatening external event; *compromise*, in which the painful impulse is allowed a partial expression; and *displacement*, in which a more painful anxiety may be replaced by a less painful one.

The elaboration of the ego defense mechanisms by Anna Freud and her followers in this country has been generally accepted by the majority of analysts. Acceptance has entailed an addition to the classical Freudian therapy of discovery and release of repressed drives. The particular defense mechanisms of the individual patient must also be identified and analyzed. Thus in addition to id impulses, Anna Freud brought ego mechanisms of defense into the psychoanalytic picture. Accordingly, any given behavior may be a part of an ego mechanism or a manifestation of the instinctual id. Further, whereas classical repression was viewed as a defense solely against painful instinct presentations of sex and aggression, the ego devices are viewed as facing in two directions: inward toward the instincts and outward toward the external world. It is this latter dual character which points toward reformation of orthodox psychoanalysis. Anna Freud herself viewed the instinctual threats as primary, thereby remaining a revised classicist.

It was, however, only a next if big step to repudiate the sexual-aggressive instinct theories and concentrate on the ego defense mechanisms formed in childhood or during the course of life to ward off blows to the self emanating from the objective environment. Such a "culturally" oriented approach constitutes the seed of the reformist movement led by Horney and Sullivan. Thus a suggestion by Freud as developed by his daughter supplied another important stage in the broad tendency away from orthodox Freudianism.

Anna Freud's concern with the ego defense mechanisms has long since become a routine part of classical Freudian theory and therapeutic practice. As a matter of fact, it would appear that discussion of defense devices for the ego has almost displaced discussion of "id" problems in the technical psychoanalytic journals. The theoretical position of the revisionists of whatever particular "school," however, remains instinct rather than environment or culture-oriented.

Another step in this movement toward theoretical relaxation and eventual dissipation, was the stress on the "secondary" processes of the ego. Along with his general neglect of the ego, Freud had for the most part disregarded what amounts to the classical subject matter of psychology: thought, memory, perception, sensori-motor activity, and behavior as a whole. Unfortunately for orthodox psychoanalysis, this neglect of psychology came at a time when that science was making considerable progress. It was therefore inevitable that some of the results of academic experimental psychology sooner or later had to be incorporated into the Freudian system, and in due course the "secondary ego processes" did in fact become a center of concentration. Heinz Hartmann made the original contribution in a paper published in the year of Freud's death, 1939. The paper was entitled "Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation."⁸

In this paper, and in others, Hartmann sought to correct Freud's one-sidedness and relative neglect of the "secondary" ego processes. Freud had viewed functions such as sense perception, motor activity, and thought as essentially subservient to the instinctual drives of sex and aggression. They were concerned with the external environment primarily as a medium of instinctual gratification or frustration, and almost not at all as a means of *adaptation*. Thus Freud assigned to the psychological functions a role subordinate to the "pleasure principle" of the id. He spoke of the "reality principle," the reflection of the external world in the mind through the agency of the senses and thought, but considered it only in connection with sexual and aggressive activity and drives.

Hartmann, on the other hand, insists on the primary *adaptive*

function of sense experience, thought, and behavior. Thus relations with the environment are given systematic importance in their own right. For example, he cites the fact that the young child takes great pleasure in exercising his limbs, in attending to objects, in exploring the immediate objective world, in creeping and walking, in learning words and language generally, in remembering, in mimicking, and the like, as well as in manipulating his genitals or withholding his bowel movements from a solicitous mother. Such "pleasures" are not "instinct connected," but rather are directly related to adaptation to the external environment, which Hartmann considers a primary function of the organism. In this connection he writes, "The pleasure possibilities of the apparatuses (sense experience, thought, activity, etc.) of the conflict-free ego-sphere seem to play a very significant role in the adaptation to the external world."⁹ The child learns about the world as an activity relatively independent of his infantile sexual phases and Oedipus complex. Hartmann, however, does not repudiate the Freudian libido and death instincts. Rather he adds the "secondary ego functions" to the classic psychoanalytic system. As a matter of fact, he maintains that while in the young child the psychical adaptive functions of sense-experience and thought are essentially independent of the instinctual drives of sex and aggression, they become instinct-connected, if not instinct-dominated, as the child grows to maturity. Thus Hartmann, by retaining the Freudian instinct orientation, remains a revisionist.

Revised psychoanalysis is psychoanalysis without the racial unconscious. It is one-half of the original Freudian theory, the innate mental drives and memories stripped of their sources in primitive man. It grafts ego-defenses and secondary ego processes onto the Freudian instinct theories. Revised psychoanalysis, nonetheless, is Freudianism and remains the dominant version of the classical theory in the United States.

Chapter 3

INFLUENCE OF CLASSICAL PSYCHOANALYSIS

In considering the *development* of psychoanalysis the difference between the orthodox and revised versions has significance. For the purpose of *evaluating* influence, however, the difference between the two is irrelevant, since both are exponents of classical Freudianism. The Oedipus complex, for example, remains the same theoretical construct whether or not it is traced to its alleged origin in the primal horde myth.

In the United States revised psychoanalysis is classical Freudianism. The extent of its influence is indicated by the fact that in the popular view, shared by the vast majority of Americans, the terms "psychology," "psychotherapy," and "psychiatry" have become almost synonymous with psychoanalysis. For the popular mind there is, to all extents and purposes, no other psychology, no other psychotherapy, no other psychiatry. In the same vein, the word "sex" is inextricably associated with the names "Freud" and "psychoanalysis," while any mother-son, father-daughter attachment is inevitably considered as "Oedipal."

Freudianism, like pragmatism, is ubiquitous, an ingredient of the ideological air unavoidably breathed by every American. It permeates the national atmosphere by both direct and indirect means. The most direct source is the psychoanalyst himself. The American Psychoanalytic Association maintains strict control of all Freudian psychoanalysts. Only members of the Association are entitled to call themselves psychoanalysts and only graduates of the various institutes accredited by the Association are admitted to membership. There are 17 such institutes scattered throughout the United States, from Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Washington to Chicago, Topeka, Los Angeles, and

Seattle. The total yearly enrollment now averages 900 students with an annual output of around 100 graduates.

AMERICAN PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION

To be accepted by an institute the applicant must be a graduate of a Class A medical school, must have completed at least one year's residency at an approved hospital, and have had a minimum of one year's work in psychiatry. The Association does not accept lay analysts, those without a medical degree. In addition, the applicant must be interviewed and recommended by a committee of Association members. One of the decisive requirements is that the student himself be a suitable subject for analysis, that is, he must be a potential patient, either suffering from a specific neurosis or be "neurotic."¹ This in effect constitutes no problem for the Freudians since they maintain that to have a character is to be "neurotic," and since everyone has a character of some description, everyone is "neurotic." With or without specific symptoms, character itself is a symptomatic neurotic constellation and therefore subject to analysis.

Each enrollee in a psychoanalytic institute has two roles to play, as a *student* and as a *patient*. As a *student* he attends a three-year curriculum of lectures and seminars on Freudian theory and techniques. As a *patient* he undergoes psychoanalytic treatment four or five sessions a week for a minimum of 300 hours. The two roles are recognized to be contradictory by the Psychoanalytic Association, for on the one hand the enrollee is considered to be sufficiently "healthy" and "normal" to be a student, while on the other he is considered to be sufficiently ill and abnormal to be a patient. As a result the institutes have elevated syncretism to a principle: the use of conflicting and irreconcilable assumptions is a theoretical and practical necessity. As a rationale there is the Freudian proposition that "Everyone is somehow neurotic, symptoms or no symptoms in the classical sense."² The theoretical reason, however, is the one advanced by Freud to the effect that psychoanalysis cannot be taught or proven, it can only be *experienced*. While courses and seminars can help, the center of psychoanalytic training is the actual anal-

ysis undergone by the student as a patient with the objective of "curing" him.

The training analysis is conducted by a member of the Association and exhibits *all* the features of a regular analysis, including fees. The student-patient is solely a patient in the analytical situation. While he may enter the treatment as an uninvolved experiment, he soon finds himself a genuine patient. In "working through" his unconscious development in reverse order from infantile sexual phases to the phallic stage and from the infantile Oedipal to the latent and eventually the advanced Oedipal complex and its denouement, with all the vicissitudes nevertheless leading to predestined scenes and predetermined mental schemata, he *experiences* the Freudian techniques: resistances, insights, transferences, projections, and so forth, as a subject. Over a period ranging from two to seven or more years the student as patient is tried, tested, and converted, as it were, by fire. Freudianism thereby becomes internalized.

This process as patient is supplemented by lectures and seminars on dream analysis, symbol interpretation, and the Freudian theories of symptom formation and character development. The student must master the dynamics of the unconscious as developed by Freud and his followers. He must also take courses in the applications of psychoanalytic theory to art, drama, literature, criminology, education, anthropology, sociology, and other fields. It is an intensive and extensive training which may go on for five, seven, ten or more years. Little wonder, then, that the average age of graduates is forty-four. The cost of psychoanalytic training ranges from 20 to 30 thousand dollars, borne entirely by the student-patient out of his medical and psychotherapeutic practice with the occasional aid of personally negotiated loans. The institutes on principle, give no scholarships. Payment is an integral part of the therapeutic and learning process.

Membership in the American Psychoanalytic Association has grown steadily from 33 in 1925 to 273 in 1946 to close to 1,000 in 1961, with present increments of 100 annually. The Association membership has been kept relatively low due to a combination of factors such as the medical degree requisite, the length,

rigor, and cost of training, and perhaps a tendency to maintain the supply of analysts well below the demand of patients. Fees per hour in 1950 ranged from 10 to 50 and 100 dollars, with the majority between 20 and 30. Annual professional incomes of members may be as little as \$20,000 and as much as \$100,000, or more.

While the ratios of members of the Psychoanalytic Association to total national population is low, 1 to 241,000, their influence geometrically exceeds their numbers. The reason is to be found in the "quality" of their patients. In 1948, 21 percent were business men and women, and the bulk of the remainder were from the professional, intellectual, and cultural communities. One-third of those analyzed had an income of \$30,000 and up, one-quarter had between 20 and 30 thousand, while five-sixths received upwards of \$10,000 annually.⁴ Six percent of those analyzed were lawyers and social scientists and four percent were physical scientists. Thirty-eight percent of the patients were from the health professions. Some 25 to 30 percent were from the cultural community: artists, writers, actors, critics, playwrights, dancers, and the like. The latter group would, of course, be in the best position to exert a wide influence. There are obviously no lists of patients, but since the cost of genuine analysis runs so high, approximately \$5,000 a year, it would be legitimate to infer that for the most part they would come from among the ranks of the more successful artists, writers, and playwrights. As partial corroboration there is a published statement by one authority that "Of the playwrights who have written this half-century of America's theatrical history, a number are known to have been personally psychoanalyzed—including Eugene O'Neill, Moss Hart, Clare Boothe Luce, Lillian Hellman, Arthur Laurents, William Inge, and George Axelrod."⁵ The actual list must be far greater and the same would presumably be the case in other fields of cultural work.

In any case, the thousand analysts exert a widespread and profound influence on the American mind through their patients, recruited as the latter are predominantly from the ranks of the more successful, influential, and opinion-setting members of the

business, professional, intellectual, and cultural segments of society. While there are no actual figures, from analysts practicing in each year since 1925 it can be estimated that somewhere between one-quarter and one-half million persons have been psychoanalyzed in the past 35 years. This refers solely to the full four- or five-times-a-week, year after year analyses conducted by members of the Freudian orthodox-revised American Psychoanalytic Association. Literally millions of other Americans in all walks of life have received some kind of more or less Freudian psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapy. Such psychotherapy constitutes the second type of direct Freudian influence on the American mind.

PSYCHOTHERAPY

If the members of the Psychoanalytic Association by treating the "elite" exert a direct influence on the opinion-making, attitude-shaping minority of the population, the psychotherapists are the means of reaching down to the grass roots, into the offices, schools, and even the factories of the nation. Psychotherapy is a loose general term referring to the treatment through personal consultation of both mild mental disorders and maladjustments of all kinds. It may be conducted by a medical doctor, a fully trained psychoanalyst, a lay analyst, a clinical psychologist, a psychologist, a psychiatric social worker, a counselor, or a guidance specialist. It is presently, on a national scale, a chaotic field without generally accepted standards or practices, one in which almost anyone so inclined can hang up a "shingle" and treat "clients," if not patients. A few states have now attempted to bring some order out of the chaos by means of licensing.

A number of professional organizations are attempting to set national and state standards and establish legal requirements. They insist that the term "psychotherapy" should be reserved for treatment by a professionally trained person, that is, by a clinical psychologist, psychiatrist or psychiatric social worker, but so far without much success. The term in practice covers everything from faith healing to psycho-drama. The great majority of psychotherapists, however, espouse a Freudian psychoanalytic

outlook and technique, however "pure" or however watered down, vulgarized or foreshortened.

While some psychotherapy may be conducted on a four or five session-per-week basis, notably by the lay analysts, and involve deep analysis comparable to the thorough working through of unconscious motivation by members of the Psychoanalytic Association, by far the more common practice is one, two, or three sessions a week. This is sometimes called the "poor man's psychoanalysis," for the cost is far less. Instead of \$100 and up a week and \$5,000 and up a year, the average is closer to \$20, \$30 or \$40 a week and \$1,000, \$1,500 or \$2,000 a year. Such psychotherapy may continue for several weeks, several months or, more commonly, for several years. Although there are no records which would give exact or even inexact indications of the number of people who at one time or another have been under psychotherapeutic treatment, an informed estimate would be that among the middle class, professional, intellectual, and cultural segments of the larger metropolitan areas, somewhere in the neighborhood of one in every five persons has been under some form of analytic treatment. For many thousands such treatment involves the most serious financial sacrifice, from one-quarter to one-third or even one-half of weekly, monthly, and yearly income. Group therapy and outpatient clinics relieve the burden of some, but the waiting lists are discouraging.

While the majority may seek help on their own initiative, medical doctors, personnel departments of offices and factories, and guidance departments of schools and colleges play a large referral role. Medical doctors, finding no pathological causes for symptoms and complaints, refer patients to "psychiatric treatment," by which, more often than not, is meant psychotherapy. Personnel departments refer "problem" employees to psychotherapists, and guidance departments of schools make a general practice of sending children with academic or behavioral problems for "psychiatric help" or euphemistically for "counselling." In either case, psychotherapy is customarily intended. The practice in schools is widespread, and is prompted more often by academic difficulties than behavioral problems. The children are

caught between their "paper" potential as indicated by the ubiquitous mystery of the I.Q. tests and their actual achievement in the classroom. If there is a chronic gap between the two, "emotional" problems are presumed to be the cause and "counselling" is the usual answer. Such "counselling" more often than not will involve the parents, since on the Freudian hypothesis it is the family constellation, particularly relations with the parent of the opposite sex, and sibling jealousy within that relationship, which is the ultimate cause of emotional difficulties.

The working class, particularly the white collar sector, is brought into direct contact with Freudian psychoanalysis through the guidance department of schools, through personnel departments attached to offices and less often, to shops, and through social workers. All three may lead to referral to psychotherapy. Workers who are "trouble makers," instigators of complaints and grievances, or amateur organizers in unorganized offices and shops, if not summarily fired, may be referred to "counselling" for help in adjustment to "reality." Revolt against the "boss" or authority in any form is, classically, in the Freudian view, ultimately caused by failure to work through the revolt against the father in the family constellation. White collar workers in metropolitan areas, however, more often find their own way to the psychoanalytic-therapeutic situation.

The most direct influence of psychoanalysis on the non-white collar and industrial working class undoubtedly comes from social workers either attached to the shop, or privately available from religious or national foundations, or publicly from municipal welfare services. Social work began as an attempt to alleviate inequitable conditions leading to widespread human distress. As time passed, however, the parallel development of psychoanalysis penetrated the field and social work widely adopted psychoanalytic theory and practice as its own. This led to sharp changes in the professional activities, particularly in case work. The social case worker now characteristically deals predominantly with client-patients in an office in a capacity similar to that of a psychotherapist, concerned more with emotional problems and maladjustments than with the effects and causes of objective

distress. "The emphasis in social work on alleviating and eliminating social conditions leading to distress," says one authority, "has declined, and social workers now attempt to alleviate distress by enabling clients to work through and understand their emotional problems." And he goes on to speak of "the adoption of psychoanalytic theory by much of social work." A critic closely connected with the field charges that social work "is increasingly becoming psychoanalytic social service, and more and more even the 'social' is being left out until only psychoanalytic service remains."⁶ Considering that in the United States there are some 25,000 social workers, ten percent being psychiatric (psychoanalytic) specialists, this segment alone exerts a strong, largely Freudian direct influence on the American working class.

The economic and social division of labor between the members of the American Psychoanalytic Association and the various categories of psychoanalytic psychotherapists succeeds in bringing the influence of Freudianism directly to bear on all classes and all segments of the national population. Millions upon millions of Americans in all walks of life have thus had personal experience to one degree or another with Freudian theory and practice. This in itself constitutes a powerful ideological influence.

A further direct influence is the continuing flood of primary, secondary, and popular books and articles on Freudianism. All these direct influences make Freudianism ubiquitous. But taken together with the indirect influence in literature, theatre, the arts and the mass media, psychoanalysis becomes as unavoidable as the air we breathe.

Psychoanalysis came into being at the end of the 19th century to fill a temporary gap in the sciences of psychiatry, physiology, and pathophysiology of the brain. The hiatus in these disciplines was the result of a combination of new knowledge and new ignorance. The new knowledge was characterized by tremendous advances in the understanding of cerebral anatomy and *organic* mental illness, damage caused by injury or disease. New knowledge, however, always brings into being new specific lack of knowledge or ignorance. This new level of ignorance poses the problems for further scientific advances. Thus the new anatomi-

cal knowledge of the brain, while making possible a great leap forward in organic psychiatry, at the same time raised sharply the question of cerebral *physiology* and the problem of *functional* mental illness.

When the causes of organic mental illness were at last discovered, or, more accurately, were concretely known to be fully discoverable, it was at the same time realized that the causes of functional mental illness were not yet known. This set the next big frontier for medical and physiological exploration.

Any new scientific knowledge, however, not only sets new problems based on knowledge of what we do not yet know, but also points a general direction in which solutions may be found. From the advances in organic psychiatry and the related sciences it was inferred that functional mental illness must be caused by malfunctioning of the brain, especially its higher parts. The general principle induced from the findings of cerebral anatomy and organic psychiatry was that mental illness, both organic and functional, is an illness of the brain. The relevant corollary for the solution of the new problem, therefore, was that the causes of functional mental illness must be sought in the pathophysiology of the higher parts of the brain, those parts concerned with human thinking, feeling, and behavior.

The grand plan envisioned that the physiology of these higher parts of the brain would be concerned with discovering the cerebral functioning underlying normal, healthy human mental activity. Pathophysiology would be concerned with discovering the cerebral malfunctionings underlying functional mental illnesses. Functional psychiatry would then be concerned with the discovery of effective treatments and cures for the specific malfunctionings disclosed by cerebral pathophysiology. Finally, it was envisioned that psychology could at last become a science of the normal healthy activity of the human mind by basing itself on advances in the science of cerebral physiology.

Such was the grand strategy in the human sciences in the closing decades of the 19th century. It was a bold and yet down-to-earth plan for scientific advancement that would, it was thought, lead eventually to the realization of man's most cherished dream,

to understand himself, to know his own mind, the last of the great mysteries on this earth. It was bold because it opened unlimited vistas for human advancement, not only in the medical sciences but in education and child care as well. But it was at the same time down-to-earth and realistic because it was firmly rooted in the actual achievements of cerebral anatomy and organic psychiatry. The principles generalized from successes in these fields seemed unquestionable and wholly applicable to the new levels of specific ignorance, the possible new sciences of higher cerebral physiology, psychology, pathophysiology, and functional psychiatry. The future appeared bright. The forces of darkness, represented by mystical concepts of divine creation of the human soul and by the medieval witches and evil-spirit theories of mental illness, were about to be routed. They appeared to be ripe for discard through the relentless advance of human knowledge.

Then came the denouement and the onset of the dark age in all these fields. What had appeared so promising failed to materialize. No way could be found to investigate cerebral functioning and malfunctioning and therefore there was an impasse in the physiology and pathophysiology of the brain. The temporary lack of such a method in these sciences led to a blockage of progress in psychology and functional psychiatry. This created a vacuum into which rushed all manner of theories and speculations, among them Freudian psychoanalysis. In the rough and tumble struggle for predominance, Freudiansism won a landslide victory, notably in the United States.

AN ALTERNATIVE TO CLASSICAL PSYCHOANALYSIS

Through his own experiences in Viennese psychiatric clinics and in his office treatment of patients, Freud already by the mid 1890's had been made painfully aware of the hiatus in psychiatry. Neither the nature nor the cure of functional mental illness was known. Under the pressure of practical necessity he determined to discover both the mechanism of neurosis and a therapy for it. He could get no effective help from any of the relevant sciences, a situation of which he himself was fully cognizant. Nevertheless he persisted, and after ten years of "lonely" work was able to produce a rough draft of what was to become the theory of psychoanalysis. It was patched together from his office experience with patients, from his own introspective self analysis, and from hints and suggestions gleaned from colleagues, anthropologists, philosophers, and psychologists.

Starting from the common universal experience of *forgetting*, Freud developed an elaborate theoretical apparatus, in which forgetting itself became suppression or *repression*. Anything forgotten was presumed to be forgotten for a motivated reason and to be directly or indirectly connected with childhood sexual or death-wish phenomena. What was "forgotten" was allegedly censored and suppressed as inadmissible to conscious memory. The repressed memory was supposed to reside in a theoretical locale called the unconscious or sub-conscious, the "cellar" of the mind. This "cellar" was said also to be the repository of the sex and death drives posited by Freud. These drives lent their energy to everything else in the unconscious, so that repressed memories

were said to be charged with the psychic energy of the sexual and death instincts. The charged memories allegedly existed only to force their way into consciousness and so harass and torture the individual. To guard the gates of consciousness the mind had, according to Freud, a built-in rampart in the form of a censorial screen.

The censor was composed of innate taboos on incestuous and other perverted sexual drives and of social prohibitions acquired by the individual particularly in childhood. The dynamics of mental activity were viewed as an internecine, intra-mental struggle between the unconscious repressed drives and memories and the taboos on them. Real motivation of human activity of all kinds was supposed to be determined by this dynamic struggle. A large part of this struggle allegedly expressed itself in the disguise assumed by the unconscious forces in their attempt to outwit and circumnavigate the censorial screen. Disguised forms of subconscious motivations appeared in dreams, off-guard associations, behavior, jokes, slips of tongue, neuroses, and so forth. Together these disguises formed what Freud called "the symbolic language of the Unconscious." The prime function of the psychoanalyst was to know this language so that he could translate it and guide the patient into self-discovery of his real unconscious motivation based on repressed drives and especially memories of infantile and childhood experiences and traumas. Much of the art of psychoanalytic practice was concerned with this symbol reading.

In actuality Freud first developed his concept of the symbolic language of dreams, and then used it in the construction of his theories. In a very real sense, the entire Freudian structure hinges on the conception of the universal symbolic language of the unconscious. It was this "language" which first furnished Freud with his data, later to be organized theoretically to fit the framework of the unconscious mind and its mode of expression, that is, its mode of infiltrating through the censorial screen.

Underlying the doctrine of the universal symbolic language of the unconscious are two assumptions tacitly made by Freud. Both are concerned with memories. Freud assumed that the mind is

stocked at birth with a set of racial memories stemming from mankind's earliest pre-tribal and tribal experiences. These innate memories are the mental counterparts of the biological instincts. They are highly charged memories of oral-cannibal and anal-sadistic phases through which primitive-hordal man allegedly passed. The memories also are of sexual object-finding of an incestuous nature supposedly characteristic of phases of primitive man's experience. Such memories are said to be the basic elements of contemporary man's unconscious id. Another set of racial memories embody later primitive tribal taboos on such experiences for the sake of social expediency. These innate prohibitory memories supposedly are the basic elements of contemporary man's conscience or super ego. Thus modern man is born with memories so charged that they become active drives or operative taboos, the two sets being in absolutely contradictory opposition one to another. Both are powerful and not to be denied. In this manner, like the first act of a well-constructed play, Freud lays the racially hereditary basis for the unfolding of the individual life-drama.

The drama of individual mental life begins at birth and passes through the phases of the human race. The vicissitudes of the particular life-experience determine not the course but only the peculiar manner in which the unconscious memories predetermine the phasic development. A climax is reached by the age of one and one-half to three, when the primitive unconscious memories force the infant into an incestuous relation with the parent of the opposite sex. It is at this point that little boys fall sexually in love with the mother, insist on sleeping with her, and hate the father as a rival. So far the innate memory-taboos have not been activated. But now the intra-mural drama rises to a terrible crashing crisis. The boy-infant of two or three, prevented from having intercourse with his mother, masturbates and is threatened by the father or father-substitute, as prescribed by racial history, with castration, by which Freud means the cutting off of the penis as well as the testicles. This drama is predestined by innate memory. Similarly predestined is the witnessing of the primal scene which finally convinces the little boy of what he has

suspected from seeing little girls naked (also predestined), namely, the reality of his threatened punishment. Little girls have been castrated. But to drive this reality home, the boy-child is fated to see his mother and father in the act of coitus (*a tergo*) which will reveal to him the absolute reality of castration. His mother has been castrated. From this fated witnessing, the boy's super-ego in the form of taboo memories is awakened, and his life-drama of opposing do-and-don't forces begins.

It is these predestined infantile experiences which are repressed and become part of the unconscious id and super-ego of each and every individual. And to trace associations and memories back to them constitutes the final objective of each full-scale psychoanalysis.

Here, then, are two layers of memories, one directly inherited and the other predestined to be experienced and repressed during the early life of the individual. Both allegedly harm the mental life of us all and appear in disguised symbolic form in our dreams, inadvertent behavior, and character traits, if not neurotic symptoms. Only familiarity with the universal language of the unconscious can translate these messages from the mental underworld and thereby reveal our real motivations and the irresistible force of mental dynamics. The techniques of psychoanalysis are the means whereby the imagery of the contradictory unconscious is gathered so that it may be translated by the art of symbol-reading and interpretation.

Freudianism filled the vacuum created by the hiatus in psychiatry, which in turn was rooted in the hiatus in higher cerebral physiology and pathophysiology, with a purely mental speculative solution of the problem of the human mind.

Freud, as he himself stated many times, was free to postulate any concept so long as it was not specifically disproven or disqualified by science. The hiatus in the physiology and pathophysiology of the higher parts of the brain left him free to adopt almost any hypothetical concept he needed. Actually the lack of knowledge of *instincts* and of the nature of *forgetting* constituted the essential specific ignorance on which Freud posited his system of thought. With regard to instincts he assumed that, in

addition to whatever else they are, they are tribal memories furnishing rough blueprints for the individual to recapitulate the pre-history of the human race. With regard to forgetting, he assumed that all forgetting is motivated by the necessity to repress the memories of the childhood of the race and of the individual and that only by such repressive-forgetting can civilization endure. Civilization is conceived as being the product of the repression of primitive and infantile memories which are powerfully charged and refuse to stay repressed. Thus civilization rests on a powder-keg of violent revolt, the revolt of the unconscious memories against their incarceration. The result is that neurotic character, the name for the unconscious revolt, is the price man pays for civilization. The extreme price is paid by those individuals who cannot maintain a neurotic character and therefore develop more or less severe neuroses or psychoses.

The theoretical transformation of instincts into innate racial memories and of forgetting into unconsciously motivated repressions constitutes the heart of Freudianism. Both transformations depended on temporary human ignorance, the one on ignorance of the nature of instincts, and the other on ignorance of the phenomenon of forgetting. These two forms of ignorance are historically rooted in the temporary limitation in cerebral physiology. That limitation is now at long last being overcome, and the temporary ignorance on which Freudianism is based is fast disappearing.

ON THE NATURE OF INSTINCTS

Over the past 50 years cerebral physiology has been quietly but steadily making great progress. It has been transformed into a separate science, the science of higher nervous activity. Building on the discoveries and principles of Ivan P. Pavlov, this science has now advanced to the point where, among other things, certain definite conclusions can be drawn with regard to the nature of instincts and the phenomenon of forgetting.¹

With regard to instincts, it was found that the word itself has been so overlaid with speculative and mysterious meanings as to render it useless as a scientific term. The term "unconditioned

reflex" is preferred. By "unconditioned reflex" is meant inborn reactions to general types of stimuli, such as nutritional, reproductive, defensive, investigatory, orientative, and the like. These innate reflexes are present at birth, latent or otherwise, and are described, as a result of decades of experimental work, as highly unspecific and generalized. As soon as they are activated by their external unconditioned environmental stimuli, they become inextricably interwoven with acquired "conditioned" reflexes. Life experiences transform the generalized, ineffective, and unspecified innate reflexes into concrete, effective, and specific reactions to appropriate aspects of the surrounding world. Thus the mammalian newborn, animal or human, which will at birth suck on any object soon "learns" to suck only on a mammary nipple.

Far from indicating that innate reflexes, or instincts, are therefore unimportant, the science of higher nervous activity pinpoints their indispensability as the absolute condition for all "learning," namely, the acquisition of acquired or conditioned reflexes. Only those stimuli which ultimately "satisfy" an "instinct" or unconditioned reflex are "learned," that is, become conditioned stimuli capable of eliciting the unconditioned response, for example, the nipple and the sucking reflex. The flow of milk into the mouth is the reinforcement of the connection between the stimulus and the innate reflex. With each reinforcement the connection becomes stronger. Conversely, any sensory stimulus which does not lead directly or indirectly to such reinforcement sets up a blockage or inhibition of connection between the stimulus and the unconditioned reflex. The action of such a stimulus is then said to be inhibited.

Innate or unconditioned reflexes can be simple, like that described above, or more complex, like the swallowing reflex or the various reproductive reflexes. In these more complex instances there is a chain of reflexes in which the reinforcement of one sets in motion the next, and so on. But in any case, the principle is the same. The unconditioned reflex, whether simple or highly complex, is general and unspecific and therefore ineffective without the embroidery of acquired experience in the form of conditioned reflexes.

Unconditioned reflexes, or instincts, if you will, are innate responses to the more permanent features of the animal and human environment, those which have remained more or less the same through tens and hundreds of thousands of years. The unconditioned reflexes, taken as a body, are those generalized and unspecific reactions to permanent features of the environment which are minimal equipment for survival of the species. They have in the course of the ages become congenital. They are general and unspecific in the sense that they do not blueprint the particular object which will "satisfy" them or the way in which it will "satisfy" them. Such specificity could not have led to survival in a world in which change is a basic feature, and in which only certain broad characteristics remain the same over long periods of time. Thus the sucking "instinct" does not specify a nipple, but only some object, any object whether bottle or breast, which will deliver a liquid into the mouth and set in motion the swallowing reflex chain.

Knowing that there must be some kind of innate equipment in the human makeup, and getting no help from the relevant sciences, Freud speculated that the mind of man is initially composed of racial memories of primitive experience. He was fully aware of what he was doing and stated flatly that since science could not tell him either about the nature of instincts or their number and type, he was free to choose among all the possibilities whatever suited his theoretical purpose. He chose to assume that there are two general sets of instincts, those centering around sex and those centering around death. The set of sex instincts he viewed as composed of racial memories of supposedly primitive forms of sex experience, each oriented around a specialized, mucous-membrane organ of the body: mouth, anus, and genitalia. Anything concerned with the functioning of these organs was then said to be sexual in character, for example, eating, defecating, and urinating. On this basis, Freud constructed an elaborate system in which each organ represented a phase of infantile sexual development: the oral-cannibalistic phase, the anal-sadistic phase, and the phallic phase. These phases were said to represent "moments" in the development of the human species as well as of

the modern individual. "Races" or individuals could either be fixated in one of these phases, or regress to it.

The Freudian elaboration of the libidinal set of instincts became labyrinthine. Not only were there said to be three phases of sexuality, but there were various predestined objects such as mother, father, sister, brother, members of the same sex, members of the opposite sex, and oneself. The possibilities, depending on the interrelation of instinctive predestination and the vicissitudes of life, were manifold. Relationships could be cannibalistic, sadistic, or masochistic, homosexual, heterosexual, incestuous, or onanistic (narcissistic), or any combination or modification of all the possibilities. The various phases and objects of the sex-instinct were said to be inherent in the unconscious of the modern individual as innate racial memories of primitive human experience. All were said to be highly charged with the "psychic energy" of the general sex drive. They demanded recognition and discharge.

The other set of racial memories was said to derive its energy from the alleged general death instinct, the drive toward destruction of oneself as well as others. The specific racial memories here were said to be of patricide, matricide, fratricide, homicide, and suicide.

Based on all these instinct-memories, with their supercharges of psychic energy, were on the one hand wishes for all forms of sex contact, with all three organs, and with all types of objects, and on the other wishes for the death of parents, siblings, friends, and self. As if this picture were not sufficiently complex, Freud viewed another unconscious section of the mind, the super-ego, as containing specific taboos and prohibitions on all the sex and death drives, phases, objects, and wishes. The taboos, like the drives and wishes, were said to be highly charged with psychic energy and to be therefore pressing with great force for recognition and action.

In this manner Freud filled the vacuum formed by the hiatus in the relevant sciences with regard to inborn human endowments. It was a highly imaginative theatrical production with unconscious racial-memory drives and unconscious racial-memory taboos pitted against one another, neither of which would brook

denial and both of which contained sufficient power to force the issues. The human mind was represented as being the scene of a dramatic internecine battle between equally matched antagonists. There could be no victory between such dark, primitive, and elemental forces. The effect could only be to catch the ego, the self of man, in between the eternal battlelines of the two unconquerable foes—the primeval do's and don'ts of man's pre-history.

FREUDIANISM AND THE NATURE OF FORGETTING

This picture, however, was a description of only one-half of man's predicament, the half based on innate racial memories. The other half, according to Freud, was composed of the unconscious evolutions and traumatic confrontations of the two dark forces as they struggled within the mind of the human infant between the ages of one and three. The memories of the experiences and wishes of this infantile drama were said to be repressed by the child as totally inadmissible and self-annihilating. The child was said to be unconsciously motivated to repress the memories of the infantile drama in self-defense. The result was held to be still another level of dramatic struggle between irrepressible forces. The childhood memories were charged, it was maintained, with the same psychic energy as the drives and taboos, and therefore waged a constant battle for recognition and release. The unconscious and powerful guardians in the super-ego and ego had to spend a commensurate amount of energy to keep the infantile memories, as well as the racial memories, repressed. These, however, when repulsed in their frontal attack, assumed disguises and took advantage of periods of lowered vigilance, in sleep and in undirected associations and behavior, to slip past the censorial guardians to appear in dreams, free associations, transferences, slips of tongue and pen, and in witticisms and behavioral mannerisms, and universally in neurotic character formations.

All human behavior was viewed as being motivated by the complex and intertwined two-level drama being enacted in the individual human mind: the never-ending battle among the innate unconscious memories of drives and taboos and the incessant

battle between the infantile memories and their repression. The former can be characterized as the war of counterposed instincts and the latter as the war of repressed infantile memories. If the one "war" filled the vacuum created by lack of scientific knowledge of instincts, the other filled the vacuum formed by the hiatus in man's knowledge of acquired mental activity, especially of the phenomenon of forgetting.

Just as Freud assumed that modern man's mind is stocked at birth with memories of what had supposedly taken place in his early history, so he likewise assumed that the individual adult mind is stocked with memories of what supposedly had taken place in infancy and childhood. It was assumed that memories, whether of racial or of infantile experience, not only remained in the mind, but contained inherent energy as active agents. Put in another way, any experience of man, as a species or as an individual, which had been "forgotten," was not in fact forgotten at all, but had simply been pushed out of consciousness into a place in the mind reserved for such mental phenomena, a place called "the unconscious." In this lower-depth cavern the memories, now more active and alive than ever, carried on a perpetual revolt against their repressed status. This revolt was then said to be the motivation underlying all acts and thoughts of the conscious person. He might *think* he was acting for some conscious motive while in fact his act and his conscious motive were determined by the status of the double war in his unconscious.

Here again, as with instincts, Freud has taken advantage of temporary ignorance, this time the ignorance of forgetting in particular and of the nature of acquired mental phenomena in general. If there is no real knowledge, then it may *sound* reasonable to speak of mental phenomena such as ideas, wishes, memories, motivations, and the like on the analogy of physical things. Of physical objects it is perfectly legitimate to speak of where they are and to assume that if they are not *here* they must be *there*. Of living organisms it is likewise perfectly legitimate to speak of their energy and self-motion. Of human beings it is legitimate to speak of motivations and strivings, and of crafty designing and the use of witty disguises and of tactics, strategies, and

cunning strategems. Freud applies all these categories, legitimate enough in their own sphere, to mental phenomena.

He treats mental phenomena as material objects: If they are not *here* they must be *there*. When they are not consciously entertained, when they are forgotten, he says, they are forced for some unconscious motive into that "place" in the mind reserved for them. The unconscious is the spatial location of the racially and individually "forgotten" drives, motives, desires, wishes, and memories. It is where they "go" when they are forgotten, that is, "repressed." Freud endows these "material object" mental phenomena with self-propelling motion called "psychic energy," as though they were living organisms. And finally he views the energized, living "organisms" of mental phenomena as "human beings" with purposeful activity directed toward outwitting other mental phenomena.

In short, Freud hypostatizes and anthropomorphizes the memories and the desires and wishes allegedly based on them. This has, of course, been the classic speculative method of replacing ignorance with mythical explanations. Ancient peoples accounted for the stars and their motions by picturing them as gods in human form with all the attributes of man. Freud accounts for mental phenomena by picturing them as dark gods with the attributes of man: purposeful activity, cunning, and plotting design. Like all mythology, Freud's *does* succeed in giving a storybook account of the real but unknown phenomena of forgetting. Again like mythology, the stories are imaginative and intriguing, more akin to art than science. But they do not help man to understand the world or himself; on the contrary they mislead him and stand in the path of knowledge. Science advances not only from specific knowledge to further specific knowledge, but must at the same time and at each step combat ignorance and the mythical explanations rooted in it.

The science of higher nervous activity already in the half-century of its existence has made sufficient progress to render completely untenable Freud's mythical speculations about the nature and dynamics of mental life. The science has made a bare beginning, but that beginning suffices to undercut fanciful, short-

cut explanations. A science, once it has established even a limited body of experimental facts and verified laws, however incomplete, is thereby enabled to repudiate utterly and forever those speculative theories which had rushed into the vacuum created by any given temporary gap in human knowledge. Astronomy, for example, did not have to be completed as a science before it could disprove and replace astral mythology and astrology. On the contrary, so soon as a limited number of facts and laws had been discovered, it was recognized by scientists and other forward-looking minds that mythology in the form of astrology was completely and forever discredited and must be cast out of the human mind as nothing but a product of man's ignorance of the nature and motion of the stars. It is still a fact that astral mythology has answers of some kind to questions which astronomy cannot yet answer. Does that mean that man should go on believing in astrological accounts until science can answer the particular question? On the contrary, the limited body of astronomical knowledge sweeps away *all* mythical tales of the stars and their courses, relegating the latter to the most backward elements living in the intellectual interstices of society—those who still, in their private ignorance, order their lives and pick their daily doubles according to astrological charts. The science of higher nervous activity, while it cannot as yet furnish answers to many of the most important and relevant detailed questions, is able nonetheless to make a number of generalizations based on firmly established facts and laws, which together furnish the basis for denying such speculations as Freud's while at the same time they point the direction in which all the detailed questions will eventually find their answers. Science is slow-moving, but fortunately for man a little genuine knowledge is sufficient to arm him in the constant struggle against ignorance and against the mythical explanations based thereon. The latter are highly vulnerable, only strong in appearance, and that only just so long as the ignorance lasts.

Enough is already known of the nature of mental phenomena to abolish forever the notion that ideas, emotions, volitions, memories, and the like can be dealt with on the analogy of physical objects and living organisms. Materialist philosophers have long

maintained that mental life is not a thing but a *function*, a function of matter organized in a certain way, a function of the human nervous system including especially the higher parts of the brain. Only in the past 50 years, however, has science succeeded in discovering the nature of the cerebral functioning which is mental activity.

The mind is the functioning of the brain, nothing else. Higher nervous activity is mental activity. The unit of higher nervous or mental activity, the "cell" as it were, is the conditioned reflex. The conditioned reflex in its simplest cellular form is, roughly speaking, a more or less temporary nervous connection between any sensory stimulus from the external environment and an innate unconditioned reflex in animal or man. In such a case the conditioned stimulus in the form of a sensory signal from a distance produces the same response as would an immediate tactile unconditioned stimulus. On this simple functional base the entire complexity of animal and human activity is constructed.

Animal behavior is limited to the interweaving of sensory signals and innate reflexes, which in itself is intricately elaborate, including the subtlest distinctions between accidental stimuli in the animal environment. Animal "learning" in all its myriad forms is a continuous, life-long process of making and blocking connections, of excitation and inhibition. The two aspects of this process account for all animal behavior, from the simplest to the most complex, from salivating to finding food or a mate, fleeing from an enemy, affection for a master, or learning circus tricks. Animal mental or psychic activity is this higher nervous more or less temporary conditioned reflex activity with its twin aspects of excitation and inhibition. What a given animal does, learns, and "forgets" is not determined by this nervous activity alone but by interaction with its life-experiences within its environment. The science of higher nervous activity accounts for animal behavior in terms of nervous functioning and adaptation to surrounding life conditions. In the rigidly controlled environment of the laboratory, the scientist can make, block, and elaborate conditioned connections at will in the animal. He can likewise at will, through overtraining the animal nervous system by excessive or conflict-

ing stimuli, produce nervous breakdown and neuroses. Again at will, the scientist can restore the animal patient to full psychic mental or higher nervous health.

The past 50 or 60 years of steady progress in understanding the higher nervous activity of animals, in both psychic health and psychic illness, has accumulated far more than a sufficient body of facts and laws to put completely to rout all anthropomorphic and mythical notions of animal behavior. No longer is there any vacuum of ignorance into which can pour vague theories of mysterious animal "intelligence," "insight," or predetermined instinctive antagonisms and predatory natures. Animal mythology is banished forever, and persists only in the pockets of private ignorance—and in fairy tales where it will always have a rightful place.

If this is true of animals and, since man is an animal, it would follow simply by inference that man's psychic life is likewise explicable in terms of the science of higher nervous activity. Such a line of reasoning was followed by the science several decades ago with the result that the science of *human* higher nervous activity came into being and has made steady progress. It was found that in so far as man is an animal, the cell of his mental life is the same as that of the animal psyche, the conditioned reflex. This cell, however, is not only elaborated into quantitatively more complex psychic activity, but there is a great difference in kind. The qualitative difference between human and animal higher nervous functioning consists in the fact that man is not limited to the sensory conditioned reflex system but has in addition the verbal or language system. Where, in the animal, sensory stimuli become signals standing for objects in the environment, in the human being words function as signals which in turn signal sensory stimuli. Where animals react to sense stimuli as though the physical object were in direct contact, man reacts to word stimuli as though the sense stimuli were acting. In this way the conditioned-reflex cell is elaborated into the unbelievably complex mental life characteristic only of man. Conditioned connections are established and blocked between a myriad of more or less temporary sensory and verbal stimuli.

Learning is the process of the formation of new sensory and/or verbal temporary conditioned connections or associations. Forgetting is a process of extinction of such connections either through the cessation of the significance of the association or the replacement of the connection by new associations. The formation of new sensory or verbal connections, the extinction of old connections, and the constant renewal of already formed connections, are the higher nervous processes underlying the human phenomena of learning, forgetting, and remembering. All three are equally important for both healthy functioning and effective living.

The question with regard to where ideas or emotions or volitions go when they are not present as activated connections in the brain is meaningless. When not before the mind in conscious attention, or on the periphery of attention, cerebral connections are inactive and hence associations simply disappear. This is the case because they are connections between stimuli and when the stimuli are absent so also is the active actual cerebral connection or association. The potentiality of the connection between words or between images, or between words and images or images and words, exists in the higher nervous functioning, but the actual concrete cerebral functioning takes place only under the appropriate stimuli. Neither images nor words have physical being, but are temporary nervous connections between sensory stimuli and objects, or between words and sensory stimuli.

Ideas, emotions, volitions, memories, and the like do not "go" into some cavern at the back of the "mind" and there, charged with energy, beat against the gates to consciousness. They cease as soon as cerebral functioning ceases. They may disappear forever as in effective total forgetting, or they may disappear for long periods of time because the associated stimuli are inactive. They may be "recalled" after an extended interlude, if a connected stimulus is presented, from outside or from within as a chain of associations.

The mental phenomenon of forgetting is embedded in the nature and functioning of the higher nervous system. Absence of associated stimuli, absence of reinforcement of the conditioned

connection, or substitution of new connections suffice in animals and man to extinguish nervous connections between stimulus and response.

These are established facts, but they were not established when psychoanalysis was born. Without such facts, Freud assumed (1) that nothing is ever forgotten in the sense that it ceases to exist; (2) that forgetting is an *act*, conscious or unconscious, which is caused by some motive, for example, to avoid painful or disturbing memories, impulses or ideas; (3) that forgetting is therefore always "repression," the pushing of memories, as physical objects, into a place called the unconscious at the back of the mind, and (4) finally, that the repressed unconscious memories are charged with psychic energy and therefore are empowered to force entry into consciousness by devious means.

Before science had established the relevant facts there seemed to be nothing inherently wrong with this Freudian theory of forgetting, for there was nothing to gainsay it. But once the facts had been discovered, the entire theory was seen to be a bold fabrication from beginning to end. *First*, where Freud maintains that nothing is forgotten in the sense of extinguished, it is found that not only does such forgetting (extinguishing) take place, but that it is just as vital and just as common a process as both learning and remembering. *Second*, forgetting is not for the most part a motivated act at all, but a natural feature of higher nervous functioning. "For the most part" is added because it is true that we do often *try* to forget what is painful or disturbing, and such attempts are conscious and motivated. The only way we can be successful in this, however, is to extinguish the association either by eliminating the connected stimuli or by substituting new associations. If the attempts are unsuccessful, it does not mean that the memory is repressed into some unconscious place at the back of our minds, but on the contrary that associated stimuli keep the connections operative. It is these motivated attempts which furnish some semblance of credibility to the Freudian theory of forgetting as always motivated repression. It is, however, only *appearance* which seems to buttress Freud's view. Actually, even motivated forgetting, according to the findings of the science of higher

nervous activity, follows the general laws of all extinguishing of conditioned connections. *Third*, contrary to Freud's contention that all forgetting is motivated repression, the science of higher nervous activity has found that no forgetting is repression in the Freudian sense of the term. Motivated forgetting is not repression, but is the attempt to extinguish conditional connections or associations, whether successful or unsuccessful.

In the place of Freud's dictum that it is dangerous to repress, it should be said that it is dangerous not to forget what should be forgotten. It is both healthy and wise to forget and even to try to forget what deserves to be forgotten. It might be added that knowledge of the facts and laws of the higher nervous process of extinguishing cerebral connections and therefore associations can help one to be successful in the attempt to forget what is better forgotten. Thus Freud's warning against repression is dangerous to the health and wellbeing of mankind. It is not only mistaken advice based on ignorance, but it is bad advice and should be categorically repudiated. *Fourth*, there is no basis whatever for Freud's contention that repressed unconscious memories and the like are charged with energy and are therefore empowered to force their way into consciousness directly or under disguises. The "power," if one can use such a term, of associations resides in the strength of the established conditioned connections. The strength of such connections depends on their frequency and meaningfulness. This strength of the conditioned connections is the *appearance* which lends credibility to Freud's notion of cathexis or charge of psychic energy attached to memories. The appearance, however, is accounted for, not as Freud supposed by some mysterious mental energy, analogous to physical energy, but by the actual ways in which conditioned connections are strengthened, as discovered experimentally by the science of higher nervous activity.

Starting from appearances Freud tried to account for memory and forgetting by means of imaginative speculations constructed into fanciful theories. His theories of racial memories and repressions, of infantile memories and repressions, and of memories repressed (forgotten) during a lifetime, comprise the central assumptions of his system of psychoanalysis. The science of higher

nervous activity undercuts the Freudian speculations by supplying the basis on which scientific explanations of instincts (so-called racial memories) and forgetting can be found. The hiatus in cerebral physiology by now has been overcome to an extent sufficient to render completely untenable Freud's short-cut, interim, fanciful "explanations" of the two elemental and decisive mental-cerebral phenomena of remembering (conditioned connections) and forgetting (adaptive inhibition or extinction of conditioned connections).

FUTURE OF CLASSICAL PSYCHOANALYSIS

Many surface phenomena of life in the United States appear to lend credence to the Freudian unconscious mental constructs whereas in fact the existence of the phenomena is completely irrelevant as evidence for Freud's constructs. The social sciences, digging below appearances to essential matters, indicate clearly that Freud's speculative explanations are overdetermined, far too intricate and devious, and altogether fanciful. He reversed the true order of things by looking to the human mind for the key to social phenomena. Actually, of course, society shapes the human mind, with its thoughts, feelings, and behavior, while the latter in turn act back again on the social environment.

In these and other ways the Freudian approach distorts the view of mind, society, and the relation between the two. In this sense, it constitutes an impediment to the understanding of the individual and the social environment. Orthodox and revised psychoanalysis is a liability in the United States. In so many areas—psychology, psychiatry, child development, education, sociology, anthropology, philosophy, and the creative and mass arts—it acts as a misleading body of ideas and establishes blocks in the path of knowledge and progress.

The prognosis for the future is mixed. The influence of Freudianism is still growing while at the same time counter-tendencies are gathering momentum and in the long run should stem the tide, reverse it, and eventually eliminate it as a major influence. These counter-Freudian tendencies originate in two sources: first, the internal contradictions developing within psychoanalysis it-

self; and second, the external contradictions between psychoanalysis and rapidly expanding knowledge in a number of fields. With regard to the latter, a combination of the social sciences and the relevant natural sciences—especially the physiology and pathophysiology of higher nervous activity—together with the mediating social-natural science of psychology, has already amassed a body of facts and laws which renders Freudianism completely untenable, incredible, and obsolete. This external contradiction acts constantly to undercut the psychoanalytic theories and exerts greater and greater pressure on the internal contradictions within psychoanalysis, forcing the latter to move further and further away from its original Freudian form.

The first step in the internal development of psychoanalysis was, as we have seen, to eliminate the alleged primitive racial sources of the innate Freudian structures. This broke the monolithic unity of Freud's system and set up a contradiction between innate memories and the rejection of the alleged primal horde events which were held to be the source of the memories.

Revised psychoanalysis attempted to retain the innate memory-structures while abandoning as untenable their referents in the pre-history of man. Only an ostrich policy could avoid awareness of the inconsistency. Already within revised psychoanalysis a tendency had arisen stressing acquired ego defenses and secondary ego processes in addition to innate pre-determined mental activity.

The *reformists* seized on this new emphasis, transformed it into an alternative and repudiated all inborn mental structures and racial memories. They resolved the contradiction in revised psychoanalysis by denying phylogenetic instincts and concentrating entirely on ontogenetic ego-defenses. Thus the external contradiction between Freud's closed system and those segments of human knowledge excluded from it set in motion an internal contradiction within Freudianism itself. This internal contradiction impelled certain more conscientious and daring analytical theorists to disengage themselves from the ostrich policy and to repudiate both innate memories and their primitive sources, thereby eliminating the contradiction.

The nature of the ego-defenses which the reformists substituted in the place of innate racial memories, together with the new contradictions, both external and internal, that arose therefrom, is the subject matter of the following chapters in Part II.

PART II

REFORMED PSYCHOANALYSIS

Chapter 5

KAREN HORNEY

The two leading psychoanalytic reformists are German-born.* The late Karen Horney and Erich Fromm began their analytical practice on the continent, but migrated to the United States in the 'thirties. Almost all their theoretical development took place in this country and their books were written and published here. Thus they may legitimately be considered as part of the American psychoanalytic scene.

Karen Horney was the first, apart from the original defectors, notably Adler and Jung, to break with major aspects of Freudian theory. She continued to be a leading figure in the reformist movement until her death.

Horney was born in Germany in 1885, but lived and practiced in New York City since 1932. At first she was a strict Freudian analyst, and when she came to this country was a member of both the American and the New York Psychoanalytic Societies. Doubts began to develop, however, and by 1937 had grown to such pro-

* A third leading psychoanalytic reformist is American-born Harry Stack Sullivan. Sullivan, however, was not trained as a psychoanalyst and never adopted the Freudian terminology. He developed his own system and terms, a fact which renders his writings, limited as they are, almost completely unintelligible to all but the initiate. For this reason his "school" is not discussed in this section. His conceptual framework, nevertheless, follows the general pattern of reformed psychoanalysis. He employs the cultural matrix of "interpersonal relations" as the means of establishing the compulsive dynamisms that allegedly determine mental activity. The basic concepts of psychoanalysis, such as unconscious motivation, censorship, repression and catharsis, follow from his interpersonal premises. Thus the conclusions from the analysis of Horney and Fromm apply equally to Sullivan.

portions that they erupted and were crystalized in her first book, *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time*. Since then she has written four additional volumes, each more critical of certain Freudian features than the last.¹ In the course of her development she broke with the Freudian Psychoanalytic Societies and founded her own rival "school," The Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis, located in New York City and having its own training institute and its own publication, *The American Journal of Psychoanalysis*. She had been a Lecturer from time to time at the New School for Social Research, where in classes many of her critical evaluations and original contributions were tried out prior to publication.

There appear to have been two particular influences, in addition to those general factors noted earlier, that channeled her thinking away from the orthodox Freudian approach. First, she experienced a number of significant differences between her work as an analyst in New York and on the European continent. Gradually over a period of years she was forced to recognize these divergences as the result of cultural differences between Europe and America. This focused her attention on the important role of environmental factors, as opposed to the innate, "instinctual" determinations stressed by classical psychoanalysis. Second, and perhaps for her the most decisive, she could not bring herself to accept the Freudian theory of "female psychology." Understandably in this age of the progressive emancipation of women, she came more and more into open conflict with and revolt against Freud's rationale for female inferiority and male superiority in the form of penis envy and the formula of penis-man-baby as the woman's fated way out of the Oedipus complex. This latter influence proved to be the opening wedge which broke through the Freudian instinct theories, while the German-American contrast pointed the direction of the solution along cultural rather than innate lines.

Of these two turning points in her career she wrote, "When I came to the United States in 1932, I saw that the attitudes and the neuroses of persons in this country differed in many ways from those I had observed in European countries, and that only the

difference in civilization could account for this."² Her starting point, however, had been more particular: "I had my first doubts as to the validity of psychoanalytical theories when I read Freud's concept of feminine psychology."³ And she specifies, "Freud's postulations in regard to feminine psychology set me thinking about the role of cultural factors. Their influence on our ideas of what constitutes masculinity or femininity was obvious, and it became just as obvious to me that Freud had arrived at certain erroneous conclusions because he failed to take them into account." From these two reactions she concluded that "neuroses are brought about by cultural factors."⁴

HORNEY'S CRITIQUE OF FREUD

This conclusion, of course, brought her into sharp conflict with the basic principles of Freudian theory. One after another the classical psychoanalytic shibboleths toppled under Horney's new cultural orientation. For once the Freudian instinctual premises were challenged, the systematic edifice was shaken from bottom to top. Grant the biologically innate drives, phases, and complexes and the rest of Freud follows by logically cogent inference. Repudiate them and the logic flies apart in disintegrative anarchy. "The system of theories which Freud has gradually developed," she wrote in 1939, "is so consistent that when one is once entrenched in them it is difficult to make observations unbiased by his way of thinking. It is only through recognizing the debatable premises on which this system is built that one acquires a clearer vision as to the sources of error contained in the individual theories."⁵ Horney was in a position to know first hand the Freudian bias, since she practiced classical psychoanalysis for more than 15 years in Europe and America. But once begun, the questioning persisted until she found her own answers.

In her practice she found that almost every patient presented problems for which accepted psychoanalysis offered no means of solution, and which therefore remained unsolved. At first she attributed the resulting uncertainty to her own lack of experience and the limitations of her own Freudian understanding. She pestered her colleagues with questions such as what Freud or they

understood by "ego," why sadistic impulses were interrelated with "anal libido," and why so many trends were regarded as an expression of latent homosexuality—without obtaining answers that in any way satisfied her.⁶ Emboldened by the findings of the cultural anthropologists, especially Malinowski and Mead, and impressed and encouraged by the sociological orientation of Fromm's early German papers, Horney finally in 1937 published some of her critical conclusions and developing positive convictions in her first book. In *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time*, attention is focused on "the specific cultural conditions under which we live." There are incidental individual experiences, but "In actual fact the cultural conditions not only lend weight and color to the individual experiences but in the last analysis determine their particular form." As an illustration of this cultural orientation she cites the fact that it is an *individual fate* to have a "domineering" or "self-sacrificing" mother, but it is only under *definite cultural conditions* that domineering or self-sacrificing mothers are found at all, and it is only because of these existing conditions that such an experience will have a later influence on adult life.⁷

From the vantage point of such a culture-oriented position, Horney criticizes Freud on two related points: First, "his overemphasis on the biological origin of mental characteristics," and second, "Freud's disregard of cultural factors" which "not only leads to false generalizations, but to a large extent blocks an understanding of the real forces which motivate our attitudes and actions." These points are clearly two aspects of the same criticism. Freud disregarded cultural factors precisely because he overemphasized the innate instinctual apparatus. As a result Horney maintained that Freudianism has followed a dead-end path. "I believe," she says, "that this disregard is the main reason why psychoanalysis, inasmuch as it faithfully follows the theoretical paths beaten by Freud, seems in spite of its seemingly boundless potentialities to have come into a blind alley, manifesting itself in a rank growth of abstruse theories and the use of a shadowy terminology." In general, she indicts Freud for believing that the standards of behavior, attitudes and feelings peculiar to a definite

"culture, period, class and sex" are biologically inherent in human nature always and everywhere, regardless of "culture, period, class and sex." She charges that Freud employs a spurious biology to obtain absolute universality for his "observations" and theories. "It is no longer valid," she states, "to suppose that a new psychological finding reveals a universal trend inherent in human nature." As an example of this Freudian tendency, she falls back on her personal quarrel with him. She notes that Freud held that women were more jealous than men and recounts his argument transforming this cultural phenomenon of a particular period and class into a biologically determined universal feature of womankind: "Freud propounds the theory that the anatomical sexual differences inevitably lead every girl to envy a boy his possession of the penis. Later on her wish to possess a penis is transformed to a wish to possess a man as the carrier of a penis. She then begrudges other women their relations with men, more accurately their possession of men, as she originally had begrudged the boy his possession of a penis." And Horney goes on to chastise Freud for such views: "In making statements like these Freud is yielding to the temptation of his time: to make generalizations about human nature for the whole of mankind, though his generalization grows from the observation of only one cultural zone." In support of her charge, she cites the cultural anthropologist who would question the universality of an observation of "a certain part of the population of a certain culture made at a certain time."

Horney sums up her position vis-a-vis Freud: "When we realize the great import of cultural conditions on neuroses the biological and anatomical conditions, which are considered by Freud to be their root, recede into the background." And she adds, "The influence of these latter factors should be considered only on the basis of well established evidence." The implication is strong that Freud had a woeful lack of such evidence.⁸

It was in such terms as these that Horney criticized Freud and his theories of instinct in her first book. While it remains at a general level, it is nonetheless promising and effective. Far more telling, however, is the specific indictment in her one book di-

rectly aimed at refuting Freud's instinctual premises, *New Ways in Psychoanalysis*.

As a result of *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time*, Horney had been subjected to the standard and universal built-in defense mechanism of classical psychoanalysis, one employed consistently by Freud and his followers to disarm and disconcert their critics. Its substance is that resistance to the libido theory is in actuality resistance to the critic's own repressed sexual and aggressive drives. Defense then consists in psychoanalyzing the critic. At the very outset of *New Ways in Psychoanalysis* Horney puts this defense mechanism in its place. "The resistance," she says, "which many psychiatrists as well as laymen feel toward orthodox psychoanalysis is due not only to emotional sources, as is assumed, but also to the debatable character of many theories."

Horney maintains flatly that analysts should "cut loose from certain historically determined theoretical premises and discard the theories arising on that basis." Among the premises that should be discarded she singles out those which established psychoanalysis as an *instinctive* and as a *genetic* psychology. Along with these, the *structural division of the mind into id, ego, and super-ego* must be eliminated, she holds. Rejection of these major premises entails the repudiation of all those theories constructed on their basis. Among these are, according to Horney: the *libido theory* with all its subsidiary sexual instinct theories; the death and aggressive instinct theories; the pre-determining role of childhood with its infantile sexual oral, anal, and genital phases, its fixations, regressions, and repetition compulsions; the concept of narcissism; the Oedipus complex and its extensive ramifications; the entire range of Freudian feminine psychology and the sexual etiology of neuroses. Formidable as this list is, it is by no means exhaustive of those Freudian concepts and theories that are repudiated by Horney. She does not bother to mention such archaic theories as the primal horde myth, the innate primordial language, phylogenetic memories, and the racial unconscious, since these had long since been effectively eliminated by the revisionists. Of the theories based on the three rejected premises, she says, "All these theories are open to criticism and must be regarded

rather as an historical burden which psychoanalysis carries than as its pivotal center."⁹

Horney devotes a chapter of *New Ways in Psychoanalysis* to each of the major rejected theories, indicating her criticisms and reasons for repudiation. While all of them are important, compelling, and definitely worthy of attention, we cannot here follow her arguments in each case. Alternatively, we select three for brief examination as examples of her cogent reasoning; her discussions of the libido theory, the Oedipus complex, and the pre-determining role of childhood. In addition we will summarize her conclusions with regard to one of Freud's underlying philosophical biases.

Horney points out that the libido theory contains two basic doctrines, one of which can be called *pan-sexualism* and the other *the transformation of the sexual instinct*.

Pan-sexualism is the Freudian doctrine that enlarges the concept of sexuality to include all bodily sensations of a pleasurable nature together with strivings toward them. In evidence Freud cites three sets of observations. First, he points out that a baby's expression of satisfaction after being nursed is similar to that of a person after intercourse, to which Horney answers that no one has ever doubted that pleasure can be derived from sucking, eating, walking, and the like, but the fact that all are pleasurable does not bear witness to the sexual nature of sucking, eating, walking—unless one has already granted that all pleasure is sexual. Therefore this "evidence" is no evidence. Second, Freud points to the variety of factors which may stimulate sexual excitement or may become the condition for satisfaction such as fantasy, voyeurism, or cruelty. "But he has not proved," Horney declares, "that these factors themselves are sexual. Furthermore, invalid inferences are involved in his reasoning. From the fact that certain types derive sexual satisfaction from witnessing acts of cruelty it 'does not follow that cruelty is an integral part of the sexual drive in general.'" As a third type of evidence for pan-sexualism, Freud points out that sometimes non-sexual bodily cravings may alternate with sexual hunger, for example, compulsive eating as a substitute for sexual intercourse. Horney makes short shrift of this, too: "Freud

has neglected as a possible explanation that fact that a substitution of one pleasure striving for another does not prove that the second is in any way akin to the first." As an illustration of Freud's faulty reasoning on this point, she notes that if a monkey cannot obtain a banana and finds a substitute in swinging, this is not conclusive evidence (or any evidence at all) that the swinging is a component drive of eating, or of the pleasure found in eating.

Horney has refuted all three sets of evidence submitted by Freud in support of the pan-sexual feature of the libido theory, and she accordingly draws her conclusion: "In view of all the above considerations it is to be concluded that the libido concept is unproved." And she adds, "What is offered as evidence consists of unwarranted analogies and generalizations, and the validity of the data concerning the erotogenic zones is highly dubitable."¹⁰

Horney is particularly concerned with the libido theory because through it Freud not only extends the notion of sex to cover all pleasurable feelings, but more importantly derives almost all character traits, attitudes, and personality features from it. He suggests several ways in which the sexual libido molds character and attitudes, among them by *aim-inhibited sexual drives* and by *sublimation of such drives*. Thus on the one hand any kind of striving for power or self-assertion is interpreted as an aim-inhibited expression of sadistic drives, and any kind of affection becomes an aim-inhibited expression of sexual desires, while any kind of submissive attitude becomes an expression of a latent passive homosexuality. On the other hand, the term *sublimation* is reserved mostly for the transformation of pre-genital drives into nonsexual attitudes and traits. Accordingly, such character traits as stinginess are said to be a form of sublimated anal-erotic pleasure consisting of holding the faeces; pleasure in painting is a desexualized pleasure in playing with faeces; while sexual curiosity may be sublimated into a propensity for doing scientific research.

In these and other ways Freud ascribes to the sexual libido an overwhelming influence in psychic life. Horney asks "whether sexuality actually has as much influence on character as Freud assumes."¹¹ She examines the evidence and in each case emerges

with a negative answer. She concludes: "It is, of course, tempting to an instinct theorist, when finding that organic manifestations such as those mentioned (tight lips and tight anal sphincter) are often combined with similar psychic attitudes (stinginess), to regard the former as the instinctual basis and the latter as emanating from it in one way or another. As a matter of fact it is more than tempting; on the basis of the theoretical premises of an instinct theory not much more evidence than the combined occurrences of the two series of factors is required to prove a causal connection."

In short, she charges Freud with a *post hoc, ipso hoc* fallacy, a most serious infraction of logical and scientific procedure. Such an argument succeeds only when the conclusion is already agreed to in the premise, in this case when the reader is already convinced of the truth of the instinct and libido theories. "If one does not share these premises, however," Horney continues, "the frequent coincidence of these traits is no proof at all. It is as little proof as the frequent coincidence of tears and grief is proof that grief is an emotional result of tears, as was assumed by former instinct theorists [notably by William James and Carl Lange—*H. K. W.*]. To-day we would assume that tears are a physical expression of grief, and not that grief is an emotional result of tears." Horney therefore rejects Freud's basic contention of the libido theory, that sexuality has the power to determine and does determine character.

Having refuted the individual elements of the libido theory, Horney draws her conclusion with regard to the theory as a whole: "In short, then, the libido theory in all its contentions is unsubstantiated." And she adds that "This is the more remarkable since it is one of the cornerstones on which psychoanalytical thinking and therapy rest." She calls the libido theory "arbitrary," "unwarranted," "gross," a "harmful illusion" and a "real danger." It is a "danger" because of its assumption that man is driven to fulfill certain primary biologically given needs and that these are powerful enough to exert a decisive influence on his personality and thus on his life as a whole. This assumption is what constitutes the real danger of the libido theory. Its main characteristic and its main deficiency lie in the fact that "it is an instinct

theory." The trouble with Freud's as with all instinct theories is, according to Horney, that they distort the relation between subject or "ego" and environment, making the former in the last analysis absolutely decisive and the latter merely a medium for instinctual satisfaction or frustration. They completely underestimate cultural factors as a result of a one-sided stress on instincts. The instinct theories are, she maintains, an attempt "to understand a whole machine out of one wheel."

Repudiation of the libido theory entails a sharp criticism of the *Oedipus complex* as one of its most essential products. Horney does not shrink from the obligation. She first describes the Freudian Oedipus constellation as a biologically determined sexual attraction to the parent of the opposite sex with a concomitant jealousy toward the other. The incestuous sexual desires directed toward the parent vary in nature according to the stages or phases of libidinal development, oral-cannibal, anal-sadistic, and finally genital. Freud, himself, was forced to make two further assumptions when in the great majority of persons no trace could be found of the Oedipus complex, and in others there was an attachment to the parent of the same sex.

Of the first, Horney says, "Finding no traces of the Oedipus complex in the majority of healthy adults, Freud assumed that in these persons the complex had been successfully repressed, a conclusion which is not convincing to those who do not share Freud's belief in the biological and therefore ubiquitous nature of the complex." Of the second assumption she says, "Furthermore, finding many instances in which the major tie occurred between mother and daughter, or father and son, Freud propounded an enlargement of the concept according to which the homosexual—inverted—Oedipus complex is equal in importance to the heterosexual—normal—one." Given his belief or advocacy of the libido instinct theory, Freud had to uphold the universal character of the Oedipus complex. If the latter is biologically determined, then it is unavoidable, and *all* persons must undergo it. If most appear not to, then a device or devices must be found to show that appearance notwithstanding they do all undergo the Oedipus complex. Such theoretically required devices are found

in the assumption that there are no traces of the Oedipus constellation because it has been "successfully repressed," and in the further assumption of the "homosexual or inverted Oedipus complex." This pair of assumptions covers all possible cases—and they are by far the great majority—which could offer evidence against the ubiquity of the complex. In this way Freud sought to build an impregnable wall around his pivotal notion of the Oedipus complex.

Again the only way to breach the wall is to undermine it, that is, deny the premises on which the entire argument rests. That premise is, of course, the libido instinct theory under which the Oedipus complex is assumed to be biologically determined and therefore universal. "Freud's conviction of the ubiquitous occurrence of the Oedipus complex rests on the presuppositions given by the libido theory, so much so that anyone accepting the libido theory must accept also the doctrine of the universality of the Oedipus complex. As indicated before, according to the libido theory every human relationship is based ultimately on instinctual drives." Denying the one, Horney discards the other. Her contention is that "the Oedipus complex is not of a biological nature" and that to hold that it is constitutes "an unwarranted belief." She concludes: "We discard the theoretical implications of the theory."

The Oedipus complex is only one in a long list of influential doctrines posited by Freud on the basis of the libido instinct theory. Among these others the one with perhaps the most far-reaching implications for practical analysis and therapy, as well as for such applied fields as child development and education, is the doctrine of the *pre-determining role of childhood*. This doctrine involves, according to Horney, two fundamental assumptions, the *timelessness of the unconscious* and the *repetition compulsion*. Together these two assumptions constitute the "evidence" whereby Freud sustains the doctrine of the pre-determining role of childhood. The latter signifies not only that the infantile past determines the adult present but that the present contains nothing except the past, that the adult-present, in brief, is primarily a repetition of the child-past.¹²

To uphold such a theory of adult repetition of childhood experiences, two elements are, according to Horney, required: one, a biologically innate and unchanging infantile template, and two, an irresistible biological drive to replicate this template over and over again. The first is supplied by Freud's doctrine of the *timelessness of the unconscious* in which fears, desires, or entire experiences, repressed in childhood, continue to exist in the unconscious isolated from and uninfluenced by the course of the child's growth into adulthood. They retain unaltered their charges of psychic energy and their specific quality. In this way drives repressed in infancy or childhood can continue to determine adult life. For example, when a little boy of three or four has repressed his desires for his mother, as well as the accompanying jealousy of the father, these desires and aggressions in unchanged intensity may still be effective in adulthood, and may be reflected in various forms in relation to parent-substitutes. This is called *fixation* by Freud. Fixation may also involve an entire phase or stage of libido development, which being repressed continues to exist in its pristine form in the adult unconscious. In spite of development and growth in other respects, a person's sexual wishes remain concentrated on some repressed unconscious pre-genital, oral-cannibal, or anal-sadistic striving.

When the assumption of *compulsive repetition* is added to the *timelessness of the unconscious*, all the elements are present which together assign a pre-determining role to infancy and childhood. The concept of repetition compulsion means, Horney says, "that psychic life is regulated not only by the pleasure principle but by a more elemental principle: the tendency of instincts to repeat experiences or reactions already established." Freud cites in evidence the tendency of children to repeat actual experiences even though painful, the tendency toward repetition of painful experiences in dreams, and finally the phenomenon of transference in the analytic situation in which the patient repeats past painful experiences but now as transferred to the person of the analyst. Horney refutes all this evidence on two counts: first, it is rooted in the arbitrary premises of instincts, libido, and timelessness of the unconscious; second, she claims she can account for the ob-

served phenomena without recourse to such "instinct" assumptions. "We understand them easily," she says, "without having to assume a mysterious repetition compulsion."

She sees a profound danger in this cluster of assumptions geared to the pre-determining role of childhood. "If later experiences are a repetition of past ones, a minute knowledge of the past must be of paramount importance for understanding the present. It is appropriate, then, to regard infantile memories of any kind as the most valuable material offered in the patient's associations. . . . It is most important to reconstruct some early constellation out of present manifestations." With this orientation it is possible to understand Freud's therapeutic speculations, Horney maintains, such as that the patient will comprehend his present difficulties when he recognizes their connection with infantile experiences, and that his awareness of the infantile trends involved will enable him to reject them as something that is antiquated and hence out of gear with his adult views and strivings. According to Freud, a person cannot be considered to be cured so long as some infantile period is not elucidated.

Horney rejects the therapeutic technique of ferreting out infantile memories for the same reason that she rejects the repetition compulsion and the other instinct theories of human nature and illness. Here, however, with the constellation of inborn infantile and childhood pre-determinations, she likewise repudiates what she calls "the genetic theory," a companion to the libido theory in which both are viewed as components of Freud's exclusive concern with instincts. "In brief," she says, "we can understand now why psychoanalysis is a genetic psychology, and must necessarily be, as long as it follows the type of thinking represented by the theory of repetition compulsion."

Her general conclusion with regard to both the libido and the childhood pre-determination theories is: "My conviction, expressed in a nutshell, is that psychoanalysis should outgrow the limitations set by its being an instinctivistic and a genetic psychology."¹³ The crucial question becomes: What happens to Freudian psychoanalysis when the two-tone rug of instincts and genetics is pulled from under it? Horney has an answer which will be in-

vestigated as soon as her views on an important element in Freud's general philosophy have been examined.

Horney speaks of "Freud's mechanistic-evolutionistic thinking" and contrasts it with what she calls "non-mechanistic" or "dialectic" thinking. True evolutionary thinking, she maintains, holds that things which exist today have not existed in the same form from the very beginning, but have developed out of previous stages. The new may have little resemblance to the old, but is nevertheless unthinkable without it. This type of thinking is characteristic of all modern scientific thought and has been ever since Darwin, she says. It has had a strong influence on psychology, and Freud was no exception. He took over the evolutionistic type of thinking, but in doing so changed it into a mechanistic-evolutionistic approach to mental phenomena. "Mechanistic-evolutionistic thinking," Horney says, "is a special form of evolutionistic thinking. It implies that present manifestations not only are conditioned by the past, but contain nothing except the past; nothing really new is created in the process of development; what we see today is only the old in a changed form. She cites a passage from William James' *Principles of Psychology* in which he advocates such thinking with regard to the problems of psychology, indicating again the close affinity between the two outstanding instinct psychologists.

To drive home her contrast between Freudian mechanistic thinking and scientific dialectic thinking, she presents a number of phenomena interpreted according to the two opposed approaches. In the case of water changing into steam, for example, she says, "The mechanistic presupposition would emphasize the fact that steam is merely water appearing in another form. Non-mechanistic (dialectic) thinking, on the other hand, would emphasize that though steam has developed out of water, in doing so it has assumed an entirely new quality, regulated by different laws and having different effects."

Another example she considers is the development of the machine from the 18th to the 20th century. Mechanistic-evolutionistic thinking, she asserts, would point out the various types of machines and factories that had already been in existence in the

early 18th century, and would look at this development solely as one of quantity—today there are simply more machines and more factories. "Non-mechanistic thinking," she holds, on the other hand, "would emphasize that the increase in quantity brought with it a change in quality; that the quantitative development brought with it entirely new problems, such as a new scale of production, the rise of an entirely new group of employers, new types of labor problems and so on; that change is not simply a question of growth but brings with it entirely new factors. In other words, stress would be laid on the point that quantity is converted into quality." She adds that from this scientific dialectic point of view "there can never be a simple repetition or a regression to former stages."

Horney points out that for Freud nothing much new happens in our development after the age of five, and that later reactions, traits, experiences are to be considered as a repetition of infantile ones. She points out also that this concept of "nothing new" and "repetition" runs through psychoanalysis like a thread on which the separate theories are strung. For example, Freud holds that the psychic life of "primitives" is of special interest because it represents well-preserved pre-stages of our own development, timeless and unchanged, that is, in the unconscious id of each individual alive today.

In summary of Freud's mechanistic, non-dialectical thinking she writes, "The most general expression of Freud's mechanistic-evolutionistic thinking is in his theory of repetition compulsion. In more detail its influence can be seen in his theory of fixation, of regression, in the doctrine of timelessness of the unconscious, and in his concept of transference. Generally speaking, it accounts for the extent to which trends are designated as infantile and for the tendency to explain the present by the past."¹⁴

The charge of "mechanistic-evolutionistic" thinking constitutes a sharp and highly effective indictment of Freud's underlying philosophy. It indicates clearly that his thinking was diametrically opposed to the general mode of scientific thought predominant for a half-century before his birth, during his entire lifetime, and down to the present. Horney's clear and acute perception of the

mechanistic nature of Freud's thought, taken together with her conscious awareness of some of the elements of non-mechanistic, dialectical thought, indicates that she was and is ahead of the general awareness in our country of dialectical thinking and modes of viewing the world and man.*

We are now ready to discuss the question propounded a few pages back: What happens to psychoanalysis when it is deprived of its instinctive, genetic, and (we can now add) its mechanistic-evolutionistic cornerstones? A further investigation of Karen Horney's thought furnishes an answer, the reformist version of psychoanalysis.

HORNEY'S REFORMATION OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

Horney opens the presentation of her answer with the statement: "I found that the more I took a critical stand toward a series of psychoanalytical theories, the more I realized the constructive value of Freud's fundamental findings. . . ." She avows that the ultimate purpose of her criticism "is not to show what is wrong with psychoanalysis, but, through eliminating the debatable elements, to enable psychoanalysis to develop to the height of its potentialities." To reform psychoanalysis along these lines, she proposes to emphasize "environmental factors" and thus substitute a developmental sociological for Freud's mechanistic-instinctual approach. "A prevailingly sociological orientation then takes the place," she says, "of a prevailingly anatomical-biological one."¹⁵ The question most relevant to our inquiry is: What and how much of Freudianism did Karen Horney retain and incorporate into her own version of psychoanalysis?

In the first place, what is her attitude toward Freud? In general it is that we must not "fail to give Freud sufficient credit for pioneering work." And of her relation to him she remarks, "It is easy enough to modify, but it takes genius to be the first to visual-

* This may be accounted for in her case by the fact that the first half of her life was spent on the European continent where the dialectic of Hegel, Marx, and Engels is more widely known in academic, scientific, and intellectual circles, as well as in the ranks of the socialist-minded working classes. We will find a similar phenomenon when we consider the other European-educated reformist, Erich Fromm.

ize the possibilities."¹⁶ Elsewhere she says, "My main gratitude goes to Freud because he has provided us with the foundation and the tools to work with."¹⁷ The foundation furnished by Freud consists, according to Horney, in certain basic concepts and methods that remain after elimination of the instinctive, genetic, and philosophic premises in which Freud had embedded them. The concepts and methods consist in the psychoanalytic techniques, which become more effective, she asserts, when liberated from the biological framework in which they were originally conceived, and in such basic Freudian concepts as unconscious motivation, repression, and resistance. "One difficulty," she says, "in presenting the basic concepts is that they are so often entangled in doctrines which are debatable."¹⁸ Among the Freudian methods or techniques, she retains dream interpretation, free association, and analysis of the transference phenomenon as it occurs in the analyst-patient situation. To indicate how much of the Freudian legacy she retains, however, it is by no means sufficient to enumerate the basic concepts and techniques. The real indication lies in her view of the nature and interrelationship of these elements. Such an examination will reveal the fact that Horney, in spite of her radical repudiation of certain fundamentals of Freud's system of psychology, does in fact, as she herself avers, preserve the *kernel* of the psychoanalytic approach to human nature and functional mental illness.

Horney's first principle is the Freudian thesis that human beings are driven by unconscious motivation. She differs, however, on the nature of the motives. In the place of Freud's libido and aggressive instinctual drives she posits two which are held to be partially innate and partially acquired, a combination of biological and sociological or cultural determinations. She calls these two drives "strivings for safety and satisfaction."¹⁹ "Man is ruled," she says, "not by the pleasure principle alone but by two guiding principles: safety and satisfaction." She never specifies the relative weight to be assigned to innate and acquired factors with regard to these strivings or to the impulses, fears, and needs based on them. I have been able to find two references which would throw some light on her conception of these fundamental building

blocks of her system. The first is that the strivings for safety and satisfaction together with their particular manifestations in impulses, needs, and passions are neither "rational motivations, conditioned reflexes or habit formations" nor "instinctual in nature," but rather they are "emotional."²⁰ The second reference is to a particular manifestation of the basic emotional drives, what Horney calls "retaliation fear," of which she says, "How far the retaliation fear is a general characteristic ingrained in human nature, how far it arises from primitive experiences of sin and punishment, how far it presupposes a drive for personal revenge, I leave as an open question."²¹

Her position seems to be that unconscious motivation is made up of "emotional drives, impulses, needs or passions"²² and that for lack of exact knowledge the question as to their type and origin must be left open—they may be more innate than acquired, or *vice versa*.

At any rate, whatever their exact nature, psychoanalysis absolutely requires some kind of innate or acquired drives to uphold the central doctrine that man is driven by unconscious *affective*, emotional and/or instinctive motives. This is perhaps the most essential and underlying principle on which Freudian psychology rests. It is a *sine qua non* of psychoanalysis. That human nature and conduct are determined by an unconscious driving *will*, whether it be innate or acquired, instinctive or emotional, or some combination, is a prime condition for all the other features of the psychoanalytic approach. It is an irrational, antiscientific tendency which has a long history in human thought, in modern times from Nietzsche and Schopenhauer to Henri Bergson and William James.²³ From the *will to power*, the unconscious will, the *elan vital*, and the *will to believe* it is not too long a step to instinctive *sexual and aggressive drives* and to emotional *strivings for safety and satisfaction*. The origin and nature of the unconscious will or unconscious emotional motivation are secondary in importance to its advocacy as a founding principle of psychology or philosophy. Its assumption in any form is, as a premise, sufficient to infer such Freudian concepts as repression and resistance, and such techniques as dream interpretation and free association.

When Horney accepts the Freudian principle that man is driven by unconscious motivations, and when she further assumes that these unconscious motives are *affective or emotional in character*, she thereby is committed to the preservation of the kernel of psychoanalysis. In spite of her truly splendid battle against Freud's instinct theory of human nature, Horney ends, or begins, by reaffirming the essential Freudian assumption that *man is driven by unconscious emotional motives*.

From this pivotal premise she deduces, along with Freud, the essential concepts and techniques characteristic of psychoanalysis, whether classical, revised or reformed. Having taken the first step in the reformation of Freudianism, Horney's thought moves logically from one inference to the next. One feature of Freud's system, however, is lacking. By rejecting the biological-instinctual orientation psychoanalysis loses its built-in *universality*. With her emphasis on cultural or sociological factors, Horney must view the various basic concepts as relative to a given culture at a particular time and place, and at least implicitly as relative to status in that culture, namely class. Her particular system is geared to the United States in the mid-20th century and to the middle and professional strata. Presumably she would maintain that man in any society at any time and of whatever class is driven by unconscious emotional drives and impulses. Just what these drives and impulses would be and how they would function in their development and interrelationships would depend on cultural or sociological factors. In what follows, then, we must understand that Horney is concerned with middle class and professional people in our country and in our particular era.

Such a limitation constitutes a fundamental weakening in the theoretical structure of psychoanalysis, for in effect it reduces its *universality* back to a simple assumption that man is driven by unconscious emotional drives. If the assumed premise should be denied, as Horney herself denied the Freudian instinct premise, the entire structure of psychoanalysis would collapse. The total rejection of psychoanalysis would then be the next step. With Horney's reaffirmation of the major premise, however, not rejection, but reformation is in order. Even if inadvertent, it is a

further very real contribution, in addition to her repudiation of Freud's instinct theory, that Horney lays bare the pivotal assumption of psychoanalysis, namely that man is driven by unconscious emotional or voluntaristic motivations. The final elimination of Freudianism then becomes not only possible, but in a sense inevitable.

Given the major premise and the relative cultural orientation, Horney proceeds to reconstruct a psychoanalysis minus the instinctive libido and mechanical-genetic theories. For our purposes, it is not essential to follow her line of reasoning in detail. We will present enough of it to show conclusively that her system, regardless of all reformatory measures, is in fact still psychoanalysis—a case which has to be proven more to the classical revised Freudians than to her own followers or to the other reformists.

Horney points out that the two assumed unconscious emotional drives toward safety and satisfaction are mutually incompatible. One cannot obtain complete satisfaction of desires, needs, and passions without courting danger from other persons whose own drives would thus be threatened, without, that is, running up against legal, social, ethical, and moral prohibitions and commandments with their accompanying punishments, disapproval, and ostracism. Safety is thus put in jeopardy by its co-drive toward satisfaction. Likewise, measures leading to safety entail frustration of the drive toward satisfaction.

* Conflicts between these drives and between the impulses, needs, fears, desires, and passions based on them lead to the necessity for repression. While Freud had posited the super-ego or conscience as the repressing force, Horney finds no practical or theoretical need for such a mechanism. She views the repressing force as the same as the repressed, that is, as she puts it, "any drive, need, feeling can be repressed if it endangers another drive, need, feeling which for the individual is of vital importance."²⁴ She describes repression as "the shutting out of awareness of an affect or impulse" in which "the repressed affect or impulse is as effective as it was before." In repression, she says, "we are subjectively convinced that we do not have the impulse."²⁵ Thus Horney recon-

structs the theory of repression without recourse to Freud's id with its instinct-drives toward perverted sex, incest, and patricide and without the innate taboos on them embodied in the super-ego. In their place, she assumes conflicting drives toward safety and satisfaction which through their very conflict engender repression.

Repression, or the shutting out of awareness, is itself not sufficient to keep the incompatible drives, impulses, needs, and the like out of consciousness and behavior. Various ego defenses, which Horney adopts primarily from Freud's daughter, Anna, are in addition required. She classifies these defenses under the headings of reaction formations and projections. It is not germane to our argument to describe the details of these types of defense. We note only that the defenses in aid of repression serve also as circuitous routes by means of which repressed impulses, needs, feelings force their way into consciousness but under heavy disguise. Other such circuitous routes with their own forms of camouflage are: inadvertent behavior or expression (Freud's symptomatic acts and slips of tongue and pen as compiled in his book *The Psychology of Everyday Life*), dreams, transference, fantasies, and unconscious associations. In these circuitous routes taken by repressed impulses to break into consciousness, much of the disguise and camouflage is furnished by symbolism, images standing as signs for a need or impulse or some component of them.

Now only one fundamental concept of psychoanalysis is missing to complete the essential picture, resistance. Underlying the concept of resistance is the assumption that "unconscious motivations remain unconscious because we are interested in not becoming aware of them." The reason for this interest is, of course, the incompatibility of the drives and the conflict between the impulses, needs, and feelings expressing them. Interest in repression has as its corollary the proposition that any and all attempts to "unearth Unconscious motivation" will be met by a more or less "fierce struggle." "We will have to put up a struggle," Horney says, "because some interest of ours is at stake."²⁶ It is this doctrine of resistance which is of such defensive value to psychoanalysis in any form. For any resistance offered by patients or theoreticians to

psychoanalytic formulations is put down as resistance to the person's own unconscious repressed motivations.

Now all the basic Freudian concepts, those without which there could be no psychoanalysis, are present and accounted for by Horney. She has reformed and re-cast these concepts without recourse to Freud's instinctive, archaic, and mechanistic-genetic theories. She has accomplished this by calling primarily on cultural or sociological factors: (1) to establish unconscious affective motivation; (2) to establish the necessity for and mechanism of repression by means of incompatible drives and conflicting impulses, needs, feelings, fears, and desires; (3) to establish defenses against and circuitous routes for entrance of repressed material to consciousness; (4) to establish the concept of fierce resistance to admission of repressed impulses to consciousness. It will be noticed that cultural forces are mentioned but not defined or utilized in any consistent manner. The reason for this is to be found in the fact that these external factors are utilized by Horney to establish an internal emotional dynamism which then suffices in large measure to determine psychic life. This dynamic determination of mind and behavior by unconscious, internal-emotional drives, whatever their sources may be, constitutes the ultimate assumption of psychoanalysis. It is this assumption that is salvaged and reconstructed by Horney.

In the course of this reconstruction she refers often to "cultural factors" and at times indicates "certain definite contradictions in our culture." Among the latter she mentions the "contradiction between the stimulation of our needs and our factual frustrations in satisfying them."²⁷ On the one hand, advertising and "keeping up with the Joneses" stimulate impulses, needs, and desires connected with the posited drive toward *satisfaction*, while on the other our culture imposes close restrictions, economic as well as legal, ethical and moral, which for the great majority of people sharply curtail and frustrate those same impulses, needs, and desires. The importance of such cultural contradictions for Horney is their effect on the internal emotional and unconscious dynamism: to what repressions, ego-defenses, rationalizations, reaction-formations, sublimations, projections, and compromise solutions

they lead; in short how they affect the emotional life of the mind and to what unconscious motivations they give rise. Thus Horney's chief interest remains, as did Freud's, in the unconscious *intra-psychic drama*. The main elements in this drama are for Horney, as for Freud, conflicting unconscious motivations based on incompatible drives in which the conflicts find some kind of solution through repression aided by the ego-defenses. The particular set of solutions, their origin and development in the course of an individual's life, form his character and personality, whether "normal" or neurotic. The central fact is that Horney reaffirms Freud's contention that the unconscious fate of unconscious drives is the motive force of the human mind and behavior. The environment remains only the stage-setting for the intensive internal psychic drama of conflicting emotions.

With such an orientation, Horney, like Freud, has as her analytical objective the laying bare of the unconscious drama, that is, bringing it to consciousness with the possible goal of lessening conflicts and thereby minimizing the need for certain extreme types of defenses. Her point is that when internal conflicts are exaggerated, there is a great drain on the energy of the person concerned in trying to maintain his fragile defenses. Analysis, bringing the drama to consciousness, may make it possible to lower the conflicting tensions, deflate the defenses and thereby release the energy, previously expended to support the defenses, in order that it may instead be expended in creative living.

The essential aim of analysis for Horney is "to effect a change in the person's personality" and her primary means of accomplishing this is to "lift Unconscious processes into awareness." How does the analyst "lift Unconscious processes into awareness"? What are his tools or techniques for doing this? "The tools with which the analyst operates during the procedure," Horney says, "are to a large extent those which Freud has taught us to use." Among these techniques she speaks, as Freud did, of "dream analysis" as "the via regia to understanding the patient's Unconscious processes"; of "free associations and interpretations as a means of lifting Unconscious processes into awareness"; of "transference" which she describes as "a detailed study of the rela-

tionships between patient and analyst" for the purpose "of recognizing the nature of the patient's relationships to others"; of studying the "resistance" of the patient to lifting unconscious processes to consciousness, in which the general principle is that the more resistance displayed the closer the analyst is approaching important unconscious impulses, repressions, and defenses; finally, she speaks of "observation of the content and sequence of the patient's expressions, together with general observations of his behavior—gestures, tone of voice and the like" and asserts these allow "inferences as to the underlying processes." These are in fact the techniques developed by Freud and together constitute, as Horney says, the "basic methodological tools of therapy."²⁸

All these techniques are designed to catch the conscious ego "off-guard," as in sleep and dreaming, or in associating when conscious attention is diverted, or in relationships formed with the analyst without conscious direction, or finally in slips of tongue and inadvertent behavior. They are themselves devious paths by which repressed material seeks disguised entrance into consciousness. The analyst interprets such disguises largely by treating them as *symbolic*. The interpretation of symbols, or symbol-translation, is thus an integral part of the psychoanalytic technique. In this connection Freud assumed the existence of a primordial, biologically innate symbolic language inherited from primitive man and tribal times and existing in every person's racial unconscious. This archaic symbolic language then furnished the disguises for repressed impulses and wishes as they appear in dreams, or involuntary-free-associations, transference phenomena, inadvertent behavior, and slips of tongue. Translations of the symbolic language, according to stereotyped translations of the imagery, would then constitute the most important element in bringing unconscious material to consciousness. Horney rejects only the concept of the archaic hereditary symbolic language. For her the symbols have a "culturally determined" meaning—an unconscious symbol tends to be universal for all people living in a given culture. The translation of symbols is thus retained in content but altered in form. "A symbolic expression," she says, "is

necessary only for tendencies or feelings shoved out of consciousness."²⁹

All the essential psychoanalytic elements are now present—the central Freudian presupposition, the basic concepts, and the techniques—and Horney goes on to reform theories of child development, character and personality, neurosis, and therapy without benefit of the libido and death instincts and without mechanical genetic predeterminations. They are based on the Freudian premise that unconscious emotional drives and the needs, fears, desires, and impulses they generate motivate human behavior and thought. They employ the basic Freudian concepts of repression, resistance, ego-defenses, and symbolic circuitous disguised routes to awareness. Finally, they use the Freudian techniques of dream analysis, free association, transference, symbol-translation, and the like to lift unconscious processes to awareness. The fact that, however reformed, this is still nonetheless psychoanalysis can scarcely be controverted.

Indeed, Horney herself insists that it is: "Since many of my interpretations deviate from those of Freud some readers may ask whether this is still psychoanalysis. The answer depends on what one holds essential in psychoanalysis. If one believes that it is constituted entirely by the sum total of theories propounded by Freud, then what is presented here is not psychoanalysis. If, however, one believes that the essentials of psychoanalysis lie in certain basic trends of thought concerning the role of unconscious processes and the ways in which they find expression, and in a form of therapeutic treatment that brings these processes to awareness, then what I present is psychoanalysis."³⁰

In our investigation of Karen Horney's thought we have found two contradictory tendencies. On the one hand, she conducts a valiant campaign against Freud's instinct theories and his mechanistic-genetic philosophy and at the same time proposes in their place to stress acquired, environmental, cultural, and social factors. This tendency is progressive and would be all to the good if followed through to its logical-historical conclusion, but she stops abruptly and assumes the task of reforming psychoanalysis minus the libido and childhood predeterminations. Thus the

opposite tendency sets in. While talking about cultural factors, she nevertheless reverts to the Freudian stress on intra-psychic dynamics in which unconscious emotional motivation drives mankind independent of cultural determinations.

If she were to follow the first tendency and view the psyche in its dynamic interrelationship with the social environment, then the task would cease to be the Freudian one of *know your unconscious self* and would become *know yourself, the external world including society, and your relationship to it*. And the problem would cease to be *how unconscious processes can be lifted into consciousness*, and would become *how to increase knowledge of man and the environment in order to adapt the latter better to meet the needs, interests and, aspirations of the former*. Emphasis would then be, not on the subjective interpretation of dreams, involuntary associations or slips of pen and tongue, but on knowledge gained by the objective methods of science, natural and social. Such a quest for greater understanding of the world and man so that consciously-directed changes can be effected, would require a stress on what Freud called the "secondary ego processes," namely, the sensori-motor and rational functions of mind. As we have noted previously, this stress had been introduced into psychoanalytic theory by Heinz Hartmann and others. Horney, however, stressed the so-called "primary" processes of the ego: repression and the ego-defense mechanisms as revised by Anna Freud.

Chapter 6

ERICH FROMM

Like Horney, Erich Fromm substitutes social factors in the place of Freud's instincts, phylogenetic memories, and innate mental constructs. Unlike his fellow reformist, however, he does not limit himself to broad generalizations about the role of "culture." On the contrary, in at least two of his books—*Escape from Freedom* and *The Sane Society*—he devotes as much space to economic, social, political, and ideological analysis as he does to strictly psychological discussion. In the process he employs, explicitly but in his own way, many of the basic theoretical concepts of Marxist historical materialism and political economy. In a sense it can be said that he employs Marx to reconstruct Freud.

Erich Fromm was born and educated in Germany, studied sociology and psychology at the Universities of Heidelberg, Frankfurt, and Munich, and received his Ph.D. degree from Heidelberg in 1922. He was trained in Freudian psychoanalysis at the Psychoanalytic Institute in Berlin and thereafter devoted himself to consultant psychology and theoretical work. He has made his home in the United States for the last quarter-century and is a naturalized citizen. He is affiliated with the William Alanson White Institute of Psychiatry and has lectured at Columbia University, Yale, The New School for Social Research, Bennington College, and the National University of Mexico, as well as at innumerable psychoanalytic institutes.

Escape from Freedom and *The Sane Society* develop his major themes. Those themes center around "the interaction between psychological and sociological factors." Since the latter play an originating role we will examine them first. We will find, how-

ever, that Fromm inextricably interweaves the psychological with the sociological, that he derives the basic concepts of psychoanalysis from the psychological consequences of the historical development of capitalism, and that at the same time he views capitalism as a product in part of the very psychic dynamisms which it has established. He first traces the history of capitalism from its beginnings in medieval society, through its competitive stage and on into monopoly capitalism, together with the psychological consequences of each phase.

FROMM'S "SOCIOLOGICAL FACTOR"

Fromm says of Freud that "he and most of his disciples had only a very naive notion of what goes on in society." While asserting that his own analysis is "based on some fundamental discoveries of Freud," he at the same time charges that the latter distorted these discoveries by two one-sided emphases: on instincts and on their suppression by society. He takes strong exception to Freud's notion that society has only a suppressive function, and maintains that "it has also a creative function." "Man's nature, his passions, and anxieties are," he says, "a cultural product; as a matter of fact, man himself is the most important creation and achievement of the continuous human effort, the record of which we call history." Thus his first thesis is that man is made not by instincts and their suppression, but by history. The character structure of man changes from one historical epoch to another, from one economic, social, political, and ideological system to another. Since his primary interest lies in man in the United States in mid-20th century, he poses as the key question: "Why is the character structure of man in monopolistic capitalism different from that in the nineteenth century?"¹ For an answer he turns first to history, political economy, and Karl Marx. In doing so he flies in the face of contemporary anti-Communist, anti-Marxist hysteria, which he deprecates and forthrightly challenges.

Fromm first depicts medieval society in terms of its mode of production with the labor and tools and class structure characteristic of it. He views the Middle Ages as a contradictory period in which on one side there was exploitation of the masses by a few

and a general lack of freedom accompanied by prevalent superstition and ignorance, while on the other there was a subordination of economic to human needs and a directness and concreteness in human relations in which each person had his place in an organic social order. "Personal, economic and social life," he says, "was dominated by rules and obligations from which practically no sphere of activity was exempted." After a more or less extended discussion of medieval society, Fromm goes on, as he does with regard to each epoch, to point out what he calls "the psychological consequences." His thesis is that the psychological consequences of the structure and super-structure of feudal society are a reflection of the contradictory aspects of social life. The medieval man was not free, but neither was he isolated, insecure, alone or a prey to anxiety. In short, he was not sharply *alienated* either from things or from people. He had a strong sense of belonging and solidarity with nature and his fellow men in spite of antagonisms between classes and between villages and principalities. In medieval society, Fromm says, "man was still related to the world by primary ties." Primary ties are said to be those natural and social connections that exist in primitive society, pre-capitalist history, and early childhood "before the process of individuation has resulted in complete emergence of the individual."²

In the late Middle Ages the structure of society, according to Fromm, began to change and with these changes came new psychological consequences for man. The organic unity of medieval society was progressively undermined by the rise of capitalist forces and relations of production. The transformation of merchants and guild-masters into wealthy capitalists and of journeymen and peasants into workers who had to sell their labor power to exist, together with the ever-growing exploitation of the latter by the former, eventually shattered medieval society and gave rise to capitalism and to the political hegemony of the capitalist class by means of revolution. With the rise of capitalism and the destruction of the old society, the free individual emerged, torn from the primary ties at last. Man stood alone and unattached, alienated from nature and his fellow men. The psychological

effects of this early phase of capitalism were, Fromm maintains, two-fold and contradictory. While the new individual had feelings of freedom, independence, and equality, he also had "a deep feeling of insecurity, powerlessness, doubt, aloneness and anxiety." Man had won his freedom from feudal restraints but at the cost of his feelings of belonging, solidarity, and security. "By losing his fixed place in a closed world," he says, "man loses the answer to the meaning of his life; the result is that doubt has befallen him concerning himself and the aim of life. He is threatened by powerful supra-personal forces, capital and the market. His relationship to his fellow men, with everyone a potential competitor, has become hostile and estranged; he is free—that is, he is alone, isolated, threatened from all sides. . . . Paradise is lost for good, the individual stands alone and faces the world." Negative freedom, or freedom *from* the organic unity and primary ties of medieval society, made man "feel alone and isolated" and "filled him with doubt and anxiety."³

Turning to the 19th century, Fromm maintains that the further development of capitalism served only to heighten the "dialectical contradiction" between growing self-reliance, power, control over nature, independence, and freedom on one side, and isolation, competition, hostility, and insecurity on the other. This contradiction produced in the individual still deeper moods of helplessness, aloneness, and anxiety. "In capitalism," he says, "economic activity, success, material gains, become ends in themselves. It became man's fate to contribute to the growth of the economic system, to amass capital, not for the purpose of his own happiness or salvation, but as an end in itself. Man became a cog in the vast machine—an important one if he had much capital, an insignificant one if he had none—but always a cog to serve a purpose outside himself." The psychological result of the exclusive stress on "accumulation of capital" was "a feeling of personal insignificance and powerlessness." Fromm maintains that this psychological effect was just as true of the working class as of the capitalist class and the middle strata. As a matter of fact, while his attention throughout his writings is concentrated primarily on the middle class, he has a marked tendency to generalize his findings with

certain reservations to include the two great antagonistic classes of capitalism. He admits that the common working class experience of being exploited, together with the struggle against it through trade unions, tends to offset the feeling of aloneness and powerlessness and to substitute feelings of solidarity and power. Nevertheless, he asserts that the worker also is dominated by feelings of isolation and anxiety, and he appeals to the historical materialist proposition that the dominant ideas of any society are by and large the ideas of the dominant class in that society. He simply transposes the proposition from the realm of *ideas* to the realm of *feelings*. Thus if the dominant capitalist and middle class *feelings* are aloneness and anxiety, then the same must be true of the "proletariat."⁴

In his further analysis of 19th century capitalism, Fromm points to the contradiction between the growing social forces of production and the ever more private ownership of the means of production; to the contradiction between the rational planning within a plant or corporation and the irrational, anarchic character of the market; and he points to the results in "economic crises, unemployment, and war." Most of all he stresses the fact of alienation and says that "Hegel and Marx have laid the foundation for the understanding of the problem of alienation, in particular Marx's concept of the 'fetishism of commodities' and of the 'alienation of labor'."⁵ By *alienation* Fromm means the estrangement of man from tools and from the raw materials of nature, from his fellow men and finally from himself. All of these, he holds, have become commodities for sale. "Not only the economic, but also the personal relations between men," he says, "have this character of alienation; instead of relations between human beings, they assume the character of relations between things. But perhaps the most important and the most devastating instance of this spirit of instrumentality and alienation is the individual's relationship to his own self. Man does not only sell commodities, he sells himself and feels himself to be a commodity. . . . As with any other commodity it is the market which decides the value of these human qualities, yes, even their existence." Alienation in all its aspects further increased the isolation, inde-

pendence, equality, and freedom of the individual. This freedom, however, was negative. It was *freedom from* things, others, and oneself and thus it only increased the individual's feelings of insecurity, powerlessness, aloneness, and anxiety.

In 19th century capitalism with its wars, crises, "ruthless exploitation of the worker," unemployment, competition and alienation, "the individual became," Fromm says, "more alone, isolated, became an instrument in the hands of overwhelmingly strong forces outside of himself; he became an 'individual', but a bewildered and insecure individual." While his stress is on the growth of negative freedom, Fromm also cites the advances made in the 19th century by positive freedom, *freedom to*. Man gained greater control over natural forces and greatly enlarged his rational knowledge of the world. In the individual this was expressed as optimism and freedom for individual initiative. Psychologically the growth of positive freedom developed feelings of power, enlightenment, and rationality. In part these feelings, he says, offset the psychological effect of negative freedom, "insecurity and anxiety."

In the 19th century, Fromm holds, there was some balance between the growth of negative and positive freedom, but since the rise of "the monopolistic phase of capitalism" around the turn of the century this balance has been shattered and negative freedom has far outstripped positive. As a result, "The individual's feeling of powerlessness and aloneness has increased, his 'freedom' from all traditional bonds has become more pronounced, his possibilities for individual economic achievement have narrowed. He feels threatened by gigantic force . . ." In monopoly capitalism, he maintains, the concentration of capital has restricted the possibilities for the success of individual initiative, courage, and intelligence, and has replaced them by "feelings of powerlessness and hopelessness." Monopoly capitalism is viewed as a colossal Frankenstein monster in the face of which all non-monopoly elements of the population are frightened, cowed, and reduced to insignificance, and more devastatingly to means to the end of accumulation of profits.

Fromm spells this effect out for each class and phase of monop-

oly capitalism, with special reference to the United States. The small or "middle-sized" businessman is threatened by the overwhelming power of monopoly capital. In his fight against monopoly he is pitted against giants, where he used to fight against relative equals. The psychological effect on him is an increase in feelings of insecurity, powerlessness, hopelessness, and anxiety. He is blocked wherever he turns, caught in a ruthless iron trap. The white collar worker, on the other hand, is part of a vast economic machine, is in fierce competition with hundreds of others who are in the same position, and "is mercilessly fired if he falls behind." The office worker has been "turned into a cog" in a "machinery" which forces its tempo upon him, which he cannot control, and in comparison with which he is utterly insignificant. He, too, has overwhelming feelings of insecurity and the like. The situation of the industrial worker, too, has changed since the 19th century when he fought against exploitation that was personified by an owner and boss he could see and recognize. "The man in a plant which employs thousands of workers," Fromm says, "is in a different position. The boss has become an abstract figure—he never sees him; the 'management' is an anonymous power with which he deals indirectly and toward which he as an individual is insignificant." Unions, he holds, have somewhat balanced this situation, giving the worker a feeling of strength and significance in comparison with the giant corporations, "but here again he is a small cog in a large machine." Thus the worker too, in spite of trade unions, shares at least some of the feelings of insecurity of the other classes in monopoly capitalism.

In the individual's role as a customer, also, he is made to feel utterly unimportant as a person, while abstractly significant as a potential purchaser. Likewise the "hypnoid suggestion" of mass advertising increases his feelings of smallness and powerlessness by dulling his capacity to think rationally and by insulting his human nature with ecstatic fantasies over soap and deodorants. The individual as a voter in political democracy is no better off, according to Fromm. He is "confronted by mammoth parties" and he is "offered a choice between two or three candidates by the party machine; but these candidates are not of his choosing; he

and they know little of each other, and their relationship is as abstract as most other relationships have become." Political propaganda and press-agent tactics in vote-getting, as in the case of advertising, dull the individual's critical and rational capacities and increase his feelings of insignificance and powerlessness. They flatter him by making him appear important and by pretending that they appeal to his critical judgment, "but these pretenses are essentially a method to dull the individual's suspicions and to help him fool himself as to the individual character of his decision."

Finally Fromm cites the World Wars ("the threat of war has become a nightmare"), depressions, unemployment ("the dread of it overshadows their whole life"), racial segregation and exclusion, and the curse of "too young" and "too old" as special features of contemporary society, characteristic of monopoly capitalism. They are the objective price paid for the freedom from primary ties which capitalism has brought to mankind. The subjective or psychological price, he says, is exacted in the coin of feelings of powerlessness, fright, anxiety, hopelessness, aloneness, frustration, and helplessness.

The *actual* fruits of capitalism, according to Fromm, are wholly negative: negative freedom or freedom-from; negative objective social features or public evil; and negative subjective feelings or private psychological suffering. In contrast with this negative actuality he points to the positive potentiality of modern capitalist productive accomplishments. Capitalism has won great power over nature through tremendous increases in the means of production in both agriculture and industry, and has thereby created the conditions for the transition to positive freedom. If society were organized so that production could be geared to use and to the development of the individual rather than to profit and the accumulation of capital, then man could overcome his feelings of isolation and helplessness, and could fulfill his potentiality for mature love and creative work.

Positive and negative freedom are, Fromm maintains, the psychological counterparts of the positive and negative sides of capitalism. The negative features of capitalism—exploitation,

war, depression, unemployment, alienation, the substitution of commodity for human relations, and the like—leave man free of all belonging and therefore alone and frightened. The positive features of capitalism—production, technology and science—furnish the conditions and ultimate hope for a better, more human life in a better, more human society. This, then, is the contradiction Fromm sees in capitalist society. The negative freedom is an albatross around the individual human neck but at the same time the situation is ripe for the removal of the rotting carcass and for setting man free to create a full and rich existence.

Fromm develops both sides of the contradiction. He employs the negative features of capitalism together with their psychological consequences to reform the substance of psychoanalysis. At the same time he utilizes the positive features of capitalism as the basis on which to construct a vision of a rational society called "socialism" which would substitute positive for negative freedom and thereby remove the objective and subjective causes of "universal neurosis." His first step is the reformation of psychoanalysis through the sociological and psychological etiology of unconscious compulsive motivation.

FROMM'S REFORMATION OF UNCONSCIOUS COMPULSIVE MOTIVATION

To a far greater extent than Horney, Fromm's reformation of psychoanalysis lays bare the pivotal assumption underlying the psychoanalytic approach to the human mind. He reduces it to a single major premise, one without which there could be no psychoanalytic theory, technique or practice. That major premise is the assumption that man is driven by unconscious forces lying deeply embedded in his own mental apparatus, that he is set in motion or in emotion by compulsive motivations, that motivation is therefore *compulsive* rather than *reactive*. Motivation proceeds from sources within the mind rather than from interaction with the social and natural surroundings. Thoughts, feelings, and behavior are not viewed as reactions to external conditions but rather as "lingering tendencies within a person," Fromm main-

tains, "which so to speak wait only for an opportunity to be expressed."⁶

Compulsion, not reactivity, is viewed as motivating man in the psychoanalytic approach. Man loves and fears, hates and expresses hostility not because he is reacting to loveable, fearful, hateful, and antithetical features of the environment, but because he is internally compelled to so feel by the intra-psychic mechanisms at work within his unconscious mind. While Freud derived these intra-psychic mechanisms of compulsive motivation from contrapuntal drives and taboos biologically inherited from primitive man, Fromm derives them from the traumatic psychological consequences of the evils of monopoly capitalism. The crucial point is that however derived the condition without which there can be no psychoanalysis is universal unconscious compulsive motivation. Once that premise is granted all the decisive Freudian doctrines, techniques, and practices follow as the night the day. They are inferences, fully valid in view of the major premise, that exist within the premise itself. Psychoanalytic theory then becomes a matter of drawing the inferences, practice a matter of acting upon them.

Fromm's reformation of psychoanalysis hinges on his establishment of universal unconscious compulsive motivation on the basis of the traumatic impact of capitalism and especially of monopoly capitalism on the individual person living within it. He describes modern man of whatever class living within a monopoly capitalist society as an individual free from all ties of solidarity with nature and his fellow human beings. This individual floats and tosses helplessly and all alone on a sea of exploitation, war, unemployment, economic crisis, and bankruptcy over which he has no control and of which he has no understanding. The psychological consequences are such intolerable feelings of powerlessness and aloneness, helplessness and insignificance, frustration and anxiety, that together they constitute a universal traumatic experience. The individual does not know who, what, or why he is. He is torn by doubts and oppressed by an abiding and shattering sense of utter futility. Life has lost all meaning.

Fromm cites the existentialist line of descent, Kierkegaard, Nie-

tzsche, Kafka, and Julian Green in corroboration of his point. All picture "the helpless individual torn and tormented by doubts, overwhelmed by the feeling of aloneness and insignificance." He quotes Green: "We peer down into a huge dark abyss. And we are afraid." These psychological consequences of capitalism Fromm calls "the burden of freedom," the cross that free individuals in monopoly capitalism must bear. Negative freedom, *freedom from*, is intolerable, he says. Novelists and poets depict some of the agony of negative freedom, but even this much is unbearable. The stage is now set and the Freudian drama can begin.

The key words are "unbearable," "intolerable." So unbearable and intolerable are the psychological consequences of capitalism with its *freedom from*, that the individual simply cannot allow himself to become aware of them. "It is too frightening for that," Fromm says. "It is covered over by the daily routine of his activities, by the assurance and approval he finds in his private or social relations, by success in business, by any number of distractions, by 'having fun', 'making contacts', 'going places'. But whistling in the dark does not bring light. Aloneness, fear and bewilderment remain; people cannot stand it forever. They cannot go on bearing the burden of 'freedom from'." There are two possible solutions: "They must try to escape from freedom altogether" or "they can progress from negative to positive freedom." The latter is rare for the individual in capitalist society, so the dominant 'way out' is to seek various *escapes from negative freedom*. These "psychological mechanisms of escape" constitute Fromm's reconstruction of compulsive, irrational unconscious motivation, the major premise of Freudianism.

The premise that unconscious, compulsive motivations drive the individual in capitalist society contains several assumptions. These assumptions are fundamental and explicit, and of logical necessity include all that is later to be deduced from the premise. As in the case of most speculative theories, Fromm begins with a self-evident fact and then attempts to account for its existence. The fact he starts with is the same that constituted Freud's point of departure: "A great number of apparently insoluble problems disappear at once if we decide to give up the notion that the

motives by which people believe themselves to be motivated are necessarily the ones which actually drive them to act, feel, and think as they do."⁷ It is impossible not to agree with this statement. Certainly no person is fully aware, and all people only relatively so, of the forces at work in determining their feelings, acts, and thoughts. Controversy enters only with theories of *how* the latter are determined. Fromm follows Freud in his answer to this decisive question.

In seeking a solution of the problem as to what forces other than conscious motives determine man's behavior, feeling, and thought, Fromm first assumes with Freud that these forces are intra-psychic *mental but unconscious motives*. He next assumes, again with Freud, that the unconscious motives are identical in kind with those familiar to psychiatrists in certain types of functional mental illness, for example, hysteria. He assumes, in short, that unconscious motivation is *compulsive*. In psychiatric language, according to *Webster's Collegiate Dictionary*, the term "compulsive" signifies "being irresistibly driven toward the performance of some irrational action." For pathophysiology and medical psychiatry a *compulsion* is viewed as the effect either of cerebral injury or of cerebral malfunctioning. In this view, both the *driven* feature of the compulsion and the irrational expression in feeling, act, or thought are the products of pathological cerebral mechanisms. It follows from this that there is a qualitative difference between normal and pathological functioning, and that the characteristic features of the former cannot be discovered from an investigation of the latter. Contrary to this generally held theory, Fromm, following in the footsteps of Freud, assumes that compulsion is not a pathoneurological-physiological phenomenon, but rather is purely psychological, that compulsive-irrational feelings, acts, and thoughts are determined by "psychological mechanisms." By this contention, the phenomenon of compulsion is theoretically removed from the realms of pathoneurology and pathophysiology and from the medical science of psychiatry.

Fromm, like Freud, then proceeds to obliterate the *qualitative* difference between mental illness and mental health and reduce it to a quantitative distinction. The compulsive mechanisms of

the neurotic person are viewed as simply accentuated, extreme instances of those determining the psychic life of normal people. This neurotic accentuation of the psychological mechanisms of compulsion is considered as an aid in discovering the mechanisms and their structure and function. The neurotic extremes simply render the mechanisms more accessible to awareness—and to psychoanalysis. "The phenomena which we observe in the neurotic person," Fromm says, "are in principle not different from those we find in the normal. They are only more accentuated, clearcut, and frequently more accessible. . . ."⁸

In maintaining this crucial thesis, Fromm follows not only Freud but all psychoanalysts, orthodox, revised or reformed. Thus Karen Horney, speaking of neurotics, says "the difference from the normal is merely quantitative."⁹ The quantitative difference formula allows the extension of the purely psychological mechanisms of *compulsion* to all people in a society. It thus transforms psychoanalysis from a theory of neurosis into a general theory of psychology.

The logical syllogistic argument underlying the major premise of psychoanalysis, as revealed by Fromm, is: (1) *whatever is found to be the mechanism of neurotic feelings, acts, and thoughts holds true—only to a lesser degree—of normal people*; (2) *purely psychological (i.e. non-pathoneurological-physiological) compulsive motivation is found to be the mechanism of neurotic phenomena*; (3) *therefore, purely psychological compulsive motivation determines the feelings, acts, and thoughts of normal people*. In the above form, the syllogism holds for all psychoanalysis from Freud to Fromm. The latter substitutes capitalist society and its psychological consequences for Freud's instincts and their suppression as the generic cause of purely psychological compulsive motivation in both neurotic and normal people.

Once this cornerstone of psychoanalysis is laid Fromm can proceed to reconstruct his versions of the psychological mechanisms that constitute unconscious compulsive motivation in capitalist society, and that give rise to irrational compulsive feelings, acts, and thoughts. To this end, he goes back and picks up the thread of his earlier argument. The individual cannot tolerate the feel-

ings of powerlessness and aloneness with which capitalist society, and particularly monopoly capitalism, imbues him. He has to repress these excruciatingly painful feelings; he has to force them below the threshold of consciousness and at the same time construct substitutes for and defenses against them. The original repression of the capitalist-generated unbearable feelings is the first compulsively motivated act. Next comes the construction of the substitutes and the defenses. These substitutes and defenses, the psychological mechanisms of escape from intolerable negative (bourgeois) freedom, are formed, Fromm maintains, in each individual no two are alike. They fall however into several general types since the economic, social, political, and ideological pressures are universally operative. He says there are many such types of compulsive mechanisms, but discusses in detail only three: masochism-sadism, destruction, and automaton-conformity.

Before going into detail, he states that he has arrived at the nature and function of these psychological mechanisms of compulsive motivation by means of the "psychoanalytic procedure," namely, the classical Freudian techniques of free association, dream interpretation, and interpretation of such phenomena as transference and inadvertent behavior. In the next breath he apologizes for and attempts to justify the psychoanalytic procedure: "Although psychoanalysis does not live up to the ideal which was for many years the ideal of academic psychology, that is, the approximation of the experimental methods of the natural sciences, it is nevertheless a thoroughly empirical method, based on the painstaking observation of an individual's uncensored thoughts, dreams and phantasies."¹⁰

If feelings, acts, and thoughts cannot be taken at face value, but rather are determined compulsively by psychological mechanisms which in turn are determined by repressed intolerable feelings, then it follows that some method of observation must be employed which can catch the repressions, defenses, and substitutions off guard; and then interpret this dream-phantasy material in such a manner as to uncover the real compulsive motivation at work in producing the overt feelings, acts, and thoughts. This art of interpretation of unconscious fragments includes at its center

the art of translating unconscious symbolism. The dream imagery, for example, is treated as symbolically referential to the "real" unconscious compulsive mechanisms motivating conscious life. It is the rationalization of these techniques rooted in the art of symbol translation that Fromm together with the other reformists must furnish. For without the esoteric techniques, analysis would collapse into common ordinary counseling. The psychoanalytic procedure is a double, tautological process. The techniques are required for analysis in the practical sense of the work of the analyst in his office and therefore some theoretical structure must be erected to accommodate them. At the same time the very same techniques are employed in the construction of the theory that is to rationalize them. Thus Fromm requires the techniques for his analytical work with patients, a fact which sets the task for his theory. On the other hand, to furnish the theory he utilizes the very techniques which are to be given a basis by the theory. The dog has his tail in his mouth. The same was true of Freud and of Horney and Sullivan. By his own peculiar use of the psychoanalytic techniques and symbol translation Fromm "discovers" the three compulsive mechanisms of escape from freedom.

The unconscious compulsive mechanism called "masochism-sadism" is one means Fromm "discovered" by use of the psychoanalytic techniques whereby the individual seeks "to escape his unbearable feeling of aloneness and powerlessness." Under compulsion of the masochistic mechanism the frightened individual seeks for somebody or something to submit himself to. He cannot bear to be his individual self any longer and he tries frantically, according to Fromm, to gain a sense of security by getting rid of his tortured, isolated, and powerless self. To be rid of the cross of negative freedom he seeks to lose himself in something other than himself. The person in whom such a mechanism has been formed feels irresistibly impelled to give himself completely to some other person or to some cause.

The perverted form of the masochistic mechanism is the submission of one's body or spirit to pain and agony inflicted by oneself or by another person. The more common, non-perverted form simply involves on the one hand loss of self and on the other

identification with some other person or thing. The trouble is, Fromm says, that the masochistic mechanism solves nothing. It may alleviate suffering, but it leaves the person acting under the compulsion with all his original doubts and fears. The masochistic compulsion is therefore an *irrational* solution, for it does not remove the cause of pain, but merely covers it up. It is an astrich policy.

Fromm compares the masochistic mechanism to the irrational behavior of an individual in a panic when trapped in a burning building. He may hide in a closet instead of descending the stairs while they are still intact. "In the same way," he says, "the masochistic strivings are caused by the desire to get rid of the individual self with all its shortcomings, conflicts, risks, doubts and unbearable aloneness, but they only succeed in removing the most noticeable pain or they even lead to greater suffering." And he adds, "The irrationality of masochism, as of all other neurotic manifestations, consists in the ultimate futility of the means adopted to solve an untenable emotional situation."¹¹ Here Fromm speaks of the irrational-compulsive character of masochism as a "neurotic manifestation." But in fact he is describing what he believes to be one of the most prevalent types of the psychological mechanisms produced by capitalist society and its negative freedom. Thus he is not describing particular individual neurotics but rather large sections of the national population living in a monopoly capitalist form of society. Almost all people in such a social system, he maintains, are suffering from one or another type of neurotic-compulsive, irrational mechanism which unconsciously determines their feelings, acts, and thoughts.

The sadistic compulsive mechanism consists in an irresistible impulse to escape feelings of aloneness and powerlessness by acquiring mastery over another person, to make him or her a helpless tool of will and desire, to be the absolute ruler and arbiter of another's fate, to play the part of a god. In the perverted form the compulsive striving is to humiliate the subordinate person, to enslave him and make him suffer, to inflict pain without possibility of resistance or retaliation. Again, the sadistic mechanism is not only compulsive but irrational, for it does not eliminate or even

reduce the suffering of the sadistic self, but merely conceals it while leading to greater suffering. "The craving for power," Fromm says, "is the most significant expression of sadism."¹² And thus the sadistic-compulsive mechanism is viewed as exceedingly common in capitalist society.*

Together, the masochistic and sadistic mechanisms of compulsive-irrational motivation comprise what Fromm calls either the "sado-masochistic character" or the "authoritarian character"—the drive to selfless submission to authority and the drive to exercise absolute authority.

This constitutes Fromm's reconstruction of Freud's anal and oral character structures. The content of the compulsive mechanism is the same, only the Freudian biological, sexual-organ theory of origin is exchanged for a theory of social genesis. By "character" Fromm means the complex of unconscious-compulsive mechanisms which determine the feelings, acts, and thoughts of a given person. If a group of people—a class, a nation—exhibit certain common compulsive mechanisms he calls this "the social character structure." We will see later how Fromm utilizes the authoritarian or sado-masochistic character structure to account in part for fascism in Germany.

The second compulsive psychological mechanism discussed by Fromm is an irresistible drive to destruction. The striving for destruction is likewise an attempt to escape from unbearable feelings of powerlessness and isolation. This time the "solution" is to destroy the world and thus eliminate the cause of the intolerable feelings. The outcome, however, is simply more feelings of hopelessness and aloneness. The drive to destruction is composed of compulsive mechanisms of hostility and aggression. It is "irrational destructiveness" because it is not reactive to things that de-

* Fromm also reconstructs the *Oedipus Complex* on the basis of the sado-masochistic mechanisms. He speaks of "the magic helper" who may be a parent or a teacher to whom the child with a masochistic-compulsive mechanism submits in selfless devotion. In later adolescence and adult life this compulsive-irrational submission may be transferred to such father-mother images as husbands, wives, and bosses or political leaders—or one's psychologist. (Fromm, *Escape from Freedom*, pp. 174-179.)

serve to be destroyed, but is an internal need for destruction, hostility, and aggression which expresses itself on any possible occasion. Fromm speaks of "a reservoir of destructiveness" within a person in whom the destructive mechanism has been formed. It is an "irrational destructiveness" in which "destructive impulses are a passion within a person, and they always succeed in finding some object." The compulsive-irrational mechanism of destructiveness constitutes Fromm's reconstruction of Freud's *death instinct* with its aggressive and hostile drives. The reformed version views the mechanism of compulsive destructiveness, the death striving, not as an instinct but as a capitalist-determined escape mechanism from unbearable bourgeois-negative freedom. The more that positive freedom, the freedom to live fully and develop one's potentiality, is thwarted under capitalism, the more the life-energy, Fromm maintains, "undergoes a process of decomposition and changes into energies directed toward destruction." And he adds, "the social conditions that make for suppression of life produce the passion for destruction. . . ." ¹³ He considers the destructive-aggressive-hostile mechanism of compulsive motivation to have been also an additional element in Nazism.

The third important psychological mechanisms is what Fromm calls "automaton conformity." It too is a compulsive escape from freedom, from the intolerable feelings of powerlessness and insignificance induced by capitalist society. This mechanism consists, first, in the individual ceasing to be himself and, second, in his adoption of the kind of personality offered him by the society in which he lives. He becomes exactly as all others are, sinks into the mass indistinguishable from others, and becomes what "they" expect him to be. Fromm likens this mechanism to the protective coloring assumed by certain animals. By giving up his self and assuming a self conforming to the cultural pattern, the person would rid himself of his feelings of aloneness and anxiety. However, he only succeeds in heightening his feelings of isolation and insignificance, since he has lost his self, the most painful and tortured condition of all. Thus the automaton-conformist mechanism is just as irrational as the sado-masochistic and the destructive compulsions. It is not reactive to environmental conditions

and therefore is wholly ineffective in removing causes of pain and anxiety. It is an internal psychological drive to lose oneself and develop a conforming personality. It is compulsive, not reactive, irrational, not rational.

However, the person who has developed a compulsive conformist mechanism is not necessarily aware of the alienation of his self, of the pseudo nature of his feelings, acts, and thoughts. He has repressed his real self and identified with his assumed automaton-conformity self. He takes his pseudo-thought feelings and behavior for his own. Pseudo-thinking, feeling, and acting have been unconsciously substituted for their genuine counterparts. The only way to discover the real thoughts, acts, and feelings, the real self, according to Fromm, is by applying the psychoanalytic techniques of dream interpretation, free association, and the analysis of transference phenomena. In this manner the compulsive mechanism of automaton-conformity can be outflanked and the analyst can penetrate the defenses and resistances to reveal the true self lying buried in the unconscious mind.

Fromm says of the automaton-conformity compulsion: "This particular mechanism is the solution that the majority of normal individuals find in modern society." It is, he holds, the most prevalent compulsive drive in capitalist-bourgeois democratic society, and particularly in the United States. But it is also an ingredient in fascism, for the loss of self and the substitution of a pseudo-self leave the individual in an intensified state of anxiety verging on panic and of helplessness and insecurity. "Thus," says Fromm, "he is ready to submit to new authorities which offer him security and relief from doubt." The pseudo-automaton-conforming self is an escape from unbearable feelings, but these feelings are merely concealed or repressed by the compulsive mechanism. The feelings, like Freud's instinct drives, are too powerful to be completely or permanently repressed, however, and will always succeed in expressing themselves in disguised and circuitous forms—in dreams, fantasies, inadvertent behavior and associations, and in transferred attitudes and emotions. It is the task of psychoanalysis, by means of its special techniques, to interpret these symbolic disguises and uncover the real self, the real and intolerable feel-

ings of powerlessness, fear, and anxiety under the compulsion of which the pseudo-self, the compulsive mechanism of automaton-conformity, was formed in the first place.

For these and other psychological mechanisms of escape, Fromm maintains that capitalism and especially monopoly capitalism are the ultimate causes. The panic feelings induced by them in turn induce a compulsion to escape the intolerable feelings. This compulsion in its turn induces the compulsive escape mechanisms. The main point here is that capitalism induces not rational-reactive methods such as the use of knowledge and truth and effective means based on them, but rather it induces irrational-compulsive mechanisms not in any sense qualitatively different from neurotic phenomena. What Fromm in effect is saying is that capitalism all but universally engenders not mental health but mental illness. Neurosis is the end-product of capitalism as far as the individual is concerned. Since he holds that society is composed only of the individuals within it, he also maintains that modern society, monopoly capitalism, is mentally sick, is neurotic. Thus he speaks of his analysis as "the diagnosis of the illness of present-day Western culture."¹⁴ "Western" society is sick and the vast majority if not all people living in it are mentally ill in varying degrees. This is the case, according to Fromm, because compulsive, irrational motivation has replaced reason, knowledge, and truth, or, in other words, rational activity. And the unbearable "negative freedom" of capitalism is the underlying cause.

Fromm sums up the difference between neurotic activity and rational activity: "In the latter the *result* corresponds to the motivation of an activity—one acts in order to attain a certain result. In neurotic strivings one acts from a compulsion which has essentially a negative character: to escape an unbearable situation." He enlarges on the neurotic activities or strivings: "The strivings tend in a direction which only fictitiously is a solution. Actually the result is contradictory to what the person wants to attain; the compulsion to get rid of an unbearable feeling was so strong that the person was unable to choose a line of action that could be a solution in any other but a fictitious sense."¹⁵ For Fromm, the central fact is that neurotic activity is the "normal," in the sense

of overwhelmingly prevalent activity. Capitalism engenders neurotic, irrational, compulsive feeling, acting, and thinking. Irrational-compulsive neurotic activity seeks only fictitiously to *escape* the effects of capitalism, not to change it. This constitutes Fromm's reconstruction of psychoanalysis. Rational-reactive-healthy activity, on the other hand, would seek not to escape capitalism but to transform it into a society which would meet human rational needs and aspirations. Such rational activity would be directed toward the transformation of capitalism into socialism. That this is indeed the perspective held out by Fromm will be seen later. In the meantime an examination of his analysis of fascism and political democracy will indicate how he views the interrelation of the psychological, or more accurately the psychoanalytic, and sociological factors.

FROMM'S INTERRELATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL FACTORS

Fromm holds that from the very beginnings of capitalism feelings of aloneness and powerlessness gripped those persons, workers, and entrepreneurs who were swept into the vortex of capitalist economic relations. On the basis of these unbearable feelings even the earliest bourgeois people were compulsively impelled to develop the various escape mechanisms such as the sado-masochistic, the destructive, and the automaton-conformative irrational drives. It is Fromm's contention that the development of these compulsive-neurotic mechanisms was absolutely indispensable for the further development of capitalism, equally as essential as the development of industry and commerce, indeed a prerequisite for their evolution, as well as a product of it.

Capitalism, he maintains, gave rise to the compulsive motivations but at the same time the latter were a pre-condition for the rise of capitalism. For example, capitalists themselves developed, and still continue to develop, the compulsive mechanism of sadism, an irrational lust for power, property, profit, and the accumulation of capital all built on the exploitation and suffering of the masses of people who were forced to submit absolutely to their will. Workers, on the other hand, developed, and still con-

tinue to develop, the masochistic compulsion to surrender their selves and submit to the great power of the capitalists. Thus both capitalists and workers are said to attempt to escape their intolerable complex of feelings by compulsively losing their selves respectively in power and submission. These compulsive mechanisms were and are, according to Fromm, essential conditions for the rise and development of capitalism. They are alleged also to have been essential for the transformation of competitive capitalism into its monopoly phase. Monopoly capitalism at one and the same time engendered and required a great heightening of both sadism and masochism, the compulsive power-drive of monopolists and the compulsive submission-drive of workers. It induced in addition a widespread masochistic mechanism among the smaller capitalists themselves, among those who were swallowed and absorbed by the giant monopolies.

In the bourgeois form of the state and politics, Fromm says, the compulsive mechanism of automaton-conformity plays a major role. Especially in its monopoly stage capitalism requires and engenders a compulsive conformity in political thought and attitudes. People compulsively believe that the thoughts and attitudes of the monopolists are their own beliefs and thoughts, that the candidates of the monopolists are their own candidates, monopoly policies their own policies, the monopoly economic system their own system. The facts Fromm cites are clearly true and reflect the actual situation. But the existence of a phenomenon is no proof of any given explanation of that phenomenon.

Fromm is saying that monopoly capitalism both produces and is the product of economic and political attitudes and thoughts which are determined by compulsive psychological mechanisms. The thoughts and attitudes of people living under monopoly capitalism are indeed widely those of monopoly capitalism. This can be accounted for far more simply by the scientific hypothesis that the thoughts and attitudes dominant at a given time and place are the thoughts and attitudes of the dominant section of the population, that section which owns and controls the opinion-making institutions and mass media. To maintain this thesis is a far cry from holding that the thoughts and attitudes of people are com-

pulsively sadistic or masochistic and that the social, economic, and political system is a product of such neurotic mechanisms, as well as producing them. Fromm makes the psychological factor at least equally as important and determining as the sociological factor. In point of fact, he further reduces the psychological factor to a psychiatric or psychoanalytic one by his insistence on the neurotic character of the psychological factor.

The psychoanalytic factor, according to Fromm, is thus inextricably interwoven with the sociological factor, as the warp and woof of capitalist society. In this manner he reforms Freud's principle that unconscious neurotic-compulsive intra-psychic dynamics plays a decisive role in historical development. Freud accomplished this by stressing anti-human instincts and their repression by society. Fromm achieves the same end by viewing the psychoanalytic compulsive ego-defenses as at least equal in importance to the sociological realities.

The interweaving of the two factors can be seen dramatically at work in Fromm's analysis of Nazism. On the one hand, he speaks of the sociological factor giving rise to and sustaining Nazism as the reactionary combination of finance capital and the Junker landed gentry. This grouping, under the impact of world depression and defeat in war, set in motion an imperialist drive to redivide Europe and the colonial world. On the other hand, according to Fromm, the numerically small but financially powerful imperialist group could not implement its policy of expansion without first neutralizing the socialist-oriented working class and without gaining the fervent support of the middle class and the petty bourgeoisie. The first requisite was met by reinforcing the masochistic and automaton-conformity compulsive mechanisms said by him to be characteristic of the mentality of the working masses. The second task was accomplished by giving full scope to the middle class and petty bourgeois compulsive mechanism of sadism. These middle strata became the mass base of Nazism with its racism, torture, brutality, and gas ovens. Fromm thus constructs an explanation of Nazism compounded equally of the neurotic-compulsive mechanism of escape from unbearable negative freedom and of the objective imperialist grouping of monopoly capi-

talism and the Junker class. He gives equal weight to the psychoanalytic and the sociological factors in his account of German fascism.

Modern history, Fromm asserts, will swing uneasily like a pendulum between capitalist pseudo-democracy and fascism just so long as the two psychic mechanisms of masochism-sadism and automaton-conformity alternate in ascendancy. The mechanisms give rise to capitalism and its forms of political hegemony, and the latter give rise to the neurotic mechanisms. The circle appears hopelessly vicious.

The only avenue of escape from the dilemma, says Fromm, is to replace capitalism with a socialist society. A socialist society would be a sane society, but the problem is how to attain it.

FROMM'S "SANE SOCIETY"

"The only constructive solution," Fromm states flatly, "is that of Socialism." He maintains that only socialism can overcome the alienation of people and things, the exploitation, the crises and wars, the psychological consequences of isolation, powerlessness, and anxiety, and the compulsive neurotic mechanisms of escape from negative freedom, all of which are characteristic of capitalism, particularly in the monopoly phase. Socialism would substitute a rational society and a rational psychological make-up in the place of their irrational bourgeois counterparts. Socialism is the solution, he says, because it "aims at a fundamental reorganization of our economic and social system in the direction of freeing man from being used as a means for purposes outside himself, of creating a social order in which human solidarity, reason and productiveness are furthered rather than hobbled."¹⁶ That socialism is the solution is, he maintains, self-evident. The real problem, however, is to find the right road to such a sane society.

A first step in the quest for this road is to recognize "the tragic mistake of Marx." According to Fromm, Marx was tragically mistaken in his view of man as a *rational* being. He did not know the "great truth" discovered by Freud: that man is an irrational animal, that he is driven by compulsive neurotic strivings which determine his thoughts, acts, and feelings, and that his vaunted

reason is for the most part only a servant of his irrational unconscious impulses, that his rational thought is largely *rationalization*. Had Marx but known this, he would not have stressed the socialization of the means of production as the primary factor in the transformation of capitalism into socialism, nor would he have viewed the modern working class as the prime moving force in the socialist revolution. "Marx had underestimated the complexity of human passions," Fromm says. "He did not sufficiently see the passions and strivings which are rooted in man's nature, and in the conditions of his existence, and which are in themselves the most powerful driving force for human development. . . . He did not recognize the irrational forces in man which make him afraid of freedom, and which produce his lust for power and his destructiveness." The working class cannot be relied upon, according to Fromm, because its members, along with the rest of the people living within capitalism, think, act, and feel under the neurotic unconscious compulsion of pathological mental escape mechanisms. The socialization of the means of production would only substitute one compulsively motivated class for another, the working class for the capitalist class. Marx, in short, "did not see that a better society could not be brought into life by people who had not undergone a moral change within themselves." Individuals must first be cured of their neurotic compulsions before there can be a transition to socialism. Far from recognizing this "fact," Marx maintained an "oversimplified, over optimistic, rationalistic picture of man."¹⁷

Contrary to Marx' view of man as rational and mentally healthy, Fromm insists that people living within capitalist society are irrational, compulsive, and neurotic if not psychotic. Since according to him society is composed only of the individuals living within it, he speaks of an irrational, neurotic, sick society which must be treated by the same therapeutic means as are employed by psychoanalysis in the treatment of individuals. Society can be changed only by changing the individuals who compose it. Treatment of society means treatment of the ingredient individuals. This treatment requires first that the individual be made aware of his unconscious compulsive strivings to escape negative

freedom, and second that the individual be made aware of his unconscious repressed striving for positive freedom. The cure of individual pathology is at the same time "a cure of social pathology." The chief agency of social change is not historical forces but, according to Fromm, "humanistic psychoanalysis." The agent that can lay bare the unconscious mechanisms and repressions is the reformed psychoanalyst, and it is he upon whom the responsibility for social change, the transformation of capitalism into socialism, rests. He alone can regenerate individuals who will go forth to establish little centers or cells of socialism within the old order. As more and more individuals are cured of their neurotic character configurations, the new society will spread and eventually replace the capitalist order. Some day all mankind will be psychoanalytically cured and socialism will become the universal form of life on earth.

For intellectual support Fromm appeals to the 19th century Utopian socialists—Proudhon, Fourier, and Robert Owen—and to the anarchists, syndicalists, and guild socialists. "They stressed the organization of work and the social relations among men," Fromm says, "not primarily the question of ownership." Following their lead he cites at length a number of agrarian, industrial, and commercial "share the profit" experiments in the United States, Europe, and Israel, and asserts that the decisive element is not ownership but "the principle of co-management and workers' participation." "The principal point here," he says, "is not ownership of the means of production, but participation in management and decision-making." Owners, managers and workers would then become a "team" working with other "teams" for the benefit of mankind and not solely for profit. Fromm calls this orientation "Humanistic Communitarian socialism." He says that this movement was once quite powerful particularly among Spanish and French Anarchists and Syndicalists, and among the Russian Social Revolutionaries. Until recently however it has been losing ground to the Marxist-Leninist orientation, Fromm complains, but is now being revived although in a "less dogmatic less ideological and hence a more real and concrete" form, a form, that is, which is being shaped in large part by psychoanalysis with

its theories of the neurotic compulsive character structure of modern man.

Although in the beginning Fromm had decried the cynicism and pessimism of Freud with regard to future individual and social development—which the latter saw as leading only to deeper neurosis and greater destruction in war—now he himself concludes on a note of despair. He sees U.S. capitalism and Soviet socialism as becoming more and more identical, with the little humanistic communitarian units all but crushed by the two giants. "What then," he asks, "are the prospects for the future?" And he answers, "The first, and perhaps most likely possibility is atomic war." But even if war is avoided, since the individual and society are both sick with neurotic compulsions, there can only be a greater degree of "automaton-robotism." "Our dangers are war and robotism," he says, and adds that although there is still some hope "the shadows are lengthening; the voices of insanity are becoming louder."¹⁸

Since Fromm's diagnosis is universal pathology, he can only pin hope on individual cure of insanity, and since there are not sufficient psychoanalysts and certainly not enough reformed humanistic analysts to accomplish the task he is bound to end on a note of utter hopelessness. War and self-destruction are all but inevitable, and thus Freud's death drive is reinstated supreme. The Freudian conclusions cannot be circumvented when the Freudian premises are maintained in whatever revised or reformed version. If neurotic compulsive strivings are held to be the determining feature in man's mental life, the conclusion must necessarily be one of darkness and despair. Gone therewith is all possibility of successful resistance to war and of effective social revolution. Thus in spite of Fromm's personal feelings and even actions on the side of peace and banning the bomb and some form of socialism, his theory, his theoretical reformation of psychoanalysis makes these things abstractly impossible. By employing the essential psychoanalytic framework he succeeds ultimately in formulating just one more psychoanalytic rationale for the existent order—and this in spite of his bruising indictment of capitalism and more especially of its monopoly stage.

It was said at the outset that Fromm employs Marx, or his one-sided version of Marx, to reform Freud. It must now be added that in the end he employs Freud to reform if not to repudiate Marx.

In his analysis of capitalism and its effect on people Fromm constructs a vicious circle from which only the psychoanalyst offers a way out: Capitalism mass produces neurotics and in turn neurotics originate and perpetuate the mass neurosis which is capitalism.

A sick society produces sick people and the sick people reproduce the characteristic features of that society. At the same time Fromm envisages a sane society, socialism, which will produce sane and healthy people. A problem arises however when the question of how such a society is to be established. In view of the alleged fact that people living in a capitalist society are universally sick and therefore incapable either of breaking out of their sick society or of building socialism, the only solution of the dilemma is the cure of individual neurotics who will then set up little socialist oases in the capitalist desert. The key to the future of man, individually and collectively, lies therefore in the therapy of mental illness, the business of the psychoanalyst. Thus the psychoanalyst becomes the main reliance in the transition to socialism. Individual conversion of moral character has always been the mark of utopian socialism. Fromm reforms the utopian theory into a utopian therapy. Moral regeneration becomes the cure for neurosis. The social reformer becomes the reformed analyst.

Chapter 7

REFORMATION OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

The psychoanalytic reformists carried the contradiction within psychoanalysis to a new level. That contradiction was first established through the inroads made on orthodox Freudianism by the external pressures of the sciences. The closed, monolithic system constructed so laboriously by Freud had been split down the middle under the impact of developments in the science of anthropology. The prehistoric source of the innate mental constructs had been discarded as untenable in the face of universal rejection of the myth of the primal horde. Revised psychoanalysis was an attempt to salvage the id by sacrificing its racial origins. This concession to science, apparently so inconsequential, in fact initiated a fundamental inconsistency in what had been a totally self-consistent body of theory. No longer was Freudianism a unified whole in which each element of the individual unconscious was rooted in an alleged experience of primitive man. No longer could the development of the individual psyche be said to be pre-determined by racial memories and to have the inevitability of a recapitulation of the course of pre-history.

Revised Freudianism was put in the unenviable position of having to maintain that there are innate memories of non-existent events. It was one thing to affirm an innate Oedipus complex when the components of that complex were said to be unconscious inborn memories of a time when the human race had lived it. But it was quite another thing to have to uphold the Oedipus memory while at the same time having to deny that there had ever been such an era in human history. The denial of the one theoretical element insistently demanded the repudiation of the other.

If there were no such events then there could of course be no such memories, however unconscious. No amount of rationalizing could conceal the contradiction. Either there is a source of the innate memories or there are no such memories. To this day the majority of psychoanalysts continue to draw a veil of silence over this fatal flaw in their thinking, and go on practicing and writing as though it simply did not exist.

Horney and Fromm opened the closet door and exposed the family skeleton. The rage of the Freudian analysts 20 years later still knows no bounds. The reformists have been anathematized, excommunicated, and expelled from association with the initiate. They will never be forgiven, for theirs was the crime of crimes, the Judas kiss of betrayal. They pointed out the inconsistency and proposed to resolve it by repudiating the alleged innate memories as well as the supposed prehistoric referents. By this simple and forthright expedient they exorcised the contradiction inherent in revised psychoanalysis and thereby at the same time theoretically destroyed classic Freudianism. Deprived of its stock of inborn memory-drives, the id ceases to exist, and without the id Freud's system collapses in upon itself like a house of cards.

If this exposure of Freudianism had not come from within, if Horney, Sullivan, and Fromm had not themselves been psychoanalysts, the theoretical denouement of Freud's system might have signified the end of the road for psychoanalysis as an approach to mental life. But such was not the case. All three were intent above all on preserving the essence of psychoanalysis, in the first place by sacrificing its Freudian form. The sacrifice being accomplished, the problem facing the reformists was twofold: what is the essence of psychoanalysis; and how can it be given a new non-Freudian form; how, that is, can it be *reformed*.

The essence of the psychoanalytic approach to the human mind, as the reformists saw it, consisted first in the contention that man's thinking, feeling, motivation, and behavior are determined by unconscious, intramental forces; second, that these forces are deeply imbedded in the mind and therefore inaccessible to consciousness; third, that they do succeed in penetrating consciousness but only under symbolic disguises; fourth, that the

techniques discovered by Freud are essential means of trapping the unconscious material and of translating the symbols and thereby making it possible to bring the unconscious forces before the conscious mind; fifth, that the conscious ego would resist all such attempts; sixth, that only by a long and painful process of "working through" could the resistances be overcome and the unconscious motivations be revealed; finally, that both cure of neurosis and transformation of character depend on making the unconscious conscious. While there are specific differences among the reformists, they all accept the five general features which together constitute the essence of psychoanalysis apart from its particular Freudian form. At the same time they share a common approach with regard to the reforming of this essence.

Horney and Fromm agree in broad outline on a rough sketch of the human mental predicament: the ego, threatened by an overpowering contradictory and hostile social environment, constructs unconscious defense mechanisms which then determine the thinking, feeling, motivation, and behavior of the individual. The latter is unaware of the compulsion by unconscious mechanisms and thinks that he is acting consciously and rationally. His character structure and personality are rooted in his unconscious ego-defenses and he will resist with all his strength any and all attempts to make him face the "facts." The Freudian techniques of dream interpretation, free association, and transference phenomena together with the translation of their symbolic language constitute the primary means of "working through" the resistances to awareness of the compulsive defense mechanisms. This extended and tortuous process of making the unconscious conscious constitutes the course of a psychoanalysis in which the limited objective is the removal of "neurotic" symptoms and the maximum goal is the transformation of character from compulsive to rational motivation.

The identity and the difference between Freudianism and the reformed version of psychoanalysis can be dramatized by contrasting their slogans. Freud's famous dictum, "Where there was id, let there be ego," is in sharp *contrast* within an *essential identity* with the reformist slogan, "Where there was ego-defense, let

there be ego." The essential identity is the implied imperative, "make what is unconscious conscious." The contrast lies in *what* is to be made conscious, in the one instance unconscious id, and in the other unconscious ego-defense. The *means* for making what was unconscious conscious is in both cases the same, namely, the Freudian techniques. These techniques are the professional *sine qua non* of psychoanalytic practice, Freudian or otherwise. Therefore, if there is to be a theoretical rationale for that practice, there must be some kind of psychological system which allows for unconscious motivation, resistance to awareness of it, and penetration of consciousness by symbolically disguised representations of unconscious motivations. Given these theoretical requisites in whatever form, the symbol-reading interpretation of the imagery collected from dreams, free associations, and transferred emotions comprise a perfectly logical means for making the unconscious conscious. Both Freudianism and its reformed version provide the necessary rationalization for the employment of the stock-in-trade techniques of psychoanalytic practice.

While the leading reformists agree on the broad outline for a reformed psychoanalysis, they differ in the manner of filling in the details. Karen Horney retained the concept of inborn mental drives but limited them to two biologically derived general needs: the need for safety and the need for satisfaction. In contemporary society the two needs, she maintains, are not only contradictory but doomed to frustration. The child early learns this hard fact of life and constructs defenses against the ensuing pain, disappointment, and anxiety. These childhood ego-defenses become the unconscious foundation on which the adult self-image is built. The ego thus has a stake in the continued existence of the defense mechanisms and will resist bitterly any threat to them from whatever source, family, friends, teacher, boss, spouse, or psychoanalyst. The ego is threatened by the environment, not as with Freud by the id. The conscious mind is viewed as being caught, not between irreconcilable unconscious drives and taboos of innate id and super-ego, but between the battering demands of a brutally overpowering society on the one hand and the defenses set up against them on the other. The pressure of external

social forces rather than of internal id-drives constitutes the threat to the ego and its defenses.

Horney was the originator of the reformed psychoanalytic theory. The others followed her lead with regard to the general theoretical structure but made their own refinements. Sullivan rejected entirely the notion of inborn drives or needs and relied solely on interpersonal relations to meet the psychoanalytic requirements. He maintained that the child developed compulsive mechanisms to deal with the environmental social relations and that the adult character structure was erected on that base. The mature individual mind, therefore, was viewed by Sullivan as having a stake in the maintenance of the unconscious ego-mechanisms, called self-dynamisms, and would resist threats to them from any source, including the analyst. Thus he arrives at the same destination as Horney, albeit by a slightly different route. The primary difference consists in his exclusive reliance on environmental factors, without recourse to innate psychic elements of any kind.

Fromm, in his early works, returns to Horney's conception of a predatory, contemporary society, but he spells out in detail the features of capitalism which make it a traumatic experience for any individual living within it. So traumatic is the experience, as Fromm depicts it, that the conscious mind cannot face the reality, but must construct unconscious defense mechanisms in the form of escapes from freedom or rationality. These escape-defense mechanisms constitute the basis on which the individual character structure is formed and any threat to their unconscious status is resisted with all the passion and power at the command of the ego.

The leading reformists thus arrive at the same conclusion by somewhat differing lines of reasoning. Whatever the differences, each has reformed psychoanalytic theory in such a manner as to furnish a fully adequate rationale for the continued employment of the Freudian analytic procedures, whether concerned with the general task of character transformation or with the more specific one of therapeutic treatment of "neurotic" symptoms. With regard to the cure of neurosis, the objective of reformed psycho-

analysis was the same as that of orthodox and revised Freudianism, namely, the rehabilitation of the patient. The manner of accomplishing this, however, was different. The reformists viewed therapy as a means for strengthening the ego-defenses so that they could in fact defend the ego effectively from environmental threats. In this way, the cured patient could reenter the normal daily round of living within his family circle, at his job, and as a citizen. This is what Freud called "adjusting" the patient to his social surroundings, the minimal goal of psychoanalysis. The maximum objective of the reformists was a deep-seated character transformation in which the individual mind would be fully rational and would cease to be determined in its activity by unconscious, irrational, emotional, compulsive defense mechanisms. This could be accomplished only through the elimination of the ego-defenses and the substitution of perception, intelligence, thought, logic, and reason in their place.

INFLUENCES LEADING TO THE REFORM MOVEMENT

In practice and in theory the reform psychoanalysts were little concerned with specific neurotic symptoms, their treatment and cure, but directed their attention almost exclusively to the problem of character transformation. This was not so much a matter of theoretical choice as it was the result of a profound change in the type of patients seeking psychoanalytic help. Where formerly the majority of patients had suffered from genuine neuroses, and therefore the minimum goal of psychoanalysis was predominant, from the 'thirties on more and more people sought the help of psychoanalysts not strictly as patients but as wanting and needing aid in meeting the pressures of an intolerably complex social environment. These latter "patients" constituted the majority in the 'thirties, and by the 'fifties had all but usurped the attention of the analysts of whatever persuasion. The maximum aim of character transformation thus became the primary concern of psychoanalysis. The new type of patient complained of "unhappiness," "anxiety," and "feelings of aloneness," "frustration," "guilt," and "ineffectiveness," rather than of specific neurotic, that is, neurological or pathophysiological, symptoms.

This radical change in type of patients was in all probability a contributing factor in the development of reformed psychoanalysis. It was one of the external influences which acted on the contradiction within revised analysis to speed up the processes of internal change. Other influential factors were also at work to produce a socially oriented form of psychoanalysis in the place of the innate sexual orientation of Freudianism. Chief among these influences were the Great Depression of the 'thirties and the anti-fascist war of the 'forties. Such world-shaking social events stood in sharp contrast to the exclusive Freudian concern with innately preordained intra-personal and inter-familial psycho-dramas. It was not as easy as it had been in the opening decades of the century to reduce the world to the dimensions of the self and the family constellation. World forces broke through the closed id-ego-super-ego cycle and demanded more realistic attention. The reformation of Freudianism, from this vantage point, can be viewed as an attempt to adopt psychoanalysis not only to new patients, but to a new world where the stepped-up pace of events could no longer be ignored.

In addition to depression and war, the radical world events included an entire chain of socialist revolutions starting with Russia and continuing through China. With one-third of the world living under socialism and subscribing to the philosophy and social science of Marxism, the latter could no longer be ignored or wished or persecuted into oblivion. Marxism was one of the external influences at work on the contradiction within Freudianism hastening and shaping its reformation.

A new, strictly speaking non-neurotic type of "patient," depression, war, and Marxism combined as external influences to exert strong pressure on Freudianism. This pressure from the outside coincided with the developing weakness within revised psychoanalysis which was already moving it in the direction of greater emphasis on the environment and on ego-defenses and secondary processes. The result was a reformed analytical system constructed in terms of social rather than innate forces.

Reformed psychoanalysis was indeed admirably suited to win adherents especially in the crisis decades of the 'thirties and

'forties, and particularly among liberals and progressives of the middle strata. The latter could join in a chorus of denunciation of capitalism and the more daring could even throw in an apparent espousal of Marxism, while in the same breath they gave their full measure of devotion to a reformed, socially oriented psychoanalysis and their indignant, even outraged, opposition to "that reactionary, Sigmund Freud" with his id and his infantile pan-sexual theories.

The new socially oriented psychoanalysis, however, engendered its own peculiar set of difficulties. These difficulties are in fact expressions of a deep-seated contradiction within reformed analysis, a contradiction which impelled Fromm in his later works to return to the innate structure of classical Freudianism in an attempt to resolve it.

THE PRIMARY CONTRADICTION WITHIN REFORMED PSYCHOANALYSIS

It has been noted that the major preoccupation of reformed psychoanalysis was with character transformation rather than with the pathological syndromes of neurosis. This primary concern was a direct result of the change in type of patients. The new "patients" were said to be neurotic but not suffering from neurosis. Neurologically speaking, they were healthy. The first difficulty is how a healthy person can be called a neurotic. The psychoanalytic answer is that neurotic character structure, or personality, is universal in modern man living in contemporary society. Freud held that neuroses were universal because all people had an intra-mental irreconcilable conflict between the drives of the id and the requirements of civil society embodied in the super-ego. Similarly the reformists, to rationalize their concern with non-sick people, had to maintain that neurotic personality is universal. To do this they were led to view capitalism as a universal source of traumatic experience. The alleged omnipresent trauma was then said to be responsible for the genesis of ego-defense mechanisms in all people.

In this manner the reformist theoreticians overcame the first difficulty, how a neurologically healthy person can be called neu-

rotic. The solution itself, however, raised a further difficulty. To establish the contention that neurotic personality is universal, capitalism, the social environment, had of necessity to be considered as wholly negative, irrational, and predatory. It had, that is, to be considered as exclusively traumatic in its effect on people living within it. At the same time the reformists maintained that the goal of reformed analysis was to transform the character or personality from irrational compulsive motivation to rational reactive motivation. Relieved of his ego-defenses the regenerated individual was to place full reliance on perception, intelligence, logical thought, and reason. The theoretical difficulty arises when the regenerated personality has to reenter and live within the same irrational and predatory capitalist society which had induced the construction of the unconscious ego-defenses and the neurotic personality in the first place. Only this time the newly freed person has to submit himself to the universal trauma of capitalism without his ego-defenses. His intelligence and reason now have to deal with what has been posited as a wholly irrational and predatory environment. His new mental powers are not suitable, for how can reason make sense of what *by definition* defies reason? The presumption is that the transformed personality would either commit suicide forthwith, or would in the interest of simple self-preservation reform his old ego-defenses and thereby his old neurotic personality; in other words, "escape from freedom."

This difficulty already with Horney had assumed the proportions of a contradiction, and she herself had begun before her death to express doubts whether a transformation of character was possible while capitalism continued in existence. Perhaps analysis could do no better than to help develop a more effective syndrome of ego-defenses in the adaptation of the individual to the capitalist environment. Fromm, however, was not willing to settle for the minimum goals of analysis and advanced the concept of a transformed rational society as the answer. The newly transformed rational individual would avoid the horns of the dilemma—suicide, or reconstitution of the ego-defenses—if he could re-

enter not the old irrational, predatory capitalism but a rational productive society such as "socialism."

The problem here, of course, was that in the United States capitalism was still very much alive. Perhaps the new personality should migrate to the Soviet Union? This Fromm maintained was no answer for on his premises the USSR could not be a rational, productive society. Had it not been built by people who had their own ego-defenses and neurotic personalities induced by the predatory and irrational nature of Tsarist Russia? Without the transformation of character resulting from analysis, the founders of the Soviet Union could, Fromm maintained, achieve no more than another irrational, predatory society. Only psychoanalytically regenerated people could build a regenerated, socialist society. The USSR, he concluded, furnishes a social environment no better, no more rational, no more humanly productive than capitalism.

What, then, was Fromm's solution? People whose characters had been transformed through analysis should join together in little communities in the United States, form model socialist cells, which eventually would set an example for the country as a whole. This, of course, was a recommendation to revive the old notion of Utopian socialist communities. The trouble was that they had been tried, Fromm says, at New Harmony and Brook Farm, among other places, and had failed. He then suggests that labor-management experiments in cooperative living might be the answer, and he mentions, for example, the Hershey Chocolate company-town in Pennsylvania. Not even he could for long take himself seriously with such suggestions.

At this point in the middle of Fromm's career he faced a crisis. Transformation of character as required and outlined by reformed psychoanalysis, his own as well as Sullivan's and Horney's, was found to collapse in contradiction. Either he would have to settle for the minimum objective, adaptation to the existing society, or abandon reformed psychoanalysis altogether. This alternative was predicated on the very premises of reformed analysis. The latter had been theoretically forced to assume the monolithic evil of capitalism in order to insure a universal neurotic personality. Not being willing or able to settle for the lesser evil, Fromm

had no alternative but to jettison the socially-based psychoanalytic structure which Horney, Sullivan, and he himself had so carefully erected over a period of some 20 years.

The decision was presumably not easy for Fromm to make. It is never easy for an intellectual to face the negative character of a system of thought which he himself has helped to create and on which he has written volumes in development and defense. Fromm's decision demanded courage and he found the resources within himself to make it.

He had brought on himself the necessity for such a decision. He had been the one, after all, who carried the implications of the reformed psychoanalytic system to their logical conclusion. In doing so he had found that the theory landed in an absurd *cul de sac*. The regenerated individual had either to reenter an unregenerated capitalism, in which case he would be unable to maintain his new character and would revert to the neurotic personality of the time, or he would have to find or found a new society called "socialism." But the latter could not exist because the great masses of mankind were neurotic and could not therefore construct a new society. Here then was an unavoidable absurdity, unavoidable on the grounds of reformed psychoanalysis. Fromm's early works can be considered as explorations of the logical consequences of reformed psychoanalysis. Once Fromm had arrived at the final absurd consequence he was trapped. Ahead was the dead-end of futility and behind was the burned bridge of social adjustment, the minimum objective of psychoanalysis which had been a main target of scorn for two decades. He could not go forward and he could not retreat. Fromm was driven to recognize that character transformation within the framework of reformed psychoanalysis was a mockery. A still greater mockery would be an abandonment of character transformation and a retreat to mending ego-defenses and thereby adjusting "the neurotic" to "the times." Fromm's early works, especially *Escape from Freedom* and *The Sane Society*, serve the useful purpose of demonstrating the bankruptcy of reformed psychoanalysis. Fromm's abandonment of his own position bears witness to this bankruptcy. The negative part of his decision was correct. Having

made it, however, he had to go on and answer the question, Where do I go from here?

Whatever his own line of reasoning may have been, there was objectively a major choice to be made. He could either give up psychoanalysis altogether, or he could make a final attempt to reconstruct it. In the latter event, he would have to return to Freud and begin all over again, this time guided by the recent painful failure of a social orientation in reforming classical Freudianism. In the former case, he would have to adopt or construct a psychology entirely outside the framework of psychoanalysis. For this purpose he could salvage those aspects of his reformed psychoanalysis which had demonstrated their incompatibility with it, such as the general social orientation, the concern with the nature of capitalism, the recognition given to Marxism, and the humanist preoccupation with perception, intelligence, thinking, logic, knowledge, emotions and ideas, reason, love, the productive life, freedom, happiness, and well-being. Starting with these orientations, concerns, recognitions, and preoccupations, for which no place could be found within the structure of psychoanalytic theory, Fromm, with sufficient study, thought, and devotion, might have arrived at a rational approach to the human psyche.

Instead of taking this path, however, Fromm chose the first alternative and decided to remain securely within the psychoanalytic fold. He in fact made a long return journey to Freud's classical system with its innate memories and primitive, prehistoric referents, and proceeded to reconstruct the master's theories. Where Freud had viewed the innate memories as anti-humanist and destructive, Fromm now viewed them as humanist and productive. Where Freud had viewed man as innately inhuman and repression as necessary for the development of human society and human values, Fromm now viewed man as innately human and repression and society as anti-human. Thus Fromm's reconstruction of classical analysis stood Freud on his head. By this undignified feat Fromm was able to salvage, not what had been incompatible with psychoanalysis, but what had been com-

pletely consistent with it, namely the compulsive ego-defense mechanisms.

In Part III Fromm's reconstruction of classical psychoanalysis and the difficulties and contradictions to which it led are explored. In the meantime an examination of two psychoanalytic assumptions and of the alternative which Fromm might conceivably have chosen, will serve to confront reformed psychoanalysis not, as above, by its own internal inconsistencies and absurd logical consequences, but by some aspects of science and philosophy with which it is in sharp external contradiction.

Chapter 8

TWO ASSUMPTIONS OF REFORMED PSYCHOANALYSIS

The same two hypotheses which had led reformed psychoanalysis into its own insoluble difficulties also lead it into open conflict with science and philosophy. The assumption that capitalism is universally irrational and destructive conflicts sharply with the sciences of history and political economy, while the contention that individual motivation is universally irrational, unconscious, and compulsive stands in direct opposition to the science of higher nervous activity and the reflection theory of consciousness.

CAPITALISM AS UNIVERSALLY IRRATIONAL AND DESTRUCTIVE

To members of the middle strata intelligentsia the proposition that capitalism is universally irrational and destructive may well have the ring of self-evident truth. Unorganized, alone and defenseless, crushed between the two giant antagonists and thoroughly confused by an endless maze of conflicting factors, contemporary society must indeed appear to defy reason and to destroy all things human. If this view were in fact true, there would be no hope for mankind, no future, no possibility of constructing a society more consonant with man's needs and aspirations. If beneath all the senselessness and nihilism there were not an inherent logic of history and a positive residue of human accomplishment, the reformist analysts would be both correct in their wholly negative evaluation of capitalism and theoretically justified in their characterization of it as a universal source of traumatic experience inducing an all-pervasive neurotic personality of our time.

Reformed psychoanalysis accounts for only one set of facts, the negative, irrational, and destructive ones with regard to capitalism, to the individual, and to the feelings of the individual. In limiting itself to the one set, it produces a total distortion: capitalism is nihilistic, the individual is annihilated, and his feelings are neurotic effects of the double nihilism.

The analytical reformists are not alone in espousing this nihilistic view of society and man with its resulting neurotic view of character. It is the salient feature of the dominant trend in current American, and, it might be added, European, serious literature, drama, and cinema. There is here undoubtedly an interaction between the reformist psychology and the psychological cultural products.

A striking example is found in the works of the American playwright, Tennessee Williams. Most of his later plays imply a predatory social background such as the destruction of the idealized "Southern way of life" under the impact of capitalism. He then employs this background as a source of trauma which as the Act One curtain rises has already produced the neurotic character or characters of the given play. The unfolding drama is the case history, or the interlocking case histories, moving from relatively slight neurosis to psychotic manifestations of one kind or another, but especially of compulsive violence, including suicide, castration, and even cannibalism. The inevitability of the dramatic development derives from the pre-determined course of the mental illness from delusional ego-defenses to their dissolution. At which point the naked self, stripped of its defenses, either strikes out in an act of mutilating violence against, or submits in self-immolation to, the monolithically evil society which has mortally wounded it.

While Williams' plays are replete with what might be called Oedipus and castration complexes, the dramatic structure derives not from Freud but from reformed psychoanalysis. The neurotic-psychotic characters are not compulsively determined by a racial id, but rather by compulsive ego-defenses against the social trauma. Thus the realistic theatre-form in which Williams' character development takes place within a social setting gives way to

case history against a trauma-inducing social backdrop. The contradiction in Williams' characters is not between human and anti-human tendencies, but between existing neurotic symptoms and developing psychotic syndromes. In this connection it is interesting to note that while his characters display all the feelings such as frustration, aloneness, anger, hate, and rebellion, experience destructive and violent urgings, and at least once during every play make tentative but doomed tender advances, yet they seldom if ever express feelings of anxiety or guilt about their lack of truly human qualities. In this sense, then, Williams' characters are conformists within their non-conformist behavior. There is no human conformation against which their anti-human conformity is pitted, hence there is no real conflict, there is no real conscience, no genuine anxiety, no piercing guilt. Without the internal contradiction between human being and anti-human tendencies, there can be no identification with the Williams characters and their clinically predestined fate. Profound and fascinated shock is the common reaction to a Williams play, together with great admiration for him as a master technician of suspenseful drama.

Perhaps the lack of feelings of anxiety and guilt in Williams' plays points up a weakness in reformed psychoanalysis. Where there is no contradiction or conflict within a character, between human and anti-human qualities, there can in fact be no guilt feelings about the lack of humanity. It may be because of the difference between expository and creative writing that on the one hand Fromm can *state abstractly* that a compulsively determined neurotic automaton, lacking the human qualities, can nevertheless feel guilt, while on the other the playwright, having to create specific characters cannot make them express guilt where, with no human contrast, none is called for. Be that as it may, it is a fact that Fromm, in his later reconstruction of classical Freudianism, felt impelled to supply an unconscious reservoir of indwelling human potentialities to rationalize the widely existent and very real guilt feelings.

In contrast to Williams, Arthur Miller in his plays and scenarios combines the contradictory features of capitalism with their reflected contradictory aspects in individual consciousness to de-

pict the development of character within a social context. The dramatic development is viewed as the clashing motion of the human and anti-human elements inherent in the characters. These elements are in turn impelled toward their denouement by the very same opposing social aspects of which they are in the first place a reflection. Such a double contradiction, an external social one and an internal psychological one, between positive and negative features of capitalism on the one hand and between conformation and conformity on the other, allows Miller to create characters and situations which can express more or less fully the human condition under capitalism. Characters can, within a dramatically telescoped time-span, exhibit actions, ideas, and feelings which give expression to both sides of both of the contradictions: the fact that they are at once human beings and commodities and that they have relevant feelings on both scores. The feelings of anxiety and guilt, as well as hope and aspirations, with which *All My Sons* and *Death of a Salesman* are replete, flow naturally from Miller's depiction of both the social and psychological contradictions. The reaction to Miller's plays is not one of pure horror and shock, but of identification in one degree or another with the conflict, for it in turn reflects similar conflicts of the audience.

Whatever their individual defects or shortcomings, theoretical or technical, Miller's plays are human experiences to be immediately lived through and eventually thought through. Williams' dramas, on the contrary, are inhuman spectacles displaying distorted "sick" creatures with whom we can better live without. The one playwright casts a ray of light on the human predicament in our society. The other draws a storm cloud over man, shrouding him in darkness and electric violence.

The contrast between two leading American playwrights dramatizes the contrast between reformed psychoanalysis and the reflection theory of consciousness. It is the contrast between a one-sided traumatic-neurotic approach to society, man, and psychology and a manysided, complex view in terms of social contradictions, their reflection in individual consciousness and the resulting conflict in ideas, emotions, and behavior. The first is de-

structive and pessimistic, since by regarding both man and society as "sick," there are no means and therefore no hopes for recovery. The second is constructive and optimistic because the contradictions in society and individual are recognized as being at once both causes of man's problems and means for their solution.

However much the surface phenomena of contemporary society may appear, especially in the eyes of the middle strata intelligentsia, to confirm a radically nihilistic view, the relevant sciences present quite a different picture. The social sciences of history and political economy, in so far as they are mature sciences, must reject all onesided views of capitalism, both of the enchanted and of the ultra disenchanted. Rather they regard it as a developing contradiction. Capitalism has among other things advanced the productive power of man beyond the most sanguine dreams of philosophers and poets. At the same time it has imprisoned this power within the confines of private ownership and profit. For several centuries these limits were sufficiently flexible to expand in rough conformity with the more and more rapid growth of productive power. For the past 60 years, however, this capacity for expansion has not only been lost but the process reversed. The area enclosed by the boundaries of private ownership and profit has become smaller and smaller while at the same time the power to produce has grown even greater, thus requiring more not less space. Although the rate of growth of production has been curtailed by the limits imposed upon it, the increased productive capacity is still so great that the pressure against confinement rises higher and higher toward the crucial explosive point. Thus capitalism is viewed scientifically as a developing contradiction between productive power and private ownership and profit.

Philosophically, "contradiction" has a precise meaning as a feature of internal change or development. It is concerned with the changes in relationship between content and form as a given process moves from its beginning to its end. A simple illustrative example would be the foetus in the womb. From the initial moment of conception to the onset of labor, the form, the flexible uterus with its sack, amniotic fluid, and placenta, are in complete conformity with the content, that which is growing and develop-

ing, namely the prenatal infant. The very conformity of the form to the content makes possible a growth and development of the foetus which will in due course bring the foetal content into the sharpest possible non-conformation with the intra-uterine form. From being the condition for life the uterus now becomes the condition for death. Unless the infant breaks out of what is now its prison, its growth will cease and it will die. Birth is the resolution of this particular contradiction, and nervously controlled muscular contraction are its means. A new form, the home and family, now conform to the new content, the newborn infant. Here again is a contradiction in which for some time the form fits the content, but by that very token, moves in the direction of eventual non-conformation. To become an adult the child must break out of home and family into the wider world, thereby solving the contradiction between the old form and the new content, the development of which the old form itself had made possible. In this particular contradiction the break-out or revolutionary period is adolescence and the means are all too often fraught with more or less violent intra-familial scenes. Among human beings with their complex emotions and developed will-power, together with widespread lack of knowledge, the representatives of the old form, in the present instance parents, seldom give up what they have without doing battle.

In philosophy, contradiction refers to a specific aspect of the structure or logic of internal change or development: the transition from conformation to non-conformation in the relationship between the form and the content of a process as it moves from its beginning to its end. This law of contradiction is as much a principle of dialectical logic, the logic of change, as the law of non-contradiction is a principle of formal logic, the logic of classification. The two laws are the foundational principles of their two respective logics. The two logics are separate but interrelated structures of thought reflecting structures of the world. Together they constitute the solid basis both of human reason and of the rationality of the universe, the solar system, the planets, and of all earthly phenomena, including human society. The two logics comprise the common, universal, most abstract and yet concrete

laws of thought and objective reality. The double logical structure common to thought and reality guarantees the complete knowability of both and the relevance and effectiveness of the former for the latter.

Logic is the science of structure, and structure is the skeletal framework of thought and of existence. Without structure there could be no thought, no existence, and no knowledge of thought or existence. Formal logic is the science of the objective classification of existent things and the reflection of that classification in the human mind. The world of existent phenomena classifies itself into types, sub-types, and particular instances of types. No logical mind of God or man imposes the classification on a chaotic, unstructured world. The world is itself structured and falls into classes. The mind discovers the structures and classes, gives them names and organizes the names to correspond with the organization of objective reality. This was the first historical task of every science. For example in botany, the first task was to identify and classify plants, according to their similarities and differences. The accomplishment of this first step, in each level or area of the world, marked a great advance in man's knowledge and control of nature. Formal logic evolved along with the first great task of classifying objective phenomena. Aristotle, building on the work of his forerunners, made the initial comprehensive and systematic formulations of the science of formal logic, its first principles and general laws. There was no need for a different logic so long as the various sciences remained in the descriptive, classificatory stage.

At some point, varying with the different sciences but starting with astronomy, geology, botany, and biology, the content of what was being classified broke through the limits of classification. Borderlines between classes were found to blur and merge into one another. The sharp distinction, for example, between plants and animals was erased when species were discovered which could not be classed as either the one or the other, but had to be defined in terms of characteristics of each. The contradiction in formal logic, marking its limits began to be apparent. The concept of simultaneous creation of all classes of things non-living and liv-

ing, with clear and distinct lines of demarcation, no longer conformed with the new discoveries. The concept of *evolution* of classes was substituted for the concept of their static, eternal *simultaneity*. Since formal logic was the science of static, eternal simultaneous classes and their inclusive-exclusive relationships, it too came into question. No longer could formal logic be viewed as the only form of logic. A new logic of transition, transformation and change came into being. Dialectical logic, as the science of the structure of change, evolution and revolution, was given its initial systematic formulation by Hegel.

Hegel made his great discoveries after the French Revolution and was concerned primarily with the transformation of ideas and of societies, maintaining that the change in ideas brought about social change. Marx reversed the order, and therewith established the sciences of history and political economy. Employing the first principles and laws of dialectical logic on the data of history, economics, and politics he was able to discover the laws of motion, the structure of social change. The classification of the types of society had already been made according to the science of formal logic. Society previous to Hegel and Marx had been viewed predominantly as simultaneously existing types identified as tribal or primitive, slavery, feudalism, and capitalism, with a dream of a perfect society called socialism. The breakdown of lines between the types, the fact that societies came into being and went out of being, and finally the dream of socialism, a new type of society, combined to force a reevaluation of the concept of static, eternal simultaneous types of social organization. The classification of types of society was still important and therefore formal logic retained its validity. But it was not adequate to the new task of discovering the structure of social change. Formal logic was thus seen to be a relative truth, part of the absolute truth but not the whole of it. It was true up to the point where classification could not furnish the entire truth about the world in general and society in particular. At that point dialectical logic was required. Both logics are necessary for human knowledge and truth. Man must first know what a thing is and what it is not, its identity, and only then can he move to the further question of

how it came to be what it is, in what direction it is moving, and what it will become.

The sciences of formal logic and dialectical logic are the sciences of ontological and logical structure, and together constitute the basis of rationality in the world and reason in man. The goal in each science is to discover the objective, ontological structure of that aspect of the world with which it is concerned. This means that the structure of the science, the logic of its principles, laws and facts, must approach ever closer to a complete correspondence with the structure of reality. The practical significance of a science lies in the increased power of prediction and control which varies directly with the degree of correspondence between scientific structure and the structure of reality.

The social sciences after 125 years of theoretical development and practical application have reached a high level of correspondence between scientific structure and social reality. They have a commensurate power of prediction and control, together with an impressive record of practical accomplishment in many areas of the world. In the United States, however, the social sciences of history and political economy, together with the philosophical science of dialectical logic that furnishes them with the general structure of change, have been rejected and to all intents and purposes banished from the land. In their place have been constructed theories and approaches the objective effect of which is to substitute masses of data with multitudinous alternative statistical correlations for underlying rational, logical, historical, and social structures. Statistically correlated data and factors serve to conceal the structure of reality, and to reduce human thought and science to the subjectively determined organization dictated by individual preference, as Charles Beard said of history. In this manner, the science of history has been transformed into an innocuous discipline called historiography. The sciences of society have become sociology, econometrics, and social studies concerned with all the myriad secondary and tertiary aspects of contemporary life, with anything, that is, except the structure of capitalism and its laws of motion. Poll-taking and statistical analysis are substituted for scientific method and for science itself.

The end result of the banishment of the social and logical sciences, together with their replacement by factor theories and the endless collection of data, is the substitution of irrationalism, subjectivity, and obscurantism for reason, objectivity, and knowledge. If the social world has no structure then man cannot know, predict, or control it. He can only arrange and rearrange factors and data according to his predilections, like children with blocks. The world then appears irrational, unpredictable, and uncontrollable, while the individual is doomed to live his life out in isolation, loneliness, ignorance, fear, anxiety, and dread, with only immediate emotional reactions of pleasure or pain to bear him up or weigh him down.

Historiography, sociology in its present form, and the other factor-data substitutes for science create a world-view and human situation completely congenial to the reformist analysts. Such a view of society buttresses the contention that capitalism is irrational and destructive and that it is, in psychological terms, above all else a universal source of traumatic experience inducing the neurotic personality of our time. While the internal contradiction within reformed psychoanalysis serves to indicate its general bankruptcy, as it did to Fromm, a first step toward positive resolution entails firm recourse to the social and logical sciences, a difficult matter in contemporary America.

The structure of capitalism with its developing contradiction and class conflict based thereon refutes not only the reformist analytical contention that capitalism is only irrational, negative, and destructive but also Fromm's doctrine that through regeneration of character by means of psychoanalysis can socialism replace capitalism. The sciences of history and political economy and the strategy and tactics of class struggle indicate that capitalism contains as a contradictory aspect of itself the potential human resources and ultimate power to transform society and build socialism, and eventually communism. The contrast is sharp between Fromm's latter-day Utopian socialism based on wishes and individual regeneration and scientific socialism based on the ontological structure of social change reflected in the logical structure of the social sciences.

Reformist psychoanalysis, especially in its Frommian form, constitutes one type of ideological theory, the objective effect of which is to conceal the structure of social reality in a fog of irrationalism. It is a particularly insinuating type since it has the surface appearance of radicalism, anti-capitalism, and socialism. In fact it can be said that it is to classical Freudianism what social-democratic demagoguery is to out and out bourgeois ideology.

If the first assumption of reformist analysis is the universal irrationality and destructiveness of capitalism, the second is the universal irrationality and compulsiveness of individual motivation. Where the first stands in opposition to the logical and social sciences, the second conflicts sharply with the reflection theory of consciousness and the science of higher nervous activity.

MOTIVATION AS UNIVERSALLY IRRATIONAL AND COMPULSIVE

The contention that irrational compulsive motivation is universally characteristic of modern man is common to Freudianism and to reformed psychoanalysis. Both maintain that thought, feeling, and behavior are universally determined by unconscious intra-mental mechanisms. Freud and the revisionists hold that consciousness is predetermined by phylogenetically induced unconscious drives and primal memories. Horney, Sullivan, Fromm, and their fellow-reformists maintain that consciousness is universally determined by socially induced unconscious ego-defenses. In either case, the outcome is universal neurotic compulsion. The psychoanalytic assumption that all people are neurotic, that their conscious life is compelled by unconscious intra-mental forces, involves two negations: first, that there is no qualitative difference and no real boundary between mental health and mental illness; and second, that consciousness is not a reflection of the external world.

The psychoanalytic assumption that all people are neurotic is by no means fortuitous. It is an essential condition of psychoanalysis, not to be limited strictly to treatment of literally sick patients suffering from specific neurotic and psychotic symptoms. To supply a rationale for the extension of analytical techniques to character analysis a concept of universal neurotic character is

required. This was already the case in Freud's time, but in the past 20 years has become unconditionally decisive. The reformists are little if at all concerned with treatment of neurosis, and all but exclusively with character analysis and transformation. That "neurotic" is an adjective applicable to all, with the only difference being one of degree and not of kind, is a necessary theoretical feature required by analytical practice. This theory and the practice on which it is based run counter to the findings of the science of higher nervous activity. According to the latter the mind, as an immaterial thing, cannot be sick. Only the brain, as the organ of which mental activity is a function, can be healthy or ill. As "mental health" is dependent on the healthy functioning of the higher parts of the brain, so "mental illness" signifies their malfunctioning.

According to the science of higher nervous activity the borderline between mental health and mental illness is the demarcation between the physiology and pathophysiology of the higher nervous system. A corollary of this principle is that if there is no higher nervous pathophysiological state, then there is no functional mental illness. If there is no such state, the brain is functioning normally and there is no need for therapy.* Conversely, if there is a cerebral pathophysiological state, then there is illness and there is need for therapy. The therapy may range from verbal and hypnotic psychotherapy to medical treatment of one kind or another, depending on diagnosis.

In theory, then, the science of higher nervous activity states the case unequivocally. There is a sharp, if at times thin, line between mental health and mental illness; there is a clearly defined, relatively limited area in which therapy of some type is indicated; and there is a far larger area in which no therapy at all is required. In the latter case, where there is no pathophysiological condition of the higher parts of the brain, there may be among individuals greatly varying degrees of mixed-up knowledge and ignorance, more or less of contradictory attitudes and emotions, conflicting wishes and desires, confusion of values, failures of will

* Here the term "therapy" is used in its proper meaning, i.e., the medical treatment of illness.

and self-discipline, personal and social maladjustments, and any combination of these and other factors which together contribute to character and personality problems.

These problems may be mild and innocuous or they may be extremely serious and disturbing, even disruptive, deviate, or criminal. Whatever their form, however, so long as they are not the result of cerebral malfunctioning, they are not symptoms of mental illness but expressions of more or less serious disturbance: distortion of understanding and emotions or malformation of character and personality. In such instances, not therapy but such measures as counseling, re-education, reformation of character and rehabilitation, depending on the individual case, would be in order. Be that as it may, the science of higher nervous activity implies that a person with problems but with no cerebral malfunctioning, no matter how much he may be suffering, or causing others to suffer, is not sick, does not require therapy, and should above all not be treated as ill. To consider such a person as sick, to allow him to *think* he is sick, is to exacerbate his problems, his maladjustments, his weaknesses, his character disturbances, distortions, and malformations. Such a person needs help, and may need it very badly indeed, but calling him "neurotic" and treating him "therapeutically" is at best a serious if well-intentioned mis-carriage of helpfulness and at worst a disastrous intervention succeeding mainly in teaching the individual to live with his troubles.

Such then is the *theoretical* position advanced by the science of higher nervous activity. It is in sharp contrast with both the practical and theoretical position of psychoanalysis on this question. The matter would already be finally settled without any possibility of argument except by a lunatic fringe, if the science of higher nervous activity were now in a position to provide in practice a reliable set of tests to determine whether or not there is a pathophysiological condition of the higher nervous activity. While such a desideratum has not yet been achieved, sufficient progress has been made in that direction to establish the position as a guiding principle not only in pathophysiological research but

also in neurological and psychiatric practice in many parts of the world, but especially in the Soviet Union.

Here again is an instance where acceptance of a scientifically derived and factually verified principle constitutes a precondition for the further advance of human knowledge and practical efficacy, even if it cannot furnish at once all the answers to the questions which can be asked and which must eventually be answered. Without the principle, the proper questions cannot be formulated. When the proper questions cannot be asked, practice is at best blind and at worst led into blind alleys by false theories. Such a false and misleading theory is the psychoanalytic doctrine of a universal neurotic character with its denial of the qualitative difference between mental health and mental illness. While the psychoanalytic doctrine is an outgrowth of the needs of analytical practice, that is, to rationalize the extension of its techniques to cover character problems, it is in direct opposition to the long-established psychiatric principle that mental illness, whether organic or functional, is an illness of the brain as the physical organ of mental life. Conversely, the higher nervous scientific principle that there is a sharp line between mental health and mental illness and that functional mental illness is limited to those instances where there is a pathophysiological condition of the brain, is in full agreement with the basic principle of the science of psychiatry: mental illness is cerebral illness. It was in fact Freud's original repudiation of this principle which led to the impatient psychoanalytic *bridging* of the gap in knowledge of the brain, a gap which could in fact be *filled* only by patient and painstaking scientific work. That work has by now succeeded in filling the gap sufficiently to establish the principle beyond all reasonable doubt.

Today the principle with its corollaries is as true and indubitable as the more general principle—accepted by all who have no religious, mystical, or special doctrinal axe to grind—that mental life is cerebral functioning, that without the human brain there is no human mental activity. The psychiatric principle is merely the other side of this coin: human mental illness is illness of the human brain. The first corollary states that functional mental ill-

ness is the pathological malfunctioning of the human brain. The second states that if there is no such malfunctioning the brain is healthy and mental activity "normal," no matter how confused. The third corollary states that medical therapy, including scientific psychotherapy, is relevant only to mental illness defined as illness of the brain. The fourth corollary states that where there is no illness of the brain and mental activity is therefore "normal" and yet there is at the same time more or less seriously confused mental activity, then specialized help may be needed, not in the form of therapy but in the form of counseling, reeducation, and rehabilitation. Therapy is treatment of illness. Counseling, reeducation, and rehabilitation are means of reorienting the cerebrally healthy.

The general structure of "normal" mental activity based on healthy higher nervous functioning is a primary concern of the reflection theory of consciousness. This theory sharply confronts the psychoanalytic doctrine of universal unconscious, irrational, and compulsive mental activity. An examination of the reflection theory of consciousness should serve to point up some misconceptions of reformed psychoanalysis and at the same time throw some light on what is meant by rehabilitation of the "normal" but troubled mind.

Reformed psychoanalysis is a theory of *unconsciousness* while the reflection theory is a theory of *consciousness*. By the term "unconscious" reformed analysis refers to its contention that conscious life is determined by *sets* of irrational emotions acquired early in childhood. These sets are said to be defenses of the conscious ego against environmental threats. The essential position is that emotions are not part of consciousness, although consciousness may become aware of them; that consciousness includes ideas only; and finally that unconscious emotions determine ideas and thence also thought, wish, desire, will, and behavior. This, then, is what is meant by *universal, irrational, unconscious, and compulsive motivation*. Emotion, not as a reflection of reality but as a defense against it, allegedly determines all aspects of conscious mental life. This determination by emotions is universal since it is said to be a characteristic feature of contemporary man. It is

irrational because it is held to be a self-defense mechanism against a hostile world. It is unconscious because it is irrational, self-defensive, and emotional and therefore inadmissible to the conscious self-image of the ego. It is compulsive because consciousness cannot avoid the fate of being determined by irrational, unconscious, self-defensive emotions. Universal motivation of conscious life by such emotions is said by reformed analysis to be the structure of the modern un-regenerated human psyche. Its prescription for regeneration is to break the determining power of the irrational emotions and thus liberate the conscious intellect so that it may realize its potentialities including thought, logic, reason, and imagination. The method of achieving this regeneration is the use of the Freudian analytical techniques to bring the unconscious, compulsive emotions to conscious awareness. Such awareness is supposedly anathema to irrational emotions, and they are said to be dissipated through catharsis, or at least to be neutralized.

Underlying reformed psychoanalytic theory is a fundamental misconception of the nature of emotions and ideas and of the relationship between the two. Emotions are, according to this theory, mechanically separated from ideas with a consequent distortion of each. Divorced from ideas, emotions are conceived as being irrational, self-defensive reactions to a predatory world. Divorced from emotions, ideas are conceived as being rationalizations of irrational emotions. The relation between the two is conceived as being one in which emotions determine ideas. What a person thinks is said to be determined by his feelings, the "rational" by the "irrational." Since "irrational" emotions are identified as unconscious and "rational" ideas as conscious, it is further maintained that the unconscious determines the conscious.

The reflection theory of consciousness, on the other hand, maintains that emotions and ideas constitute the two primary aspects of individual consciousness, that they are inseparable and yet at the same time opposite aspects, and finally that the level of emotional reactions is determined by the level of ideational understanding, not *vice versa*.

The two approaches to the human psyche stand in opposition

at almost every point. Where reformed analysis views society as a source of traumatic experience the primary effect of which is to induce unconscious ego-defenses, the reflection theory regards society as a source of human experience the primary effect of which is to induce the mental qualities characteristic of man's conscious life.

Reformed analysis conceives of man as passively undergoing the predatory attacks of a wholly destructive society against which he can defend himself only by constructing self-deluding, self-hypnotic emotional reaction patterns. The world is viewed as a source of threats and the primary concern of the individual is to protect himself and perhaps thereby also turn the threat into an advantage to himself. For example, a child living under the regime of a domineering or tyrannical father, may defend himself by developing an emotional reaction pattern in which unprotesting and long-suffering obedience, the ego-defense mechanism itself, becomes a source of submissive satisfaction and even masochistic pleasure. When such a child grows up, the reformed analyst might say, his adult life will be largely determined by the ego-defense mechanism formed earlier in emotional reaction to the father acting as a predatory social agency. He will find his satisfactions and pleasure in submitting to the father-substitute authority of wife, boss, and political leader. He will therefore tend to be a henpecked husband, a conformist citizen and a cog-in-a-machine organization man. Another child with the same type of father may construct an oppositely oriented ego-defense. He may rebel against paternal authority and take his satisfaction and even sadistic pleasure in hurting and destroying both in childhood and as an adult. Such a compulsive emotional reaction pattern may lead, the analyst might say, to the rebel-radical-anarchist type. In any case, and in all human beings generally, the irrational emotional mechanisms developed in childhood are said by the analysts to compulsively predetermine the adult character. Thus, it is said, people universally "escape from freedom," escape, that is, from becoming rational, productive human beings and become instead automatons under the rigid mechanical control of their own unconscious-compulsive ego-defenses.

It is an initially convincing package, one which at first glance seems to account for appearances. Especially in America it is true that conformity and even a certain "robot tendency" are in fact widely prevalent. It is, however, a characteristic of psychoanalysis to point to a phenomenon, then to give some kind of rationale for it, and finally to point once again to the phenomenon in corroboration, not of its existence, but of the psychoanalytic theory of *why* it exists. Such an argument is, of course, completely spurious. The widespread existence of a phenomenon is no evidence whatsoever in support of any given theory purporting to explain why it exists. Freud used this type of circular reasoning in his theory of why so many mothers turn to their sons and sons to their mothers. If truth of a theory were tested by either the existence of the phenomenon or the number of its believers, Freud's theories would be "true" by acclamation. Similarly, if the widespread conformity of the American people were a test of the truth of the reformist theory of compulsive motivation as its cause, this theory would likewise be "true." Fortunately, science does not proceed in this phenomenal, pragmatic, positivist fashion. Neither is truth a matter of "democratic vote." The truth of a theory depends on its ability to account for all the facts by the least complex set of principles. At the same time a true theory is the one which neither conflicts with other established theories nor runs into insoluble problems and contradictions due to its own structure. Finally, the ultimate test of a theory is whether or not it provides guidance for further progress in understanding of the given phenomenon and of others related to it, and to eventual control over it for the purposes of mankind as a whole. Reformed psychoanalysis, like Freudianism, fails on all counts.

In the first place, the theory of universal compulsive motivation does not by any means account for all the facts. Contrary to the theory, there *are* people who are neither ultra-conformist nor ultra-rebellious, people who are rational and who live productive personal and social lives, and who therefore, by the reformist definition itself, cannot be said to be under the unconscious control of compulsive ego-defense mechanisms. If there is such a thing as

unconscious compulsive motivations formed in childhood and predetermining adult mental activity, then at least it is not universal as alleged.

A more fundamental objection, however, is that, as has been indicated previously, society and particularly capitalism cannot be reduced to a source of traumatic experience. While it can be shocking, terrifying, and destructive in its effect, it is literally, in the psychoanalytic meaning of the term, traumatic only when it overstrains particular nervous systems and thereby produces chronic pathophysiological states. The incidence of such cases is extremely high and constantly rising in the United States. One per cent of the population, or 1,814,000 people, in each year are in hospitals and institutions for the mentally ill.¹ While this is a high figure, it still constitutes a small fraction of the American people as a whole. The fact is that the great bulk of the population is not mentally ill, some 99 per cent in any given year. Many more while not sick are allegedly "suffering" from what are called "emotional problems," but even here the highest estimate is an additional ten per cent of the total population,² or around 18 million. There is no question but that the pressures of American capitalism are tremendous, put a heavy strain on nervous systems, and take an exorbitant toll in functional mental illness as scientifically defined. They likewise produce a high incidence of overpowering social and personal problems which impel millions of people to seek aid in solving them. The salient fact, however, is that for less than one percent, since that figure includes organic mental illness, American capitalism cannot by any stretch of the imagination be summed up as a source of *traumatic* experience. It plays that role, but that is not its essential feature.

Far from accounting for all the facts, reformed psychoanalysis could conceivably account for only the one percent of the population that is literally "mentally ill." For only in strict mental illness is there the phenomenon of what could be called compulsive behavior, verbal, emotional, or otherwise. Even here, however, the analytical theory of unconscious, compulsive, irrational, emotional reaction patterns is wholly fanciful. The latter are in a gen-

eral way descriptive of the syndromes expressing disturbed cerebral functioning. These syndromes may well be induced in the first place by such things as emotional problems, but the disturbed or compulsive emotions, ideas, and behavior are not the mechanism of the disease, but rather its symptoms. The real mechanisms are pathophysiological states of the higher nervous activity. Thus the reformed analytic theory in the first place does not even serve to account for the one percent mental illness segment of the population, not to mention the other 99 per cent. Far from being universal, the supposed emotional compulsive determination turns out to be totally non-existent.

In the second place, reformed psychoanalysis runs into its own insoluble problems and contradictions. If the capitalist trauma and the concomitant compulsive emotional motivation were universal, how could there ever be any rational and productive human beings? There could only be robot, conformist automatons, driven by their own unconscious, neurotic mental mechanisms. If, as the reformed analysts maintain, the compulsive ego-defenses can only be eliminated by psychoanalysis employing the classic Freudian techniques, what happens after the defenses are gone? Perhaps the analyst furnishes the "patient" with the non-compulsive human qualities of reason, love, imagination, and so on. But where did the analyst acquire them? From other analysts, but where did they get them? This is the *reductio ad absurdum* that forced Fromm to abandon reformed analysis and to reconstruct the Freudian id in the form of a humanistic racial unconscious in which reside all the truly human traits, virtues, abilities, and potentialities. The analyst then does not have to supply the human element. He has only to liberate it from the prison of the unconscious by eliminating the ego-defense prison guards.

Reformed psychoanalysis fails to account for the facts and at the same time runs into its own internal difficulties and contradictions because of mistaken conceptions of the individual, of society, and of the interconnections between the two. By viewing society exclusively as a source of psychic trauma, and the individual mind as dominated by a resulting neurotic state, reformed

analysis reduces the interconnection between society and the individual to the pseudo-medical one of traumatic shock producing a neurotic condition.

It was these difficulties that led Fromm to attempt a radical reconstruction of psychoanalysis.

PART III

RECONSTRUCTION OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

Chapter 9

PSYCHO-PHILOSOPHY OF LOVE

To escape from the dilemma of reformed psychoanalysis, Eric Fromm returned to classic Freudianism and began its reconstruction along humanist lines. The first step was theoretically to transform Freud's inhuman id into a human unconscious, innately endowed with the need and power to love.

Among the American people there is a widespread and deep-rooted tendency to view love as a panacea for the ills of contemporary man. From Tin Pan Alley to the movies and from popular novels to the plethora of popular books on psychology and sex, love is both subject and object. In his book on *The Art of Loving*, Fromm analyzes the subject and affirms the object. In doing so he enters the mainstream of national concern and at the same time raises its level. He takes the dominant themes, that love is of supreme importance and that it is the only real answer to all problems, individual and social, and transforms them into universal principles of human psychology and philosophy. He discovers within man certain emotional essences and potentialities of which all the varied forms of love are expressions—erotic love, mother love, father love, brotherly love, and love of God.

FROMM'S THEORY OF LOVE

In his theory of love, Fromm begins to spell out what he means by the unconscious as the human potential, a process he continues and completes in his works on ethics, religion, and Zen Buddhism. He speaks of love as "the ultimate and real need in every human being" and as "the only sane and satisfactory answer to the problem of human existence." As a corollary of the doctrine that love

is of the immanent human essence, Fromm advances a new historiological principle: "Any society which excludes, relatively, the development of love, must in the long run perish of its own contradiction with the basic necessities of human nature."

Capitalism is such a contradictory society, and therefore, according to Fromm, it must eventually perish by self-destruction. Simply "to analyze the nature of love," he says, "is to discover its general absence today and to criticize the social conditions which are responsible for this absence." He thus claims radical implications for his theory of love. "The *principle* underlying capitalistic society and the *principle* of love are," he says, "incompatible." Capitalism engenders egotism not love. "If our whole social and economic organization is based on each one seeking his own advantage, if it is governed by the principle of egotism tempered only by the ethical principle of fairness, how can one act," Fromm asks, "within the framework of existing society and at the same time practice love?" The existential contradiction between capitalism and love leads Fromm to a revolutionary conclusion: "Those who are seriously concerned with love as the only rational answer to the problem of human existence must, then, arrive at the conclusion that important and radical changes in our social structure are necessary."¹ Fromm thus develops his psychological-philosophical *theory* of love within the context of an overwhelmingly negative prospect for its *practice* under capitalism.

Fromm's leading thesis is that love is the only answer to the problem of human existence, while his trailing thesis is that capitalism generally excludes the development of love and therefore cannot provide man with the solution of his overriding problem. A pertinent triple question is posed which only an examination of Fromm's theory of love can answer: What is the problem of human existence, why is love the only answer, and how does capitalism fail to provide it?

Fromm views the problem of human existence as inherent in the ultimate natural conditions of man's evolution. With the transformation of animal into man the inseparable instinctive fusion of the animal kingdom with the enviroing world was lost. By virtue of his reason and self-awareness man is torn from nature.

He is separated from his environment and cannot return to it. He is a part of it, and yet not a part of it. He belongs and does not belong. As a human being he cannot rely on instinctive adaptation, but has consciously to find his path in the world, guide his footsteps by thought, feel his way by emotion, invent his own social environment, create his own forms of society, his own laws, standards, and values. As a result man can, and for the most part does, mistake his path, lose his way, misguide his footsteps, create predatory social systems, and invent robot norms of behavior.

Man with his gift of reason is "life being aware of itself." Man is aware of himself as a separate entity, separate from nature, from other people, from his physical self, and most dramatically from persons of the opposite sex. He is aware, in short, of his total alienation and aloneness. "All this," says Fromm, "makes his separate, disunited existence an unbearable prison." Due to his experience of separateness, man feels anxious, ashamed and guilty. He suffers from intense anxiety because, being cut off from things and people, he feels helpless, unable to grasp the world actively. He suffers from shame because he is aware of belonging to a sex alienated from its opposite. He suffers pangs of guilt because he is aware of his inability to use his human powers.

To dramatize his point, Fromm reinterprets the myth of the Garden of Eden. Adam and Eve disobey God and eat of the tree of knowledge. God drives them out of the paradise of instinctive unconscious unity with the world and leaves them to their own rational conscious devices. He drives them out of natural free relatedness and belonging into the prison of their individual aloneness with its self-torture instruments of anxiety, shame, and guilt.

The separateness, the prison house of aloneness, is according to Fromm, the universal natural evolutionary condition of human existence, as true of the individual after it is torn from the womb of the mother in birth as of the race when in the dim past it emerged from the animal kingdom. This condition sets the need and the problem for the human species as a whole and for each single member thereof, past or present. On the one hand is a universal need, on the other a universal problem growing out of it.

"The deepest need of man, then," says Fromm, "is the need to overcome his separateness, to leave the prison of his aloneness." The universal human problem is "How to overcome separateness, how to achieve union, how to transcend one's own individual life and find atonement."

The overriding human problem is negatively to overcome separateness and positively to achieve *reunion* with the world, fellow men, himself, and the opposite sex. This problem, Fromm maintains, is the same throughout human history, from primitive man to contemporary man, from tribal society to capitalism. The problem is the same for the remote past and for the present because, Fromm says, "The question is the same, for it springs from the same ground: the human situation, the conditions of human existence." The problem of separateness and the overcoming of it is the same throughout history, only progressively more so. The course of historical development, the succeeding forms of society, far from making progress in overcoming the separateness of man, actually mark stages in its further exacerbation. "But the more the human race emerges from these primary (instinctive) bonds," Fromm says, "the more it separates itself from the natural world, the more intense becomes the need to find new ways of escaping separateness."²

FROMM'S THEORY OF ALIENATION

Is it a fact that today under capitalism man is more than ever separated from the world, man, woman, and himself? A hint of the answer may be found in a current humanist commonplace, the world is more one than ever, and yet man is more than ever divided. The possibilities for peace, brotherhood, and happiness are brighter than in any previous period of history, while at the same time the dangers of war, annihilation, and anarchy have never been greater. This would indicate that in some ways man is more and in some ways less separated than before, that in some ways he has made progress and in others he has not. Where Fromm views history as beginning with natural alienation on all fronts and moving historically toward wider and deeper forms of it, it may be closer to the truth to view it as a developing contra-

diction. On the one hand it is an indisputable fact that man has evolved through three broad stages, from the absolute scarcity of primitive society, through the relative scarcity of civil society, to the approaching absolute abundance of tomorrow. Man has thus made great progress in overcoming his alienation from the necessities of life, from food, clothing and shelter. He has likewise made giant strides in overcoming his alienation from health, from knowledge, and from beauty. Put positively, he has developed tremendously his ability to produce, to control nature, to change the environment to meet his needs, to create works of art and architecture, to shrink space by vehicular travel, and to know the world and himself through science.

On this side of the ledger, man has accumulated an impressive total of assets and achievements. It is this that Fromm neglects in his view of man's evolution. On the other side, it is true that the great majority of mankind under capitalism and colonialism is separated, first, from the world, from the land, from the tools, machines, and raw materials by virtue of their private ownership in a relatively few hands. Second, man is separated from man as class alienated from class and as competing commodities in the labor market. Third, man is alienated from woman in love and marriage relationships which are subordinated to and crushed in the struggle for survival and status. Lastly, man is alienated from himself, his aspiration separated from reality, his ideals from actuality, his life from creativity, direction, and meaning.

CRITIQUE OF FROMM'S THEORY OF ALIENATION

Fromm is right in identifying these alienations of man, but he is wrong when he attributes them to the *natural* conditions of human evolution. They are not *natural* alienations, they are not the effects of man being torn from the animal kingdom. They are rather the result of the development of one side of the contradictory history of society, the social-economic-political aspect, the forms of ownership and control of society. The other side, the one that carries forward the positive progress of man, is a combination of the control over nature through production and the knowledge of nature, including man, embodied in technology, the arts and

sciences. The latter side of the contradiction accounts for the great possibilities inherent in the contemporary world, while the former accounts for the great current dangers. Fromm sees and describes only the liabilities, not the assets; only the alienation, not the overcoming of alienation; only one side of the contradiction, not the other. He views the problem of man, therefore, as a problem of overcoming universal natural but socially aggravated alienation. Whereas, in point of fact, the contemporary problem of man is an historically constituted one: To end the separation of man from the world, fellow men, women, and himself and thereby bring the economic, social, and political forms into line with the great progress made in man's control over and knowledge of nature and society.

Fromm, by seeing only one side of the contradiction, mistakes the human *historical* problem to be a *natural* problem of mankind's evolution from animals. He views human separation as a kind of unconscious original sin penetrating the conscious awareness of man in all epochs as feelings of aloneness, helplessness, hopelessness, anxiety, guilt, and shame. These feelings are, according to Fromm, not primarily emotional reactions to particular historical situations, but find their original and forever renewed source in the evolutionary emergence of the human race and in the physical separation of the infant from the mother in birth. The role of society is held to be only contributory to the natural alienation of man on all fronts. Both the existential separations and their emotional counterparts are viewed as effects of human beings "having emancipated themselves from the original animal harmony with nature, i.e., after their birth as human beings." This is a new version of the classic psychoanalytic "birth trauma." Ontogenetically as well as phylogenetically man is wrenched from the natural harmony of biologically instinctive unity and faces the world and himself with his isolated and nakedly vulnerable body and mind. "When man is born, the human race as well as the individual," Fromm writes, "he is thrown out of a situation which was definite, as definite as the instincts, into a situation which is indefinite, uncertain and open. . . . He has awareness of himself as a separate entity . . . awareness of his

loneliness and separateness, of his helplessness before the forces of nature and society, all this makes his separate, disunited existence and unbearable prison." The natural, birth-induced prison of aloneness, heightened by alien society, is the source of the syndrome of negative emotional states identified by Fromm, by existentialist philosophy, and by the new theology as characteristic of contemporary man. "The awareness of human separation," Fromm says, "is the source of shame. It is at the same time the source of guilt and anxiety."³ The birth trauma, it is alleged, gives rise to human separation and to the self-conscious misery syndrome in the individual as in the species.

Too much testimony on the part of novelists, playwrights, and poets as well as psychologists, philosophers, and theologians, bears witness to the existence of both objective alienation and the reactive emotional syndrome to allow for doubt. Just as there is widespread alienation on many levels, there is a syndrome of self-aware misery including feelings of aloneness, helplessness, frustration, and the like. Can the cause of the syndrome, however, be any more *natural* than the cause of the actual human separations? The latter, as formerly stated, comprise the negative side of a developing historical contradiction, the opposite side of which is composed of all the great progress made by mankind through the ages in overcoming other alienations. The misery syndrome of emotional states, it would follow, are one-sided reactions to those social, political, and economic alienations which compose the negative side of the historical contradiction. In this event the current separations of man together with the misery syndrome emotionally reflecting them are components of a particular form of society at a particular stage of its development.

If the misery syndrome expresses a onesided view of the negative aspect of history, and especially of capitalism, as is the case with Fromm, then what might be called the "Pollyanna syndrome," composed of all bright colored and optimistic emotions, could arise in a onesided view of the great and undeniable positive achievements of history, even including those made under capitalism, past and present. Viewing only one side of the developing historical contradiction, whichever side is so viewed, can lead only

to an exclusive syndrome of emotional states, either all negative or all positive.

A sober realistic view of history, including contemporary capitalism, looks carefully at both sides of the contradiction, including the historical development of each separately and of the two in their interactions, and discovers the direction of movement of the contradiction leading toward its ultimate resolution. In such a careful, many-sided analysis attention is paid both to past progress in overcoming alienations and to those separations which have grown sharper and more insistent with the passage of time. Such a view will indicate the possible and potential solutions of the problem of remaining alienations. The emotional states expressing a realistic appraisal of the developing historical contradictions in capitalism, as in history as a whole, should, if they are truly based on careful analysis, be characterized by clearness of thought, steadiness of nerve, firmness of purpose and will, and be deeply rooted in strong emotional affirmation within the knowledge that nothing will evolve without knowledgable struggle.

The cluster of emotional states expressing a considered overview of both sides of the developing historical contradiction, will be determined, as all emotions are, by the level of the knowledge, the truth of the ideas, facts, and theories on which they are based. An overview can degenerate easily into either extreme pessimism or excessive optimism, into, that is, the misery or Pollyana syndromes, if at any point it fails in its knowledge of concrete historical development. Only persistent expansion and deepening of knowledge can truly reflect constantly shifting social reality either ideationally or emotionally.

By viewing only one side of the historical contradiction Fromm becomes so pessimistic and blinded, that he can see nothing of positive value in capitalism, or in any other form of society. Nor can he see anything good in the individual, at least in the surface social self. On the other hand, he is convinced that man is human and good deep down inside somewhere. The only way in which he can account for such an anomaly is to take seriously the myth of the Fall of Man, that he was driven out of Paradise. What is good

in man comes from before the Fall, after that the good human essence was repressed in favor of the socially constructed robot-self. Seeing only those alienations that far from being overcome have grown worse, he attributes them, not primarily to history, but to the natural fall of man from the paradise of instinctual relatedness. Thus the emotional misery syndrome is attributed in the first place to separations occurring in natural evolution, and only secondarily to society in general and capitalism in particular—and then solely as aggravating agents.

Viewing history and the individual in a onesided fashion, Fromm is bound to misstate both the human problem and the possible solution. By his failure to consider the concept that society furnishes the primary potentiality for man, both positive and negative, both good and bad, both in the alienations and in the overcoming of alienations, Fromm is forced to accept the age-old but uncriticized tradition that human potentiality is somehow inherent in the individual. The individual must then be conceived as containing within himself both positive and negative powers. Tradition likewise holds that the good in man originates in Paradise and the evil in the post-Fall era. Fromm takes the myth out of its theological form and gives it a biological interpretation. Man fell out of biologically instinctive unity into psychologically conscious separateness. The evils of the individual, and of the society he creates, then follow from this tearing birth-trauma, and become progressively worse. This is indeed a pessimistic view, one calculated to heighten rather than lessen the hold of the misery syndrome on so much of contemporary mankind. Fromm however holds out a ray of hope, albeit a slim one. He advances a solution to the problem of man's existential separation and emotional aloneness, namely, "reunion by love."

CRITIQUE OF FROMM'S THEORY OF LOVE

Before elaborating on what he means by "reunion of love," Fromm distinguishes two false methods of overcoming alienation, called "escapes from separateness." He refers to orgiastic states and to conformity, both, he asserts, being common in capitalist society. The first is induced by drugs, alcohol, or animal sexuality

and affords a transitory relief from the prison of aloneness through fostering an illusion of oneness. The second is mass produced prefabricated robot personalities with the abstract equality of sameness in appearance and character, and of routinized marriages, homes, work, and play. Conformity like orgy furnishes a temporary spurious sense of "at-onement," but in the long run it succeeds only in accentuating the separation and in inflaming the misery syndrome. Together orgy and conformity are the two dominant escapes from separation in American capitalist society—an orgy of conformity and a conformity in orgy, a merry-go-round of endless, restless, futile hunting.

In love alone can man find the true solution: "Love," says Fromm, "makes him overcome the sense of isolation and separateness." But what is love? "Love is an active power in man," he says, "a power which breaks through the walls which separate man from his fellow-man, which unites him with others."⁴ Love is not a type of relationship and a set of emotions the various forms of which have developed under specific conditions in the thousands of years of human history. It is not a social phenomenon which each child and each adult must internalize and learn in the course of individual development. It is rather, according to Fromm, "an active power in man," an inherent capacity, an indwelling potentiality which only waits to be recognized in its various forms and to be released from the prison of the repressed unconscious.

What are the forms of love? Fromm distinguishes six: mother-love, father-love, love of parents, brotherly love, erotic love, and love of God. All these he views as eternally coexisting in the human individual unconscious. They constitute a large portion of that human potentiality with which Fromm imbues his humanistic substitute for the seething, inhuman cauldron of the Freudian id. They are part of the human legacy from Paradise, before the Fall. Here again Fromm attributes to natural evolutionary conditions what rightly should be ascribed to historical development. The forms of human love, both the relationships themselves and the varied constellations of relevant emotions, are in fact products of historical processes, and relatively late ones at that. Most if not all of them probably developed along with the

development of the family in its many forms, moving closer to the forms of love we know, as the family approached the modern monogamous type. It is known, for example, that erotic, romantic love began to develop among the Greeks and Romans, and in the Middle Ages as a reaction to contract monogamy, and only in modern times did it become a basis for marriage itself.

Each type of love has its own history which in turn is related to human history as a whole.⁵ A child is not born with the capacity to love in any form. He must learn to love parents, siblings, playmates, friends, country, and eventually his own mate and children. There is also love of truth, of science, of art, of recreation, among others. None of these are inborn, or inherent in some repressed unconscious. Only the anatomical-physiological structures and functions are inborn, the structures and functionings which make possible participation in society. By this participation, the child and the adult learn what it is to love and be loved.

The forms of love exist all around the individual in the social environment. When the child or the adult learns a form of love, he too can begin to love, and the more he loves the more he can love. The *appearance* is that love comes from inside, without having to be learned, because it is learned as it were by social osmosis. The child and the adult make the capacity to love their own. Hence the appearance is not wholly false. We *do* by our participation in society create in ourselves abilities to love in various forms, much as we acquire so many other abilities, to talk, for example. This cannot be inborn, simply *there* waiting to flower, for what then determines which language we would speak? Similarly, what determines the forms of our love as compared with the forms current in different places or different times? The problems involved in viewing human "powers" as inherent in the species are insuperable. Such things as language and love must be viewed as existing in the society and as being acquired afresh by each child as he moves to adulthood by means of social participation as well as by biological maturation of body and nervous system.

The forms of love are social phenomena acquired, like other abilities and relationships, only by social practice. Any other view runs afoul of insuperable difficulties and contradictions. Fromm's

theory of love is no exception. For him all the forms of love are active powers inherent unconsciously in man. According to his own psychoanalytic theory one would expect him to maintain that by the use of his revised methods of analysis and his reformed art of interpreting the alleged universal symbolic language of the unconscious, the various abilities to love and be loved, in the six types of love, could be disinterred, could be brought to the light of consciousness and activated as modes of interpersonal behavior. If he really took his explicit theories and methods seriously, this is indeed what he would do, or recommend. Instead of using the psychoanalytic techniques of dream interpretation, free association, and transference and the art of translating the universal symbolic language of the unconscious, Fromm relies on old-fashioned rational arguments with the object of teaching the reader the nature of love and even how to love. If love and the ability to use it were part of an unconscious, forgotten human legacy, why teach it? Fromm should act as mid-wife to what is already within a person, employing the psychoanalytic mental-obstetrical instruments. As it is, there is no recourse but to follow his rational argument.

There is, Fromm maintains, an essential nature of love underlying all six of its particular forms. This inner essence is composed of two poles or principles, the masculine pole or male principle and the feminine pole or female principle. Both are immanent in the individual regardless of sex. Man has an indwelling female as well as male polar-principle, woman a male as well as a female. In women the female is dominant, in men the male. The two poles embody two opposite principles. The female polar-principle is defined, Fromm says, "by the qualities of productive receptiveness, protection, realism, endurance and motherliness," the male "as having the qualities of penetration, guidance, activity, discipline and adventurousness." These poles with their defining features are generalized by Fromm into universal indwelling principles of nature as a whole, "the principles of receiving and penetrating, of matter and spirit." "The same polarity of the male and female principle," he says, "exists in nature; not only, as is obvious in animals and plants, but in the polarity of the two

fundamental functions, that of receiving and that of penetrating. It is the polarity of the earth and rain, of the river and the ocean, of night and day, of darkness and light, of matter and spirit."⁶ Essentially the concept advanced by Fromm is the age-old doctrine of receiving matter and penetrating spirit, in which passive, formless, female matter takes on specific quality through penetration by active, informed male spirit. Many of the theological adaptations of Aristotelian metaphysics followed this ancient line of thought, after Maimonides and St. Thomas Aquinas. Latterly it has been a favorite theme, not only of theology, but of romanticism from William Blake to D. H. Lawrence.

Fromm blends the theological and the romantic versions of the indwelling male-female principles. In the eternity before the Fall, in Paradise, that is, the male and female principles were kept in balance by natural instinctive forces. When man ate the apple of knowledge, this natural balance was broken. Thereafter the story of mankind is the tale of a restless and fruitless search for unity of the poles, both in the opposite sex and within self, man in search of woman, woman in search of man, and each in search of self-integrity, a balanced unity of the male and female principles. The simplest kind of reunion would be a return to Paradise, to instinctively ordered unity. Early romanticists, for example Rousseau, glorified natural primitive man, and modern ones, for example D. H. Lawrence, at times advocated such a return. But by and large the romanticists, including Lawrence in his more reflective, responsible moods, held that there could be no going back for mankind, that he must go forward in his "adventure into consciousness" and find new ways of uniting the two opposing alienated principles. Fromm sides with this dominant romantic view: "once torn away from nature, he cannot return to it. . . . Man can only go forward by developing his reason, by finding a new harmony, a human one, instead of the prehuman harmony which is irretrievably lost."⁷

The "new harmony" which Fromm's "reason" finds, is a unity of the male-female principles within the individual human being. He calls this inter-principle unity an "orientation of character" which is the core of love common to all its various forms. "Love is

not primarily a relationship to a particular person," he says, "it is in orientation of character which determines the relatedness of a person to the world as a whole, not toward one object of love."⁸ If such is the case, then the central problem of love is how to create this orientation of character. For without internal, intra-individual harmony of the male-female principles there can, according to Fromm, be no possibility of parental love, erotic love, brotherly love, or love of God. Love is viewed as "indivisible." Either one is or is not capable of love, depending on the character orientation. If one has achieved the proper balance of the male-female principles, it follows that one will be able to love the world, man, woman, himself, and God. The acquisition of the harmonious character structure is the key to life and love, the means of overcoming original separation and creating unity at all levels.

In Fromm's solution of the problem of how to achieve the new harmony of the male-female principles within the individual soul, there is a surprise ending. One would expect him to appeal to psychoanalysis, and, to be sure, he does. But he does so only to point to its limitations, and to the alleged limitations of all "rational thought and science." Here Fromm apparently senses that he has climbed to the last rung of psychological thought, at least in its psychoanalytic form. From the top of the ladder he finds that a leap into the thin air of mysticism is the only alternative to admission of impotence and defeat. In following the argument we witness his transition from psychoanalysis to mystical logic, theology, and Zen Buddhism.

Psychoanalysis, psychology, rational thought, science can, according to Fromm, penetrate to the central core of the humanistic unconscious and there identify the two root elements of the human soul, the male and female principles. They can define the two opposed principles in their opposite features. But traditional rational thought, in whatever scientific garb, is powerless to harmonize contradictory opposites. Here it is alleged is the limit of reason, at least in its "Western" form.

Turning to the mystical philosophies and religions of the East Fromm discovers a logic the primary concern of which is to deal

in paradoxes and contradictions. He turns to paradoxical logic when traditional Aristotelian logic reaches its limit, the limit of an ultimate contradiction in which each of two opposite principles is said to be equally true and necessary in the same person at the same time.

Fromm describes Aristotelian logic with its basic principles, the purport of which excludes the possibility of contradiction. He quotes Aristotle himself: "It is impossible for the same thing at the same time to belong and not to belong to the same thing and in the same respect." Aristotle called this "the most certain of all principles." Two opposite attributes, such as the male and female principles, cannot be ascribed to one and the same thing, the human soul or unconscious, at one and the same time. Just this, however, is what Fromm finds is unavoidable. Therefore formal Aristotelian logic is of no further use. He appeals to "*paradoxical logic*, which," he says, "assumes that A and non-A do not exclude each other as predicates of X."⁹ Paradoxical logic would see nothing impossible or extraordinary in the contention that the opposed contradictory male and female principles must simultaneously be attributed to the human individual unconscious.

Fromm identifies paradoxical logic with Chinese and Indian mystical thinking and under the name of dialectics with the philosophies of Heraclitus, Hegel, and Marx. He, however, ignores dialectical logic, ancient and modern, and affirms the mystical paradoxical logic, quoting the most relevant principle from Chuang-tzu: "That which is one is one. That which is not one, is also one." He appeals to Lao-tse and Taoist thought, to Brahmanic philosophy and Vedantic thinking, to the Kabbalah and Meister Eckhart.

From all these he concludes that there is "unity behind manifoldness," that, as paradoxical logic maintains, "the perceived pair of opposites reflects not the nature of things but of the perceiving mind." Contradiction or paradox is a characteristic of mind, not of the world. It is therefore purely subjective, not objective. Contradiction, Fromm maintains along with paradoxical logic, is a feature of thought only. Beyond thought or mind there is absolute unity, a harmonizing of all oppositions and contra-

dictions in the one reality. Reality is harmonious unity while the ultimate limit of thought is contradiction. "The human mind," Fromm says, "perceives reality in contradictions" thus "man can only know the negation, never the position of ultimate reality." More clearly put, Fromm states that "man can perceive reality only in contradictions, and can never perceive in *thought* the ultimate reality-unity, the One itself."¹⁰ He concludes that one cannot find the answer in rational thought. "Thought," he says, "can only lead us to the knowledge that it cannot give us the ultimate answer." Even the "most advanced" thought in the form of paradoxical logic "remains caught in the paradox." It can think in terms of contradiction, but it cannot resolve the contradiction it posits. Only a leap to the assumed non-contradictory, non-paradoxical, harmonious reality, the mysterious One of mystical religious philosophy, can resolve the problem of contradiction, bringing unity out of duality.

The leap to unity with the mysterious One is Fromm's solution of the problem of love. This solution, he says, "is based on our knowledge of the fundamental, and not accidental, limitations of our knowledge." Rational knowledge is limited; only in mystical knowledge can man grasp the unity of the male and female principles. "It is the knowledge that we shall never grasp the secret of man and the universe," he says, "but that we can know, nevertheless, in the act of love." Man cannot resolve the contradiction in his unconscious, cannot unify the male and female principles, whose harmony was held to comprise the essence of love and to constitute the prerequisite for its possible existence, except by—the act of love. Here indeed was much labor to bring forth a tautology.

Psychology can no more know love, according to Fromm, than theology can know God. In the one case as in the other only the experience, the act of believing and of loving, can give full knowledge. "Psychology as a science has its limitations," Fromm says, "and, as the logical consequence of theology is mysticism, so the ultimate consequence of psychology is love."¹¹

Why go through all the intricacies of internal, indwelling contradictory principles, the limits of thought, subjective paradoxical

cal logic and objective harmony, if we are to be told in the end that the solution of the problem of love is to love? Not only that, but there is an insoluble contradiction in Fromm's thought. If the harmonizing of the male and female principles is the prerequisite for love, how can the act of loving be recommended as the means of bringing about that very harmony? The only conceivable resolution of this contradiction in Fromm's thought is that paradoxical logic taught him that there really was no such indwelling contradiction between male and female principles, since reality is one. Fromm only *thought*, because of the limitations of his thinking, that there was such a contradiction the solution of which was a prerequisite for love. Since the contradiction exists only in Fromm's thinking and not in the alleged individual unconscious, then it follows that human beings can just go on, as they have always done, learning to love by participating in the social forms of love that exist for them in their society. They can even develop them into forms more closely approximating their needs, interests, and aspirations as these in turn develop in the course of the interplay of individuals with an advancing society.

The hopeless impasse in Fromm's thinking on love has its source in two mistaken and uncriticized assumptions, one having to do with *theory*, the other with *method*. The theoretical assumption which leads Fromm astray is that love is an indwelling power of man, rather than a social phenomenon in which the individual participates. As was previously indicated, the view that love is an immanent potentiality deeply imbedded in human nature makes it impossible to account for the historical origin and development of the particular form of love. It also involves Fromm in the self-contradiction that man can only know love in the act of loving, that is, in participating in the socially constituted forms of love. Only by viewing love, along with all other relationships, ideas, emotions, faculties, and the like, as historically evolved social phenomena, can such contradictions be avoided.

The methodological assumption which misleads Fromm is that contradictions are, as paradoxical logic maintains, characteristic only of thinking, not of reality. The two types of logic, formal and dialectical, have traditionally been considered to be ontologi-

cal as well as logical, that is, as expressing laws and modes of the objective world as well as of human thought. The classic scientific, as opposed to the subjective idealist, position is that logical laws are reflections in the human mind of objective, existential laws.

We have seen previously that Fromm involves himself in a one-sided view of society, and particularly of capitalism, because he cannot recognize simultaneously existing contradictory aspects—that capitalism contains within itself elements which are both good and evil, progressive and reactionary, human and anti-human. By concentrating exclusively on the evil, and ignoring or dismissing the good, Fromm brands capitalism in such an extreme manner that nothing good can grow out of it, nor can there be any good progressive humanistic people in it. The conclusion of such thinking is that there are no human resources within capitalism which could possibly produce a better society out of its ashes. It leads, that is, to almost complete cynicism.

The same is true of Fromm's approach to love. Capitalism and the natural alienation of man work together to produce people who cannot love, even though buried deep inside they are said to have the power to do so. Under the alleged uniform horror of capitalism, how can people love? The fact, of course, is that capitalism is not a uniform horror. It is, rather, a dynamic contradiction between features which provide great human possibilities and those which thwart and distort them. This is as true of love as of other aspects of life. On the one hand, under capitalism romantic love, for example, has replaced the parent-arranged contract as the accepted basis for marriage, a great step forward. On the other hand, there are strong influences at work under that same capitalism to subordinate romantic love to economic and social advantage as a ground for marriage, and to entangle and smother the love of husband and wife in a crush of economic pressures and distorted values. Thus at one and the same time the capitalist organization of society offers heretofore unheard-of possibilities for romantic-love relationships and for their frustration. This contradiction is only one instance among a welter of conflicting aspects which characterize contemporary capitalism. Any failure to recognize such objectively existing contradictions can

lead one either into cynical despair or blind wishful thinking. These two extremes of mood are absolute and unreal opposites which easily transform one into the other.

Fromm's despair of love under capitalism finds its opposite mood in the wishful thought that man deep down inside has the power to love, and that it needs only to be allowed to flower. The transformation of this wishful hope into despair is accomplished each time Fromm returns to his dismal view of capitalism. For him there are no contradictions in capitalism. It provides no human possibilities but only the thwarting of indwelling powers. Capitalism exclusively produces "alienated automatons," and, he says, "automatons cannot love." The automatons can achieve only "a number of forms of pseudo-love which are in reality so many forms of the disintegration of love."¹² With this onesided view of capitalism, Fromm despairs of love and speaks of "the basic incompatibility between love and normal secular life within our society." What then is left for man? He can only "have faith in the possibility of love." The only "rational" ground for such faith is the "insight" that love is an inherent power in human nature. The faith in love is, he says, "a rational faith based on the insight into the nature of man."¹³

Just as participation in the socially existent forms of love is universal, so also are the forces frustrating the human aspirations concerning love. This holds for the minority non-conformists as for the majority conformists. The contradiction between love as it is in practice and as it is in aspiration is itself a promise and hope for mankind. In the overcoming of this contradiction through effort and struggle lies the future of love.

Fromm, with his unhistorical view of capitalism, can see no basis for the development of love, and in rebellious reaction places his hope and the hope of mankind in a frail alliance between an alleged imbedded capacity to love and a non-conformist fringe practice of it. His only alternative to despair is therefore a tenuous *faith*.

The ultimate reliance on faith leads Fromm to an alliance with theology and Zen Buddhism.

Chapter 10

PHYSICIAN OF THE SOUL

The Merging of Psychoanalysis with Religion, Existentialism and Zen Buddhism

Erich Fromm is a leading representative of a new direction in American thought, a focal point for the confluence of three streams: psychoanalysis, philosophy, and theology. The common concern is for the soul of man, considered to be in crisis and to require regenerative treatment. "The analyst," Fromm says, "is not a theologian or a philosopher and does not claim competence in those fields, but as a physician of the soul he is concerned with the very same problems as philosophy and theology: the soul of man and its cure."¹

More particularly, the three streams of thought uniting to point a new direction are a reconstructed humanist psychoanalysis, a broadly existentialist philosophy, and a reformed non-sectarian theology based on the later Hebrew prophets and the early teachings of Christianity. Running through all three is a leaven of Zen Buddhist thought.

In Fromm this new direction finds its most articulate and influential voice. It is the voice of a rebel in the Camus sense, a voice crying in a wilderness of crass materialism and conformity in spurious values. It is the cry of the lonely humanist adrift in a sea of human commodities and atomic anxieties, an Ishmael calling for the moral regeneration of a hundred and eighty million lost souls. The voice, the cry, the call has an exceedingly strong appeal to fellow isolated humanists and men of good will,

especially in this country and at this particular juncture of uncertain history.

Many influences are at work, both within the three fields and outside in the nation and in the world at large, to produce a situation favorable to the genesis and wide appeal of the Fromm type of thinking.

PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY TURN TO ANALYSIS

In philosophy there is a growing impatience with academic systems concerned with the problems of knowledge and reality rather than with the contemporary predicament of man overwhelmed by the impersonal colossus of modern society. Disillusionment with knowledge in general and science in particular is taking the place of those epistemological considerations which have been uppermost in the minds of positivists whether logical, semantical, or pragmatic. Where John Dewey, for example, in another age, affirmed science and the scientific method while cutting the ground from under both, the current trend is openly to degenerate science altogether. Deposed from its heroic role, science is now blamed for much of the evil in the world, not least of which are hydrogen bombs, mechanical brains, and mass produced minds. Science, reason, and progress are debunked as 19th century naturalism and materialism. Rationalism and realism are dismissed as archaic idealisms of the previous century. Socially oriented philosophies, whether naturalistic pragmatism or dialectical and historical materialism, are in abject disrepute as products both of the 19th century and the excesses of the '30's.

Academic philosophy is still largely concerned with its traditional problems and systems, but exerts little direct influence outside—or even on—the university campuses. A rapidly growing body of students, artists, writers, theatre-goers, readers, are turning to a loosely-knit philosophical outlook subsumed under the name of existentialism. Existentialism is founded in the emotional situation characteristic of the self-awareness of contemporary Western man. Its starting point is the complex of feelings expressed as loneliness, frustration, guilt, anxiety, and despair. To

gether these are called the "sickness unto death," the "*maladie du siècle*," or the "human predicament."

Existentialism starts from a state of mind with which the alienated individual can fully identify. It then poses a metaphysical but emotionally real question: to be or not to be, being or nothingness, life or suicide. If after much agonized soul-searching, a decision is rendered against self-destruction and in favor of living, a second question is posed: to be or not to be my real self, to choose the being of myself as an integral human individual or to acquiesce in a pseudo-self conforming to the anonymous nothingness of the modern mass-man. This second question involves, it is alleged, the problem of soul-saving. How can I become my real self in the sense of living my human potentialities?

Existentialism variously offers a number of paths to the cure of the soul. With Camus it proposes responsible *rebellion* against the inhumanity of God and the established social order. With Sartre it recommends *engagement* in the social and political issues of the day. In neither case, however, is there any affirmation of human historical development with which the rebellious engaging individual can ally himself, nor is there any technique for the salvation of the soul which would make possible either rebellion or engagement.

As a result, Sartre himself and existentialism in general, including its French, German, and American versions, are turning to psychoanalysis. It alone offers an established technique for character transformation or soul-curing. Today many existentialists are busy adapting the psychoanalytic method to their own needs. At the same time, many psychoanalysts are turning to existentialism in their attempts to give their discipline a broader base than that offered by Freud. In particular, the analysts are studying existentialist literature for a deeper understanding of the philosophical-psychological "*maladie du siècle*." The subject-matter of the two is essentially the same: the personal, emotional anxiety, guilt, and despair of contemporary man.

In theology there is a disenchantment with tradition similar to that in philosophy. On the one hand it takes the form of revolt against the hypocrisy, sectarianism, and social-club ex-

pediency of organized religion. The charge is made that church and temple tend to be agents of the comfortable status quo. On the other hand, theology itself is said to be concerned not with the personal emotional situation of contemporary man, but with the traditional minutiae of sectarian differences. As a product of this revolt, a new movement in theology is apparently taking shape which starts from the current predicament of man as described by Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and the existentialists, and moves to the need for transformation of the human soul.

The first step is recognition of the plight of the individual in an antagonistic world and in a society and international situation which submerges him in megaton institutions and submits him to fears and forces beyond his ken or control. Alone and threatened with self-extinction, he is caught in the complex of emotions composed of anxiety, guilt, and despair. The second step is to lead the individual to the task of actualizing God's image of the human person so that he may live a creative life of service to God and his fellow men.

The problem is the age-old one of how to save the soul of man. Prayer, exhortation, and belief, rational or revealed, have been tried for thousands of years with, to say the least, unsatisfactory results. The new theology looks for a new method, one which will at least supplement the old, and is in the process of finding it in the techniques of psychoanalysis. Character analysis is soul-saving, the cure of the soul, and it offers modern means for getting rid of the old self and allowing the real self to emerge unrepressed at last. No longer need theology rely solely on prayer and conversion; dream interpretation, free association, and transference can come to their aid. The ingestion of psychoanalysis by theology is progressing rapidly and promises a new era in soul-saving. At the same time, psychoanalysts in their role as "physicians of the soul" are moving closer to theology, with or without God.

In philosophy and theology there is thus a tendency to gravitate toward psychoanalysis. The attracting force is in each case the same: the Freudian techniques for cure of the soul.

FROMM'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE NEW THEOLOGY

The employment of the Freudian techniques for the common purpose of the cure of the soul rather than for the elimination of pathological symptoms requires drastic changes in the form of psychoanalytic theory and method. Most decisive among such changes is the necessity to transform the unconscious from a prehistorically derived anti-human id into a beatific fount of human potentiality. Only such a change would permit a modified version of the Freudian technique to become a midwife to the soul of man and thus make possible the merger of psychoanalysis with the indwelling God of the new theology and the innate life-force of existentialism.

Fromm has gone further than any other analyst in making those formal changes in theory and method which are essential if psychoanalysis is to meet the challenge of its new "patients," the needs of its new philosophical and theological allies and its new task of soul-curing. He transforms Freud's id with its innate primitive forces into the unconscious viewed as the repository and fountainhead of all human potentiality. To tap this source he transforms the Freudian unconscious sexual symbolism into a universal symbolic language of the human soul. Within such a framework Fromm assigns new roles to the Freudian analytical techniques. The interpretation of dreams, free association, and transference phenomena are viewed no longer as methods for disinterring repressions of infantile sexual phases, but as the *via regia* for the revelation of the soul of man. Such a view of the unconscious together with the techniques for rendering it conscious, leads Fromm away from clinical psychology and toward a merger with idealist-religious philosophy and theology.

Fromm, himself, makes this merger explicit in his three ethical-religious works: *Man for Himself*, *Psychoanalysis and Religion*, and *Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis*. Here, while maintaining formal allegiance to the essential structure of Freudian thought, he in effect breaks with traditional psychoanalysis and embraces philosophical and religious mysticism.

Fromm begins his religious argument with a discussion of the

maladie du siècle. Modern "Western" man is said to be in a state of deep crisis. This crisis is the result of the confluence of two maturing situations, one "existential" and the other "historical." The existential situation is rooted in the primary conditions of man's existence on earth, what Fromm calls "the human dichotomy," the split between body and mind. In body man is one with nature, while in mind he is set in opposition to it. The original harmony of nature found in the animal kingdom is lost with the advent of mind, reason, imagination, and self-awareness. The latter have "made man into an anomaly, into the freak of the universe,"² a stranger on his own planet. While his body unites him with animals, his mind transcends nature. He belongs and yet is set apart. Man is aware of himself, and being aware he realizes his powerlessness and visualizes his own end in death. "Never is he free," Fromm says, "from the dichotomy of his existence: he cannot rid himself of his mind, even if he should want to; he cannot rid himself of his body, as long as he is alive." He has to live each moment as a split self, half body and half mind, half animal and half man. The dichotomy between body and mind or reason is an unalterable condition of human life, and is unsolvable. "Reason, man's blessing," says Fromm, "is also his curse; it forces him to cope everlastingly with the task of solving an unsolvable dichotomy." Thus man is always a problem to himself, a problem which he has to solve in order to go on living, but which at the same time he cannot solve, for, according to Fromm, there is no solution of the split between body and mind, unity with nature and transcendence of nature. Man cannot live without a solution of the body-mind problem which is unsolvable.

Out of this existential predicament man generates his most insistent need, the need for "faith" and "religion." Man can live with the insoluble dichotomy only through religious faith. The need for religion therefore is "rooted in the conditions of man's existence." By religion Fromm means "any system of thought and action which gives the individual a frame of orientation and an object of devotion." In this sense, religion embodies man's attempt to overcome the inner split in his existence by visualizing

some kind of harmony of body and mind, nature and spirit. Faith is the belief that the vision of harmony will somehow be actualized in this world or the next. Deity is the hypostatization of the vision and the faith and thus the frame of orientation becomes an object of devotion. God is worshipped because he at once embodies the vision and guarantees its realization. Faith is the cement binding together these two aspects of divinity.

For Fromm, however, religion stands independent of the concept of godhead. Historically the great religions have anthropomorphized the essential features of religion. God in the image of man has been traditionally viewed as the embodiment of the frame of orientation and as the object of devotion. But this is not, according to Fromm, essential to religion. Religion is composed of only two elements: first, a system of thought in the form of an all-inclusive picture of the world as a higher or ultimate unity of man and nature, mind and body; second, sufficient devotion to this picture of the world to inspire activity directed toward achieving it in all spheres of life. The more advanced a person is, the less he will require the concept of deity as an adjunct to religion. Fromm himself feels no need of the concept, but has no quarrel with those who do.

Since the need for religion arises in the dichotomy of body and mind, and since this dichotomy is the very condition of human life common to all people, it follows that "there is no one without a religious need, a need to have a frame of orientation and an object of devotion." But if this is the case then man must always have had the need. Why then does Fromm view the dichotomy of body and mind together with the religious need to overcome it as peculiarly characteristic of the crisis of modern man? It will be recalled that he spoke of two contributory elements, one existential and the other historical. The dichotomy comprises the existential factor present in man from his inception. The historical factor taken in conjunction with the existential predicament allegedly accounts for the current crisis of "Western" man.

Until the 20th century man from the beginning had been predominantly concerned, according to Fromm, with the problem of bread, the problem of production of sufficient food, clothing,

and shelter. During this prolonged epoch of thousands of years, man's religious concern, his self-awareness of the existential dichotomy, had not only played a secondary role but had been prostituted to the political requirements of successive owning and ruling classes. Priests and theologians, serving the interests of the dominant sections of society, had exploited the "natural" need of man for religious devotion. They had used religion as an "opiate of the people" promising "pie in the sky" so that discontent could be dissipated in blind faith and the ownership of the earth could remain secure in the hands of the few.

Today however, Fromm maintains, in the Western world the problem of production has been solved, only the *distribution* of bread has to be improved and perfected. It is this fact that lies at the root of the 20th-century crisis of man. For thousands of years man thought that if only he could solve his economic problems, life would be good. But now, according to Fromm, by and large in the western world he has solved them, and yet life has become worse, more intolerable than ever. In fact man is everywhere disoriented, without values, without anything to struggle for, alone, anxious and alienated from nature, fellow man and self. The reason for this desperate state, Fromm says, is that man finally has to face squarely and without mediation the greatest truth of all, the existential dichotomy of human existence. This truth is embodied, he maintains, in the prophetic utterance that "man does not live by bread alone." As long as bread was the primary and all consuming goal, he could worship false gods, follow false religions promising paradise regained in the form of material plenty. Now Western man is stripped of false religions and false values and stands naked at last before the great spiritual truth, the need for genuine religion, for a system of thought which will picture the unity of man with nature, fellow man and self, and which as an object of devotion will inspire him to strive for universal harmony.

Material plenty as found in the advanced nations of Europe and America confronts man with the subsidiary role of bread and the decisive role of religion. Man faces his existential dichotomy without the veil of economic distress. Thus the historical factor

accounts, in Fromm's thinking, for the crisis of contemporary man. In essence it "frees" him to face the overriding problem of his alienations. Where man had thought that all his alienations, from nature, fellow human beings, and self, would be solved through the solution of the problem of production, he now is faced with the terrifying realization that the alienations are not historical but natural, embedded in the very conditions of human life. This realization, dimly felt by all in the Western world, and sharply felt by some, especially by certain artists and philosophers, has, according to Fromm, been a growing traumatic shock. The end is not the end at all, but only a new, and this time the real, beginning of man's truly human quest for himself, for self-realization. Disillusionment is universal, all values have disintegrated, all perspectives lost. For there is as yet no ready answer.

Traditional and existing organized religion has been too closely connected with the grand illusion of economic plenty as a panacea, and therefore is not, for the most part, true religion at all. Man, according to Fromm, must first honestly face the problem of existential dichotomy and concomitant alienation on all levels, and then must create the religion, the frame of orientation and object of devotion, which will give him a sense of direction, a vision of the future, which will in turn restore his hope, aspiration, and sense of values, and lead eventually to the overcoming of universal alienation and the establishment of universal harmony.

Fromm's argument thus far has advanced two theses: first, that man by his very nature requires a religion, meaning a frame of orientation and an object of devotion; second, that today man at last stands naked before this need, since he has allegedly solved the problem of bread but cannot live by it alone. The *maladie du siècle*, the crisis of 20th-century man, lies in the fact that more than ever he needs a religion, while at the same time the old religions do not and cannot satisfy him.

Fromm divides all traditional religions into two types which he calls idolatry and authority. By idolatry he refers to one or another form of "materialist" orientation together with worship of physical objects. Magic was the original form of idolatry but

today the prevalent form is the idolatrous worship of commodities. The values in such a religious idolatry are based on competitive ownership and conspicuous consumption, while its practice is earning in order to buy for the sake of status. With the "solution" of the problem of production, however, it is becoming more and more apparent to 20th-century man that idolatry is not a genuine religion at all, but a false religion leading to further frustrations and alienations.

Does this mean that there should be a return to the earlier and purer forms of traditional religions such as Judaism and Christianity? Fromm answers in the negative. These religions originally marked great steps over ancient idolatry, but today are seen as various forms of authoritarian ethics. God is viewed as king or father and his word as law. The values, Fromm maintains, are dispensed from on high by divine edict and are enforced by punishment in this world or the next. Too often such organized religions have ideologically reflected the values of owners and rulers and have been employed practically to buttress and preserve a status quo of minority privileged classes over the vast majority of people. Traditional religion has thus been subservient to idolatry, and today has for the most part been reduced to a Saturday or Sunday sabbath lip-service to other-worldly values, having little or no relevance for week-day idolatrous living.

Fromm's conclusion is that neither commodity-idolatry nor King-Father authoritarian religion offer man an effective frame of orientation or object of devotion. What is needed is a new religion, one which will repudiate idolatry in all forms, will take the best from the old religions, and will develop a set of values and norms relevant to modern living-not-by-bread-alone. Only with such a new religion can man, according to Fromm, overcome his alienations and his concomitant feelings of anxiety, guilt, and aloneness. Without such a new religion man will continue in his idolatry or in some sabbath-week-day combination of traditional religion and commodity worship. Today, Fromm maintains, neurosis is the expression of man's dissatisfaction with religion and idolatry. Neither religion nor idolatry can serve to

overcome the split in human nature between body and mind, nor resolve the alienations afflicting man, individually and collectively. For Freud, religion was a symptom of neurosis, the neurotic need of man for authority, for father-worship. For Fromm false organized religion and commodity idolatry are not only symptoms of neurosis but causes of it. The only real cure for neurosis, Fromm insists, is a new and true religion, for only such a religion can overcome the duality of body and mind together with the alienations based on it.

Religion, according to Fromm, is the most basic and deeply rooted need of man. As military matters cannot be left to the military, just so religious needs are far too vital to be left to religion, priests, and theologians. "Can we trust religion," Fromm says, "to be the representative of religious needs or must we not separate these needs from organized, traditional religion in order to prevent the collapse of our moral structure?"³ To whom, then, should they be entrusted? To the modern physician of the soul, Fromm answers, to the reconstructed humanistic psychoanalyst. His concern with and analysis of neurosis as caused by the lack of a religion authorizes the psychoanalyst to assume the role of savior of man's soul, the creator of the prescribed new religion. After all, it is the analyst who diagnosed the modern ailment as universal neurosis resulting from lack of a true religion. Is not the diagnostician also best equipped to prescribe a remedy?

Fromm proposes his own reconstructed version of psychoanalysis as a system of thought which can provide a frame of orientation and object of devotion for modern man in search of his soul. He offers, that is, a psychoanalytic theology for a new religion. In his three ethico-religious works (*Man for Himself*, *Psychoanalysis and Religion*, and *Psychoanalysis and Zen Buddhism*) there is no need to alter the structure or form of his "humanistic" system of psychoanalysis. He has only to indicate its ethical, theological, and religious implications.

The unconscious, which Fromm has already transformed from the Freudian innate, naturally inhuman id into a repository of all the potentiality for humanity in man, is now said to be the individualization of the human life-force, or if you will, the

locus of the indwelling God. The unconscious of every human being, he says, "is the bearer of all human potentiality." The unconscious potentialities with which all men are endowed are said to be the general powers to love, to reason, and to image, together with their specialized detailed capacities. In answer to the question of whence man derives these powers, Fromm states only that they are in the individual human unconscious at conception. They are therefore hereditary, part of the innate equipment of man. Human life is a process of giving birth to the in-born potential to love, to reason, and to imagine. "Birth," he says, "is only one particular step in a continuance which begins with conception and ends with death. All that is between these two poles is a process of giving birth to one's potentialities, of bringing to life all that is potentially given in the two cells."⁴ The central problem of life is to give birth to the human potential, to deliver it from the unconscious, from the soul. It is the problem of the second birth to which all great religious teachers of whatever faith have referred. The traditional religions, however, have been signally unsuccessful in their function of midwife to the human soul. This is the case, Fromm maintains, because organized religions have viewed the moving forces of good and evil as outside man, as God and devil wrestling for the possession of the soul of man.

The greatest contribution of psychoanalysis, and particularly of humanistic psychoanalysis, to theology is the recognition at long last of indwelling good and evil. The drive for realization of the human potential is viewed by Fromm as inherent in the unconscious. But at the same time the destructive anti-human drive likewise is located in the unconscious. The good productive potentialities and the psychic energy attached to them are called primary, while the evil, destructive powers with their energies are called secondary. If the primary powers are blocked, if they are not released from the unconscious into consciousness and action, then the secondary powers are unleashed in all their destructive fury.⁵

Humanistic psychoanalysis offers theology the solution, at long last, to the problem of why man is predominantly evil rather than

good, why, that is, the good potential is blocked while the evil potential is released. It is not, as religion has viewed the matter, due to the temptations of the devil in the form of the seductive pleasures of the material world. The good is blocked, Fromm holds, not primarily because of inadequate social conditions, but because man worships false objects or false gods and subscribes to false frames of orientation. False beliefs block the release of the primary human powers and thereby set in motion the evil indwelling secondary forces. The worship of money, of economic success, of social status, for example, constitutes belief in a false frame of orientation and object of worship. Such a false religion blocks the human potential and sets in motion thoughts and actions which destroy all human values, relations and aspirations, and ultimately destroy the personal character, the self, if not all mankind in an atomic holocaust. If the false religion is "socially patterned," if it is a widely held belief and therefore is "socially acceptable," man can continue to live by it until such time as he destroys himself—or is converted to a belief in the true human potential.

If a person, however, develops a personal, non-social "religion," such as worship of one's child or one's father or mother, Fromm terms it a "neurosis" and the person is said to be "sick." One form of cure, then, is to bring him back to the common faith in a socially patterned though false and idolatrous religion. On the other hand, the *real* cure, the cure for all mankind suffering from the "character defect" or "soul sickness" of our age, is to reveal the primary good human potential, the powers of love, reason, and imagination, belief in which will then allegedly drive the secondary destructive powers of man back into the unconscious, repress them, and lead to the release of the truly human potential into consciousness and action.

The final contribution of humanistic psychoanalysis to the new theology is the method for revealing the primary potentialities. Here the techniques of classic psychoanalysis are brought to bear. After all, Freud originally devised these techniques as means of penetrating through resistances deep into the unconscious in order to release repressed, pent-up memories, emotions, and

drives. Fromm's revision of Freud's techniques prepared them for the task of penetrating through the anti-human resistances to reach the human potential—the opposite of Freud's technical mission. The key to Fromm's psychoanalytic techniques, like Freud's, is the concept of a universal and unconscious symbolic language. This language, when translated from the symbolism of dreams, free associations, and myths into common everyday tongues, can divulge the contents of the unconscious. Freud with his pan-sexual symbolism lays bare the antihuman destructive drives of the id, those which Fromm calls the "secondary powers." Fromm with his humanistic symbolic language reveals the so-called primary or truly human potentialities of love, reason, and imagination.

Like Freud before him, Fromm claims that his "system" of psychoanalysis is the product of his analytic practice. In either case it would appear that the analyst "finds" what he is looking for, that he translates the supposedly unconscious symbolism according to his particular key to symbolic meanings.

FROMM'S TRANSFORMATION OF PSYCHOANALYSIS INTO RELIGION

For Fromm psychoanalysis has two functions, both of them being refinements and modernizations of the ancient functions of traditional religion. The first is the function of divulging the truth about man in general, every man. What was formerly the province of prophets, divine emissaries, and sons of God, is now the rightful responsibility of humanistic psychoanalysts. The question of the nature of man's soul is said to be the question of man's unconscious. Psychoanalysis has the awesome task of penetrating through the repressions and ego distortions to the inner core of humanity immanent in each individual unconscious. This is the function of revelation of man to man, laying bare the human potentialities.

The essential proposition here is that "every human being is the bearer of all human potentialities."⁶ The psychoanalysts are far better equipped than the ancient prophets, it is said, for they have the techniques with which to penetrate the depths of the

soul and overcome resistances. While the prophets of old relied on alleged divine revelation direct from God, written on tablets, appearing in burning bushes, or during fasts or lonely vigilance in the wilderness, the psychoanalysts have modern "scientific" methods at their disposal. They employ the psychic microscopes of dream and myth interpretation, free association, and transference, together with the *art* of symbol translation. In this manner, the essential ingredients of religion, a frame of orientation and an object of devotion, are supplied quite without recourse to divinity. Such an approach, it is alleged, renders religion theoretically acceptable to modern man.

The first function of psychoanalysis, according to Fromm, is then to furnish a modernized form of religion—an orientation in which human potentiality is said to reside in the individual unconscious and to be composed of the many human capacities for love, reason, and imagination. This potentiality in turn constitutes an object of "wonder" and "worship," an object of "belief" and "faith." "Man," Fromm says, "cannot live without faith,"⁷ faith in mankind, faith in the innate if repressed potentialities buried in ourselves, in others, and in all human beings. Only such a faith can overcome the existential dichotomy and the alienations now more than ever bedeviling man.

The first function of psychoanalysis is thus to equip man with a modern "scientific" religion, acceptable to all, whether atheist or deist. Of the concept of God, Fromm himself says, "There need be no quarrel with those who retain the symbol of God although it is questionable whether it is not a forced attempt to retain a symbol whose significance is essentially historical."⁸

In Fromm's view, the analyst, as a physician of the soul, sets himself the task of guiding the "patient," suffering not so much from neurosis as from the *maladie du siècle*, in a process of self-knowledge and self-discovery. The first objective is self-knowledge—knowledge, that is, of the tacit or avowed idolatrous religion by which the person lives. It is this false religion with its distorted frame of orientation and unworthy object of worship which has succeeded in blocking, bottling up, or repressing the human potential. The idolatrous personal religion is most com-

monly, at least in the United States, an orientation centering around financial success and the worship of money. This, according to Fromm, is a wholly false religion which succeeds only in releasing the secondary, anti-human destructive powers inherent in the individual unconscious. It releases the innate potentialities of "archaic man, the beast of prey, the cannibal, the idolater,"⁹ which characterize man's relationships in one way or another at all levels, as worker or boss, as husband, as parent, and as citizen. At the same time, the false religion, together with its effect on character and life situations, heightens the dichotomy between spirit and flesh, and leaves the person torn and shattered by his alienations from nature, man, and self, and by feelings of aloneness, anxiety, frustration, and anguish.

The person under analysis cannot simply be *told* about himself. The analyst must, according to Fromm, lead him to *experience* the false religion which has misguided his life. It is a process of self-knowledge through being made to face the truth about oneself without excuses or rationalizations. Of the analyst Fromm says, "He must avoid the error of feeding the patient with interpretations and explanations which only prevent the patient from making the jump from thinking into experiencing. On the contrary, he must take away one rationalization after another, until the patient cannot escape any longer, and instead breaks through the fictions which fill his mind and experiences reality—that is, becomes conscious of something he was not conscious of before." The patient will resist such break-throughs, but the analyst must persist in his task. Only through years of such persistence can the patient himself come to the experiential realization that his idolatrous frame of orientation and object of worship, his false religious beliefs, are indeed the source of his anxieties and frustrations, his guilt and anguish.

The next step is self-discovery. With the aid of his techniques, the analyst acts as a midwife in helping the patient to give birth to a new self, through expressing what Fromm calls "the wider, deeper reality within himself." The aim of this second phase is "to make the unconscious conscious," to attain the state of "non-repressedness." The state of non-repressedness signifies, for

Fromm, the liberation of the unconscious human powers to reason, to love, to imagine, which in turn leads to "the achievement of freedom, happiness and love, liberation of energy, salvation from being insane or crippled." The state of non-repressedness is the psychoanalytic counterpart of the religious state of "becoming as a child," the return to innocence. "The state of non-repressedness," Fromm says, "is a state in which one acquires again the immediate, undistorted grasp of reality, the simpleness and spontaneity of the child." It is the state of grace, based on faith in the human potential. It is beyond intellectualization and is essentially indescribable, but must be experienced. It is a leap to *oneness* with nature, man, and self. It is *insight*: non-intellectual, affective, and experiential. It comes only when a person has put himself beyond "the interference of the conscious mind predominated by intellection." It is a matter of "affective total experience," not of intellectual, scientific, or rational processes. It is a matter of the belly, not the head. "The authentic psychoanalytical insight is sudden; it arrives without being forced or even being premeditated. It starts not in our brain but, to use a Japanese image, in our belly." The childlike state of unrepressed innocence "cannot be adequately formulated in words and it eludes one if one tries to do so; yet it is real and conscious, and leaves the person who experiences it a changed person." It is "the child's experience of . . . immediacy and oneness," a state of transcendence or grace in which there is "no split between subject and object."¹⁰ The psychoanalytic insight, according to Fromm, overcomes the internal split between body and mind, and the external alienations between self and world and between self and others. In essence it is the insight that *I* am this world and this world is me; I am myself and I am all men.

Humanistic psychoanalysis, then, furnishes modern man with a new religion replete with revelation, conversion, and a state of grace. "The psychoanalytical cure of the soul," Fromm says, "aims at helping the patient to achieve an attitude which can be called religious in the humanistic though not in the authoritarian sense of the word."¹¹ The father-authority religions predominant in the West are not congenial to this psychoanalytic religious

experience. As a matter of fact contemporary Western man has become disenchanted, according to Fromm, with the traditional religions based on God-the-Father. He needs a religion without such authority, one in which the idea of the potentiality of man is God, or is an object of worship.

Fromm finds such a god-less religion in Taoism and Buddhism, especially in Zen Buddhism. The Eastern religions, or systems of thought, he says, "had a rationality and realism superior to that of the Western religions."¹² Zen Buddhism offers a revelation of man's inherent potentiality, of his soul, without offending his reason by belief in a father-image. At the same time, Zen Buddhism is in full accord with the aims if not the methods of humanistic psychoanalysis. Satori or enlightenment is said by Fromm to be the same as psychoanalytic insight. It is the freeing of the immanent cosmic unconscious of each individual so that he can experience the identity, the oneness, of self and world, and thus overcome all alienations. The realization that the subject-object split is an illusion is the heart of Zen, as it is of psychoanalytic insight.

Zen employs one method of uncovering the cosmic unconscious, humanistic psychoanalysis another, but the end product, satori, enlightenment, or insight, is the same: non-intellectual, belly knowledge of the oneness of all things—self, man, and world.

Fromm thus reconstructs the great Judaic-Christian tradition of an indwelling soul by means of the theory and method of his humanistic psychoanalysis set within the philosophical framework of existentialism and Zen Buddhism. It is this reconstructed religious tradition which Fromm recommends as the cure for the soul-sickness of modern man, the means of overcoming the *maladie du siècle*, the dichotomy of body and mind and the alienations based on it. It is the recommendation of a new psychoanalytically oriented religion in which the unconscious is the soul and the psychoanalyst, as physician of the soul, replaces the prophets and priests.

That Fromm's reconstruction of psychoanalysis culminates finally in a reconstruction of religion and mysticism stands as a

symptom of the current widespread disillusionment on the part of Western and particularly American humanists, scientists, artists, and men of good will generally. It represents disillusionment with science and especially with the social sciences and with Marxism, with rational, naturalist and materialist philosophy, with progress, with the great aims of the American, French, and Russian revolutions.

Fromm's transformation of psychoanalysis into a religion represents a sense of powerlessness and hopelessness reflecting a series of earth-shaking, thought-shaking, emotion-shaking upheavals. Among these are: the cumulative effect of the Great Depression sandwiched between two devastating world wars; the cold-blooded, calculated extermination of the Jewish people in Europe; the colossally indifferent mass murders of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; the headlong rush of the cold-war, atomic-rocket armaments race toward the self-destruction of mankind; the shattering revelations of the later Stalin era. Above all stand the soul-destroying conformity within the bauble of unstable prosperity set against a background of the general crisis of capitalism; the dead-end flood of creature-comfort commodities threatening to drown the Western world; the meaninglessness of life in a myopic society, doomed and vaguely conscious of its fate; the loss of direction, of perspective, of a future; the lack of values and the utter bankruptcy of ideas and emotions; a dying society composed of people who above all want to live in comfort, peace, and security.

Little wonder that Fromm starts with the individual characterized as powerless, helpless, hopeless, overcome with anxiety, despair, anguish, aloneness, and a sense of life slipping away without ever having been lived. Little wonder also that he turns to the saving of the individual soul, and to religion, the traditional agency for soul-saving. It is a dim recognition that the society is doomed, that the only ray of hope is a modern ark harboring a few regenerated individuals who may ride out the terrible hurricane of the 20th century.

With Fromm's attempted reconstruction, the internal development of psychoanalysis comes full circle. In essence, all the pos-

sible logical inferences from the theory of psychoanalysis have been exhausted through the seriatim explorations made by the revisionists, the reformists, and the reconstructionists. There is no further direction in which psychoanalysis can move. The most that can still be done is to create endless minute refinements in the broad lines laid out by Freud himself, Anna Freud, and Franz Alexander, and by Horney, Sullivan, and Fromm, the latter in his early and later works. The criticism and repudiation of Freud's essential theories by the revisionists, the reformists, and the reconstructionists serve to indict psychoanalysis as a whole from the inside. From the outside, all of the natural and social sciences and scientific philosophy combine to reject it as a discipline belonging within the mainstream of human thought.

In the past half-century all the basic theoretical elements of psychoanalysis have been eliminated one by one by the very people whose closest interest led them to try to salvage them. In the attempt to save psychoanalysis its exponents effectively destroyed it. The final coup was delivered by Fromm's attempt to convert Freud's inhumanities-to-man into a human system of psychological thought. In this attempt he demonstrated once and for all that psychoanalysis is completely inimical to humanism, that when a human content is poured into the Freudian mold, the mold is split asunder by the powerful forces of human nature. The unconscious, Fromm inadvertently proved, is a totally inadequate and useless concept for the understanding of man's mind and nature.

Human potentiality is no more to be found in a biologically hereditary unconscious than in a divinely implanted indwelling soul. Human nature and human potentiality can be rationally and scientifically understood only in terms of the interaction of the individual with the historically constituted society in which he lives. Such an approach alone can avoid the insuperable theoretical and practical difficulties encountered by either a psychoanalytic or a theological-mystical orientation. The two are at one level, identical, in spite of their apparent differences. Both psychoanalysis and theology-mysticism view human nature and its potentialities as biologically or divinely inherent from con-

ception in the mind, spirit, soul, or unconscious of the individual human being. Sharply opposed to this view of human potentiality is the theory of the interaction of phylogenetic anatomy and physiology with the ontogenetic participation of man in the surrounding natural and social world.

Chapter 11

HUMAN POTENTIALITY

An Alternative to the Psychoanalytic Unconscious

The problem of human potentiality is an ancient and persistent one. The two classic but diametrically opposed solutions were formulated by Greek and Roman philosophers. One set of thinkers found the answer in the environment, the other in man. From that time down to the present, the argument has swung uneasily between the two extremes.

Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius took the position that man's behavior, thoughts, and feelings are formed by the world and the society in which he lives. Taking the opposite view, Plato and Aristotle maintained that human nature is innate, Plato by divine gift and Aristotle by biological structure.

The first view would today be termed an environmentalist approach to human potentiality and is currently represented in psychology by the behaviorists. Such a view has traditionally been anathema to religion and theology and considered politically radical as subversive of the established social order. The environmentalist orientation has historically often been utilized by rebellious and revolutionary elements in their attempts to replace an old form of society, state, or government by a new one. Such a political exploitation is inherent in the environmentalist approach. All the ills of the status quo can be blamed on the social order rather than on the evils inherent in human nature, and the promise of a fine new people can be held out when a new society is established. It is not innate human nature which is *bad*,

but rather the organization of people in a *bad* social structure which produces *bad* people.

Philosophically, such an approach to human potentiality is mechanical materialism. It is a onesided view of potentiality, with all the stress on the environment and none on man, collectively or individually. It has served useful purposes such as its employment by the ideologists of the revolutionary bourgeoisie, for example John Locke, in the struggle against feudal doctrines of a God-given human soul stocked with innate feudal ideas. Locke's doctrine of the mind as a *tabula rasa* on which experience writes was a great weapon in the bourgeois revolutions in Britain, on the continent, and in America.

The second view of potentiality, as inherent in human nature, was developed by Plato into an elaborate hierarchy of innate ideas of the true, the good, and the beautiful with regard to universe, society, and man. No proper environmental conditions were required for their development, but only a wise old philosopher acting as mid-wife to pregnant man, with questions employed as obstetrical instruments. Aristotle amended the platonic doctrine, substituting appropriate environmental conditions for the Socratic method as means of giving birth to the innate human potentiality. The Platonic approach was followed by Augustine and the Aristotelian by Aquinas, and thus both views were embraced by orthodox Christian-Church thought. Historically, the innate view of human potentiality, whether Platonic or Aristotelian, has been utilized by ideologies and institutions representing entrenched social orders. Each established form of class society has relied heavily on the conception of innate and unchangeable human nature as a rationale for its own particular structure. The society is what it is because human nature is inherently and unalterably slave, feudal, or capitalist. The doctrine of innate potentiality has proven a highly effective ideological weapon in defense of a whole series of social organizations through at least two thousand years.

The struggle between revolutionary and reactionary elements has over and over again taken the intellectual form of the struggle between the two extreme points of view with regard to the nature

of human potentiality. The fact that the environmental approach has been historically useful on the side of progress is, in itself, no surety of its truth, nor is the reactionary use of the innate approach no guarantee of its falsity. An objective examination of the question indicates that in fact both extremes are false, that the truth lies elsewhere. Freud's classic and Fromm's reconstructed psychoanalytic versions of the innate view of human potentiality collapse, as has been indicated in previous chapters, into absurdity. At the same time, the reformist psychoanalytic version of the environmental view likewise encounters insuperable difficulties and is untenable. Some combination of the environmental and the innate approaches, without recourse to Aristotle's formula of proper conditions for actualization of the inherent potential, would appear to be the only viable alternative.

Whether the human potential is internal or external, lying within the individual person or in the social environment, is a highly complex question, one which defies a simple answer. It cannot be answered by either-or, either internal or external, one or the other. It requires a more subtle treatment involving both-and. Potentiality lies both internally within the individual and externally in society. This is, of course, not an answer but only a beginning. In what sense can the potentiality for becoming a human being be said to reside within the individual from birth or conception, as Fromm claims, and in what sense can it be said to lie outside the individual, in society, as the reformists claim?

Fromm maintains that "man has the power to walk," that "Man is endowed with the capacities of speaking and thinking," that "Man has the power to love," that he has "emotional and intellectual potentialities." Man has, says Fromm, "psychic as well as physical powers"; he has them within him from conception, "potentially given in the two cells." The notion of internal potentiality is so obvious to Fromm that he feels no need to discuss it further, except to declare, with Aristotle, "if only the proper conditions are present."¹ The combination of internal innate potentiality and proper external conditions is considered sufficient to convince anyone. Unfortunately, Fromm is in all

probability justified in considering it to be sufficiently convincing. Most of us are ready to accept its adequacy because the combination seems to do justice both to heredity and environment. Potentiality plus proper conditions for its growth or maturation appears to cover the matter. This is especially the case since we have been brought up on this very notion, without ever questioning its adequacy. If, however, we refuse to accept the proposition at face value, if on the contrary we ask with what potentialities man is born and what conditions are proper for their development, we see at once that the matter is far from clear or self-evident.

THE ACQUISITION OF PRIMARY SKILLS

Fromm starts with what he considers the simplest possible power of man, the power to walk, and limits his discussion to the presumably self-evident statement that man has the power to walk and will walk if only the proper conditions are present. That is all. For practical purposes such a formulation is adequate, but is it adequate for the theoretical purpose Fromm has in mind? He employs the phenomenon of walking to establish an analogy for the development of psychic powers such as talking, thinking, and loving. The stakes are high and the subject therefore worthy of investigation. Is it sufficient to discuss the phenomenon of walking in terms of internal innate powers and external environmental conditions?

What is this "internal, innate power to walk?" A child is born with the anatomical structure of bones, joints, muscles, tendons, and central nervous connections, including the balance mechanism of the inner ear, which will be brought into play and will develop in the processes of learning to walk and of walking. This structure constitutes the internal "potentiality" of the child for walking. It is not an inborn "power to walk," but it is an internal condition without which human walking could not be acquired. The hereditary anatomical structural element can be called an "innate internal potentiality" if we know precisely what is meant by the phrase.

The loose employment of the term "power" or "potentiality"

is an archaic remnant of ancient and medieval times before there was scientific knowledge of the human body, and especially of the nervous system and the brain. Man is born with the anatomical and nervous equipment which make it possible for him to learn to walk at a certain age. This and this alone constitutes his "internal innate power to walk."

The other element in the phenomenon of walking is "learning to walk." Learning to walk is not simply a matter of environmental conditions such as objects to support the child in his fledgling efforts. Walking is learned by the child in a human, social environment, one in which walking already exists as a reality. The child grows and develops in an environment of walking. He is taught the skill of walking by his peers. Parents teach the child, phase by phase, whether or not they are fully aware of what they are doing. Walking exists in the society; it is a social skill which must be imparted anew to each generation. If we know precisely what we mean, we can call the skill of walking an internal-external potentiality of man.

The human potentiality of walking, therefore, has both an internal and an external element. The internal element is in the first place biologically innate in the form of the relevant anatomical and nervous structure. The external element is in the first place socially external in the form of the already acquired skill of walking characteristic of older children and adults. Actualization of the two potentialities involves the interaction of the internal anatomical structure with the external social skill. This interaction is itself highly complex, requiring the teaching of nervous and muscular control through the medium of parents, siblings, and friends, with the psychic aids of emulation, reward, and other motivational inducements. Through the process of learning to walk, the process of bringing together the two potentialities, the external social skill becomes internalized within the individual. From an external social potential it becomes an internal individual actuality.

The internalization of the social potential, however, does not exist vaguely in some unconscious, but exists concretely in the physiology, the functioning of the relevant anatomical structure

under nervous control. The skill of walking gradually becomes involuntary, or, if you will, unconscious (as an adjective). This means only that the external social skill of walking has become semi-automatically embodied in the anatomical functioning. The internalization, or what might be called the "physiologicalization" of the social skill is the particular form in which the internal and external potentialities are united, through more or less long interaction, in a higher unity. This higher unity is simply the automatic functioning of the anatomy relevant to walking. When the social skill has become fully incorporated in the physiological activity of the anatomic structure, then from that point on one can speak of actual walking as the externalization of the internalized social potentiality. The motion here is from internal to external, to internalization of the external, to externalization of the internalized external! A complex process, indeed! Put in this abstract manner, the motion *could* very well be a general description of how internal and external human potentialities meet and mingle to form any newly acquired individual skill or ability. In its specific form, with regard to the skill of walking, the motion is from relevant internal inborn anatomical and nervous structure to interaction of this element with the social skill of walking which exists external to the individual, that is, in the society. Through such interaction the social skill is physiologically internalized and the act of walking is thereafter an externalization of the internalized (formerly external) social skill.

Walking is a universally acquired quality of man, just as is location of sounds in space. The mediation between internal anatomical structure and unconditioned reflexes on the one side and external social environment on the other is social practice or participation in society. The outcome of this mediation is the individual acquisition of social potentialities. The mechanism for this individual acquisition is physiological functioning. Physiological functioning is the fusion of unconditioned and conditioned reflexes in a complex unity, called dynamic stereotypes. Through this mediation, acquisition, and stereotyped physiological functioning the child, for example, fuses his anatomical potentiality for walking with the existing social skill of walking as embodied

in those people who have already acquired it. The child, in other words, unites his internal structural and functional potentiality with the external social potentiality, thereby internalizing the skill that had been external to him. Thereafter the *act* of walking is an externalization of an ability which is now internal.

The fact that walking is a universally acquired ability may serve to conceal the process of learning to walk. The ability almost *appears* to grow from within the child. It is this *appearance* which *seems* to justify the contention that walking is an innate potentiality of man, that it will mature if only the proper external conditions are present. Investigation beneath the appearance, however, reveals that the innate potential for walking, consisting of anatomic structure and certain unconditioned reflexes, is only a pre-condition for acquiring a skill which exists socially. In walking there is then an innate internal potential in the form of an anatomical and functional prerequisite and an acquired external potential in the form of a social skill. The acquisition of the skill requires the merging of the two potentials through the medium of physiological functioning by means of the conditioned reflex. Both potentials must be present if a child is to learn to walk.

If a child were somehow to be raised by a wolf, he would never learn to walk in spite of the fact that his innate potential, his anatomical structure, and unconditioned reflex equipment was perfectly normal. Such an hypothetical child would creep on all fours, elbows and knees, as learned from the wolf, but he could not walk.* According to the Aristotelian-Freudian notion, the proper external conditions would have to be considered as present even in a forest-setting with wolves as parental surrogates. If the power to walk were innate, all a child would need would be objects by means of which he could pull himself erect and onto which he could hold as he took his first tottering steps. Such material conditions, however, do not in fact lead to walking. Learning to walk involves not only appropriate supporting objects, but necessary social stimulation, participation, and emulation. Only

* There have been reports of such cases, for example, the so-called "Wolf Boy" from India.

people who already know how to walk can teach a child to walk. On the other hand, a child with irremediably defective anatomic structure or nervous functioning could not learn to walk even in a social environment.

All this is quite obvious. Unfortunately the climate of opinion in the United States is so oriented around the concept of innate abilities that few people question the adequacy of the modified Aristotelian approach to the problem of human potentiality. Thus Fromm can point to walking as an example of an innate ability, and for the most part will not be challenged. If one stops to think about the matter, it is quite obvious that both the internal and external potentialities are absolutely indispensable elements for learning to walk.

SPECIAL SKILLS AND SOCIETY

The double potentiality underlying the acquisition of the ability to walk becomes even more fully apparent when certain non-universal skills connected with walking are considered. The skill required to become a contestant in a walking race, for example, is a highly social one which is built on the basis of the double potential acquired in learning to walk in the ordinary fashion. This racing skill is a social potential existing in society, one which has developed over hundreds of years. An athlete who would enter such competitions must train for a prolonged period of time to acquire the necessary ability. The latter is a refinement of ordinary walking involving intricate nervous control of highly specialized muscles.

The same is true of mountain climbing. The skill has been developed over a long period of history and exists as a social potential. This social potential, like the skill of walk-racing, is entirely social. It exists in society alone, but its acquisition depends on the original merging in childhood of the innate and social potentials required for walking.

Again in dancing, the various forms are purely social and have been historically developed down the ages from primitive society to the present. The potentiality for the individual with regard to dancing resides entirely in society. Tribal dances, folk dances,

country dances, ballroom steps, ballet, and the modern dance have been developed and exist in society. To acquire the ability to dance, a person must acquire the social skill by participation and tutelage. There is no other way. Ballroom dancing is a relatively easily acquired ability, ballet exceedingly difficult and complex. In any case, the potentiality lies in the society. If a person were raised in a society in which no dancing existed as a social form, he could not acquire the ability. Once more it is important to remember that the potentiality for *learning* to dance rests ultimately on the double potentiality which in childhood is merged in the process of learning to walk.

Learning to walk is the merging of actually existing internal and external potentialities. However, the acquisition of more specialized and complex skills depends on the social forms existing in society. These social forms must be mastered if the skill or ability is to be acquired. The potentiality is therefore social not innate, external not internal. The external social form is there to be mastered, to be made into an internalized ability. The degree of nervous control of muscular movements acquired in walking, jumping, spinning, running, and the like, is an essential ingredient in the learning of more complex and intricate skills such as dancing, tumbling, track and field events, athletic games and so on.

While the potentiality for ordinary walking, running, and jumping is double, the potentiality for the more advanced and specialized forms of leg and body movements is single, that is, it is social and exists only in society. This is not in any way to say that "accidents" of innate structure and function or the degree of nervous and muscular control acquired in the learning of the universal leg and body abilities do not lead to special "talents" and internalized abilities which can make it possible for a given person to master far more easily and effectively than other people the social forms, for example, of the ballet. But it does mean that there is no such thing as a "born" dancer, in the strict meaning of the term. *There are no innate skills.* All skills are social and must be socially acquired.

A general principle of the acquisition of leg and body skills can

now be formulated. The universally acquired abilities of walking, running, and jumping are a direct fusion of innate, internal (structural and functional) elements with acquired external (social) elements, in which the fusion is effected by physiological functioning, the mechanism being the conditioned reflex directly fused with the unconditioned reflex to form a dynamic stereotype or "habit." On the other hand, all specialized skills and abilities, such as dancing, are social forms mastered on the basis of the underlying universally acquired abilities. The universal skills are the basis on which the specialized skills are erected as a superstructure. They are a direct fusion of unconditioned and conditioned reflexes. The mechanism of the specialized skills, on the other hand, is a complex of interrelated conditioned reflexes built on the basis of the fused reflexes of the universal skills.

From this general principle of body and leg skills, an hypothesis can be formed with regard to the acquisition of all human skills and abilities. The primary childhood universal skills are the product of the merging of innate internal anatomical and nervous elements with socially-existing external skills. The secondary specialized skills are the product of the merging of the universal skills with the extant social forms of play, work, art, or athletics existing in the given society. Put in terms of human potentiality this hypothesis signifies that universal abilities are a merger of internal and external potentialities, while the specialized abilities are a merger of already fused internal and external potentialities with other more complex external social potentialities.

Applied to the acquisition of language, this hypothesis indicates that the universally acquired ability to talk is the result, not of the maturation of an innate power as alleged by Fromm, but the fusion of internal and external potentialities. The child is born with a certain muscular, nervous, and cerebral apparatus, which matures sometime between the ages of one and three. This anatomical structure and unconditioned reflex equipment makes it possible for the child to learn to talk. It is the internal prerequisite for such learning. In itself, however, it can never lead to talking. The existence in society of a given language is the external requisite. The acquisition of the spoken language

depends on the fusion of the internal biological potential with the external social potential. Spoken language exists in society as embodied in the ability of older children and adults to speak. The one to three-year-old child can acquire the ability only through utilizing his relevant innate structure by social participation, orally and verbally, in the language spoken by his parents, siblings, and the other people coming in contact with him. Through such participation the rudimentary and common vocabulary, grammar, and logic of the society become internalized.

This primary universal acquisition of the spoken language in childhood constitutes the basis on which the child may later acquire the more and more specialized and individually acquired skills of conversation, articulation, abstract thinking, writing, reading, public speaking, composition, creative prose writing and poetry, reading novels, watching theatrical productions, writing plays, and so on. All these secondary skills exist in society, as historically constituted over hundreds and even thousands of years, and can be mastered as superstructures of special abilities erected on the basis of the universal childhood-acquired primary ability to talk.

The universal ability to talk, the acquisition of oral-verbal language by the young child, involves a double potential, one innate and biological, the other acquired and social. The fusion of these potentialities is the pre-condition for the acquisition by the child, adolescent, and adult, of all the diversified special potentialities which modern society has to offer. The special potentialities of language exist only in the society, as already embodied in the spoken and written word, the expressed or materialized abilities of the members, past and present, of that society, together with the interchange among the peoples of the world. The nature and degree of participation of a person in this vast social linguistic potentiality, his mastery of various aspects of it, will determine both the level and extent of his linguistic ability and the scope of real potentialities that are open to him.

The vast linguistic potentiality constitutes an abstract potential for every member of society. The concrete potential for any given individual at any given time, however, would depend

on the way in which he has thus far participated in the social potential. This would depend on innate factors only in his early childhood acquisition of the ability to talk, in the fusion, that is, of innate structure and social language. Thereafter, his mastery would be a direct function of his social participation.

Language, the universal acquisition of the spoken and written word, is a decisive condition for opening the great social potential of human society to the individual. The other, and even more fundamental condition, is the participation of the person in the historically constituted tasks of his time. The human potential, of which Fromm speaks, resides essentially in society, in the achievements of man thus far in his earthly adventure. To be able to take part in the achievement and the adventure, the individual has first to acquire the various *universal* attributes of humanity, such as, for example, walking, language, and manual dexterity. These primary abilities he acquires by means of fusion of innate biological structure and social skills. Secondly, he has to build an entire superstructure of socially acquired abilities and knowledge on the basis of the primary, childhood-acquired capacities. Education, the schools, should be society's method for bringing to the child, in a structured manner, the world potentialities which alone can prepare him to participate in the adult adventure into life and knowledge, productivity and creativity.

The human potential exists abstractly, for the species—that is, in society—in the past and present achievements of man in all fields of activity. Such a concept sharply confronts Fromm's notion of the human potential as being innately present in some racial unconscious lying dormant embedded in man's hereditary psychic nature. If the latter were the case, man would indeed require some kind of psychoanalytic midwife to help him to give birth to the foetus of his human potential. In the case of the hypothesis here advanced, individual acquisition of the social potential through active participation is the royal road for man to become actually what he is potentially. The concrete potential for the individual depends on the universal and specialized abilities he develops in the course of his life. A

given society may be so organized as to make this the avowed and actual goal for the individual. Or it may be so organized as to throw obstacles in the path of participation by the individual in the social potentiality. Mankind should have as its over-all aim a double objective: first, to construct a society which will allow for the maximum participation of the individual, all individuals, in the human potentiality; and second, to construct a society which will most rapidly and effectively advance the social potentiality of mankind on all fronts. The double objectives are clearly interlocked, so that the one enhances the other, and together they comprise one grand human aim.

THE POWER TO REASON, TO IMAGINE, AND TO LOVE

Fromm speaks not only of walking and talking but also of such "powers" as "to reason," "to imagine," and "to love" as being innate biological potentialities. In the latter powers there is considerably less plausibility for psychic innateness than in the former. The abilities to reason, to imagine, and to love are far more readily accounted for by the hypothesis advanced in the previous pages. The varied forms of reason, imagination, and love exist in society as embodied in established individual capacities and achievements and in creative works and relationships of the past and present.

Reasoning, in the strict sense, is a specialized skill constructed on the basis of the universal primary and rudimentary abilities to talk and to think. In each of these, language is involved with its elementary vocabulary, grammar, and logic. The latter are learned initially without special tutelage along with the general learning of language in conjunction with practical experience of the world. The specialized ability to reason, in addition to a wide vocabulary and correct grammar, would today involve in the first place some degree of mastery of the two levels of logic, the logic of classification and locomotion on the one hand, and the logic of interconnection, conflict, and change on the other, each with their principles, laws, and inferences. Such mastery in whatever degree is no small matter, since each of these logics is in itself a highly developed science and since the two together

constitute the general science of the most abstract structure both of the world and of thought, in their two aspects of classification and change.

Mastery of the general science of logic, no matter in what degree, would not of itself however be sufficient to produce the specialized ability to reason. This ability requires, in addition, mastery of a large segment of human knowledge in its two forms of science and art and covering many fields, including wide acquaintance with the social sciences of history, economics, and politics; the natural sciences of astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, and physiology; the human sciences of anthropology, psychology, education, medicine, and psychiatry; the creative arts of architecture, painting, sculpture, the novel, poetry, and drama; the mass arts of movies, radio, and television; and finally the practical activities of man in daily living, human relations, production, social organization, and the making of history.

Acquisition of the power to reason requires at once wide and deep participation in the knowledge and life of society. The degree of the ability in any given individual would depend on the degree of his mastery of learning and life, which in turn would be a function of his participation in social knowledge and social living.

There is a complicating factor in the power to reason and its acquisition. In spite of great advances in the sciences and arts, and therefore in human knowledge, there is still a vast reservoir of collective and individual superstition and ignorance. Some forms of society would seem still to hold, with Anaximander of ancient Greece, that the maintenance of social stability and law and order requires myths rather than knowledge, or with Plato that the "royal lie" is a prime condition for preservation of the given social structure. At any rate, the individual is faced with a giant task of sorting out science and art from their pseudo forms. Today the acquisition of the power to reason depends to a large extent on this process of distinguishing between truth and falsity, made infinitely more difficult by the fact that the one is often presented, consciously or naively, as the other.

The power to reason, then, is a *social* potentiality of man, exist-

ing in society, and has to be acquired by the individual at once through mastery of knowledge and rejection of ignorance. The pre-condition for acquisition of the ability to reason lies in the universal fusion of innate biological structure with the primary social forms of language, that is, with acquisition of a working level of vocabulary, grammar, and logic. The *specialized* power to reason, on the other hand, is a superstructure erected on the basis of the universal power of language. It is innate only in one aspect of the universally acquired pre-condition. It can be said, therefore, in direct opposition to Fromm, that the power to reason resides essentially in society rather than in some innate psychic unconscious buried somewhere deep in the mind of man. Mastery of external potentiality, rather than intellectual parturition, constitutes the means by which the individual, having in childhood acquired the universal ability to talk, comes to possess in one degree or another the power to reason.

The power to imagine, according to the hypothesis here advanced, is likewise a specialized capacity developed by the individual on the basis of a universally acquired ability. In this instance, the universal basis is the unity of sense experience and language, or, more technically, the fusion of the two higher nervous systems, the first or sensory signaling system and the second or verbal signaling system.

The pre-language child develops the first or sensory signaling system on the basis of the innate or unconditioned reflex system. Through the formation and pinpointing of connections by means of positive and negative reinforcement, the child during his earliest years acquires the universal ability to react to sensory signals such as scents, sights, and sounds. In the course of this period, he acquires, again universally, the ability to form the diverse sensory signals into sense images of the world around him. The reflection of the environment in sensory images greatly expands with the acquisition of the ability to walk and to use the hands as well as nose, eyes, and ears in the exploration of his surroundings.

At some point in this process of acquiring sense imagery, usually between the ages of one-and-one-half and three, the child

begins to acquire the ability to talk, to acquire language, that is. Language is a second signaling system in which words act as signals representing not only sensory signals, but the reflectory images into which they have been formed. Now a new fusion is gradually achieved between the sensory images of the world and the words appropriately connected with them. This new fusion transforms sense experience into *perception*. Perception is the unity of the first and second, the sensory and verbal, signaling systems. It makes possible a tremendous extension of the child's exploration of, and interaction with, the surrounding world. The combination of images and words in a complex perception is a universally acquired ability. One of the properties of this ability is that perceptual images can be evoked, without presence of the actual object, either by associated words or by connected scents, sights, or sounds. Such evocation of images, or chains of images, constitutes an element within the ability to imagine, but is not yet the specialized ability itself. It is still a part of the universally acquired fusion of sense experience and language. It is perception and the power of evocation or recall by association.

The more specialized ability to imagine involves the combination of some degree of knowledge of the sciences and arts on the one hand, and the universal power to perceive and to recall perceptions on the other. Imagination, as distinguished from fancy, is an important ingredient of creative thought and work. It is the ability to combine meaningful *perceptions* into new and more meaningful *conceptions* which can be clothed in the perceptive imagery available to a person on the basis of previous experience. It is not simply the ability to conceive of new possibilities, for life, for art, or for science, but to endow such conceptions with perceptual imagery. It is the ability to combine images in new ways and so enrich the understanding of life, relationships, people, society, and the world in general.

Specialized imagination is particularly important in framing scientific hypotheses and in creating real works of art. The ability exists socially as embodied in works of art, of literature, of science, of mathematics, of philosophy. It exists in the life, relationships, and conversation of people who have, to one degree or another,

mastered the ability to imagine. To acquire the specialized ability, the individual must first have acquired the universal ability of perceptual evocation. On the basis of this ability, he can then develop, through participation in the social forms of imagination, the peculiarly human power to imagine. This power, of course, has an infinite variety and can be acquired in degrees ranging from the simplest imaginative conception of some prospective life experience to the most complex imaginative conception in science, art, engineering, or production.

Contrary, then, to Fromm's contention that imagination is an innate, indwelling power deeply buried in man's psychic unconscious, and that the task of the physician of the soul is to liberate it, the hypothesis followed here indicates that imagination exists socially outside man and that the acquisition of the ability depends on a universal basis and a specialized mastery. The only innate element lies not in the specialized ability but in one aspect of the universal pre-condition, namely the early pre-language fusion of sensory signals with unconditioned reflex activity.

The same hypothesis applied to the various forms of love poses a challenge to Fromm's contention that love of parents, love of man and woman, love of children, and love of mankind are innate endowments of the human unconscious. In each of these instances the general hypothesis suggests that there would be a universally acquired basis, composed of a combination of innate elements and acquired social potentialities, and a superstructure of specialized capacities erected on this basis through further and more individualized participation in the forms of love extant in the surrounding society. The specialized capacities acquired by a given individual would be a function of the level of his participation in the forms of love which the particular society offers.

The love of children for parents exists in the form of two potentialities, one universal and the other specialized. The universally formed capacity is generated from two sources, the innate unconditioned reflex needs of the child on the one hand and the meeting of those needs by the parents on the other. The primary needs met by parents are nutrition and defense, feeding and security. This minimum is required by law and therefore is recognized

to be at least partially a social responsibility of parents. It is not left to the parental instincts alone. The legal minimum, however, is not considered to be sufficient. The parents are *morally* and *ethically* bound by society to meet the vital needs of their child with *loving care*, that is, they bring the emotion of love to the child. The child learns to love them by participating in the social emotion embodied in the parents' concern, joy, sorrow, and so forth. The parents teach him to smile, laugh, play, and transform tears into tranquility. They teach him to love them by making him the recipient of their parental love.

This universally acquired power to love parents is, then, a combination of the innate biological needs on the part of the child and the externally existing emotion of tender concern and ministration to needs brought to the child by the most immediate representatives of society, the parents.

On the basis of the universally acquired capacity to love his parents, the child *may* develop more advanced and specialized forms of such love. Whether or not he does in fact develop them will depend both on the quality of the parents and on his participation in that quality. If the parents continue with loving care to foster and meet the expanding needs of the child, his emotional, social, intellectual, and cultural requirements, then the child's love may grow, mingled and reenforced with respect, admiration, and emulation. If, however, the parents demand these responses without deserving them, the child's love may well turn to resentment, rebellion and even, in extreme cases, to hate. Since society demands that children love their parents, such an adverse outcome leads to conflict and guilt feelings. In a highly developed urban competitive society, in which parents too often are preoccupied with pursuits beyond the range of the child's, the conflict between duty-to-love and felt-love, between respect as an ingredient of love and respect as demanded simply by parental authority, is by no means uncommon. Neither is the concomitant resentment and rebellion uncommon.

On the farm, on the other hand, in "the good old days," the mother and father not only cared for the needs of early childhood but also embodied many of the skills and techniques which the

growing girl and boy required to become adults. Respect, admiration, and emulation were common ingredients of love of parents and allowed for growth of specialized forms of love beyond the universal capacity. Today it requires considerable effort and loving understanding, as well as wide knowledge of, and love for, the sciences and arts, social progress and human values, so that parents may stimulate and expand the needs of the child, meet those needs and thereby inspire continued development of the child's love, respect, admiration, and emulation. The economic and social pressures of urban, suburban, and today even of small-town and farm living, make it more than ever difficult for parents to generate the more advanced forms of a child's love.

In any event, love-of-child-for-parents is not innate, but exists in society to be mastered by the child with the decisive part played by the parents. The only innate element in this power-to-love-parents is the unconditioned reflex needs of the child for food and defense which must be met by the parents. The innate element is a vital ingredient of the universal capacity and as such is a pre-condition for it and for all further more specialized forms, but it itself is not sufficient to engender either the universal or the special capacities. Beyond the innate biological needs of the child, the potentialities for love exist in society, and in this case more specifically in the parents' ability to meet needs on ever expanding levels.

The love of man and woman, romantic love, is likewise, according to the hypothesis, a human potentiality residing primarily in society, but with an innate biological element as a vital ingredient of its universally acquired capacity. Without the innate biological element incorporated in the universal power, the more specialized forms of romantic love would be impossible. Thus the innate element is a pre-condition for the genesis of the universal form, while the latter is the basis on which the advanced forms are erected as superstructures.

The child is born with an anatomical structure and unconditioned reflex apparatus concerned with sex and reproduction. This apparatus comes into operation in stages beginning in early childhood, and advancing through puberty, adolescence, and

maturity. The universal capacity to love romantically is formed gradually throughout all these stages, but not as an automatically maturing innate biological process. It develops in conjunction with boy-girl relationships as experienced, as emulated from older children and adults, especially parents, as read about in fairy tales, stories, and novels, as seen in the movies and on television. The process of finding a congenial mate is inculcated by myriad social sources and finds incipient expression even in pre-school children.

Monogamy is a social institution which a society based on it inculcates in its members from an early age. Romantic love is the voluntary, as opposed to the contract, means of acquiring a wife or husband. The universal form of romantic love is the fusion of the innate biological apparatus with the social institution of a single mate. The search for a mate may lead through a maze of more or less temporary, more or less lasting, romantic relationships ranging from childhood attachments, through "puppy love" and "crushes" on contemporaries or older persons, to adolescent sweethearts, to serious love affairs, engagements made and broken, and finally perhaps to marriage. Through all this vicarious and direct experience, the universal form of the capacity to love romantically is formed. It is largely limited to the minimum criteria of selection, namely, attraction and compatibility. Often it is sidetracked in the course of the search into the sole criterion of attraction at its least developed level, in which event the object of the search tends to become lost, and the immediate attraction to become an end in itself. Habits of promiscuity may thus be formed.

Whatever the particular course, the process of acquiring the universal level of the ability to love romantically is a fused combination of the innate biological element with the minimum potentialities of the social institution of romantic love. It is a fusion, that is, of innate and acquired "powers."

The more advanced forms of romantic love may be achieved on the basis of the formation of the universal capacity. They may be acquired at a relatively early age and at any of the later stages of development of heterosexual relations. The more advanced forms

exist in society as depicted in the best of the world's novels, plays, movies, poetry, and biographies, and as embodied in the living relationships of at least some of each person's known contemporaries and peers. In general the acquisition of these forms of romantic love are a function of knowledge and culture, involvement in historic processes, awareness of the world at many levels, and concomitant high criteria for attraction, compatibility, and selection on the one hand, and sensitivity, understanding, tenderness, and mutual enrichment in living together, on the other.

In a society which understood this process and which at the same time made readily available the requisites for the acquisition of both the universal and the advanced capacities to love romantically, romantic love, as the most developed and civilized means for finding a mate and for creating lasting and rich relationships in marriage, would be the rule rather than the exception. As it is, however, much of contemporary culture seems designed to freeze the capacity not only at its universal stage, but at the lowest level of that stage. Especially the mass media, the most influential of the vicarious forces, bombard the national audience with raw sex relationships and banal if not brutal stories of love, marriage, adultery, separation, and divorce. Even more subversive of romantic love is the now almost unbearable economic and social pressures bearing down on the individual and on the love relationship. The impersonal corporate giant is like a bulldozer leveling individuals to one flat plane of conformity and crushing creative abilities and relationships. The "search for love" becomes more frantic and full of fear, panic, and hopelessness.

All this notwithstanding, in spite of a national atmosphere generally inimical to real romantic love, especially in its more advanced forms, there are in all probability more instances of truly voluntary and truly creative romantic relationships than at any time in our history. This is the case, beyond doubt, primarily because the past half-century has seen at least partial victory in the struggle for equality of women and men. Only in such circumstances can there be in any real sense creative romantic love between the two sexes. The battles between men and women in the attempt to establish relationships are sharp and often bitter.

But such battles are between equals and are, at least at this stage, more often than not, necessary for the development of the advanced forms of romantic love.

Far from being innate, the love of man and woman as a human potentiality exists primarily in society and in the historically constituted social heritage. The innate factor constitutes an important element, even a pre-condition, but is not of itself sufficient for the formation of the capacity to love romantically. It must be fused with the social forms to generate the universal capacity, which in turn is only the basis on which the creative levels of romantic love can be achieved.

The hypothesis indicates that man should spare no effort in the attempt to construct a society which will build on the historical achievements, among other things, of romantic love, monogamous marriage, and the freedom and equality of women. Such a society would consciously develop those conditions on all levels which would encourage and foster the acquisition of the advanced power to love romantically and creatively as a universal capacity of mankind.

The love of parents for their children has already been explored in conjunction with the acquisition of the capacity of children to love parents. In either case the capacity has a universal stage fusing innate biological and acquired social potentialities, and advanced stages built on the basis of the first. While it always retains an innate element, parental love in all its forms and degrees is principally a social phenomenon. Acquisition of the capacity depends, therefore, on participation by parents in the socially existent potentiality, while the quality of their love is a function of the scope and depth of such specialized participation, set against a background of the level of their participation in the general human social potentiality.

Love of man for man, the brotherhood of man, which Fromm views as an innate potentiality, is, according to the hypothesis, likewise essentially a social phenomenon, with its common universal and its advanced specialized forms. The universal form, however, differs from the others previously discussed since it is not directly based on an innate biological element. Acquisition of

the universal level of the capacity to love one's fellow men, that acquired by all members of society, is a combination of the universally formed capacities to love in all its other forms: love of children for parents, parents for children, and romantic love. This most common form of the capacity is an extension of "blood" and "romance" relations to include "others like us" selected from the immediate circle of fellow students, co-workers, neighbors and fraternity, club, and lodge members. The universal form of love of mankind begins in fellowship and proceeds to friendship based on personal acquaintance. The opposite side of the limited personal character of the universally acquired capacity to love one's fellow men, is the concomitant capacity to distrust, despise, and even to hate "those who are not like us," in color, religion, and nationality.

The more advanced forms of the love of mankind exist socially in the actively engaged contemporary humanists and in the humanist art, literature, and science of the world down the ages. They are based on the universal personal level of the capacity, but constitute at the same time a vast expansion of it through knowledge of man's past great accomplishments and through participation in current advances. In this way man comes to love man in the common struggle to build a world, regardless of race, religion or nationality. Distrust, contempt, and hate are directed against those ideologies, institutions, and individuals which stand in opposition to man, would thwart his full acquisition of the human potential, and block the social frontier.

THE POWERS OF MAN

All the powers of man—to walk, to talk, to reason, to imagine, to love, among others—are, according to the hypothesis here advanced, a combination, direct or indirect, of innate requisites and social capacities to form the universal level, together with a superstructure of advanced abilities rising on the universal basis to possible heights not yet within the range of human vision. A million or more years of evolution of the species has created the innate biological, anatomical, physiological potential which is an indispensable ingredient in the total historically constituted hu-

man potential existing in society. Acquisition of the biologically innate potential is automatic by means of conception, foetal development, and birth, and is in essence the same for all mankind though different in each individual, no matter what the type of society. Acquisition of the universal form of the human social potential is "automatic" by means of unavoidable participation, as the only mode of continued existence, in the common everyday life of man within his social environment, and is *in essence* the same, though in appearance and detail different, for all who live within a similar type of society. Acquisition of the more advanced levels of the social potential is neither "automatic" nor "universal," but is rather a function of the scope and degree of participation by the individual in that potential. Such individual participation is itself dependent on the one hand on the availability to him of the potential within the given society, and on the other on his determination to allow nothing to stand in the way of his attempted mastery of it. Failure to acquire the more advanced forms of the human potential on the part of any individual can neither be blamed wholly on prevailing social conditions nor wholly on individual character. If, however, responsibility must be assigned, as it must as an historical necessity, then the prime cause is the given organization of society, since it is ultimately responsible for the formation of character as well. With such an assignment of responsibility, a cherished goal of man should clearly be the building of a society and a world which will ensure that the maximum human potential is made available in a manner that will allow all people everywhere to participate in it, and thereby transform it into universally acquired internalized capacities.

Fromm mistook appearance for essence and went on to construct an entire theory of innate human potentiality. In particular, he mistook the fact that what is socially external to the individual becomes, through participation, internalized. External potentialities become internal capacities. By starting from the wrong end, by starting, that is, from the already acquired and internalized capacities, Fromm viewed the human potential as innate capacities somehow biologically inborn in what he, and

Karl Jung before him, termed the "racial unconscious." His psychoanalytic orientation prevented him from starting at the beginning, with the newborn child equipped with all the structures and innate functions which make it possible for him to participate in the human potential as it exists in society.

The problem as Fromm saw it was how to externalize the internal potential. In point of fact this is putting the cart before the horse. The full problem involves, on the contrary, first the internalization of the external social potential, making the potential into an individual capacity, and secondly the externalization of this internalized potential, the use of the capacity by the individual in terms of productive work and creative living. In actuality, both these processes go on simultaneously and continuously throughout life, from birth to death. The acquisition of capacities and their employment comprise a spiraling development, the one leading to broader use and this in turn leading to greater capacity.

When the innate potential is viewed as being limited to atomic structure and unconditioned physiological functioning, and when the human potential is viewed as social and external, then the acquisition by the individual of the social potential requires the interaction of the innate and the social potentials. Such interaction takes the form of participation by the individual in society, the physiological basis of which is higher nervous activity. Participation mediates between the innate and the external potentials, thereby producing individual capacities which in turn lead to further participation. Given his native biological endowment, the individual becomes a human being through participation in society. The level of his acquired humanity is a function of the level of his social participation, that is, of his concrete living.

For Fromm, on the other hand, man is born with embedded humanity and has only to be helped to express it, or in his own terminology, to "de-repress" it. The means advocated for such de-repression are in the first place the psychoanalytic techniques for rendering the unconscious conscious, and in the second place, the Zen Buddhist ladder of paradoxical logic culminating in a leap to emotional identification through "belly knowledge."

Fromm's aims were humanistic, but his psychoanalytic orienta-

tion rendered them irrational and unattainable. Any concept of a totally *innate* human potential involves the problem not only of giving birth to the potential but of where that potential came from in the first place and how ideas and values can be biologically hereditary. The entire concept of an exclusively innate human potential is so foreign to science and reason that it enmeshes its proponents inextricably in an endless spider-web of impossible assumptions and rationalizations.

The counterposed hypothesis, on the contrary, while its outline is exceedingly abstract and general, may serve to guide thinking about the human potential along rational and scientific paths toward ultimate understanding of the highly complex but universal phenomenon of how an infant becomes a mature human being in the full sense of the word.

REFERENCE NOTES

REFERENCE NOTES

CHAPTER I

1. A. A. Brill, "Introduction," *The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud*, Modern Library, New York, 1938, p. 25.
2. Brill, *Freud's Contribution to Psychiatry*, Norton, New York, 1944, p. 22.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 25.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 40.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
8. Brill, *The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud*, p. 26.
9. Brill, *Freud's Contribution to Psychiatry*, p. 102.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 103.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
12. *Ibid.*
13. *Ibid.*, p. 42.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 95.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 194.
16. Ernest Jones, *The Life and Works of Sigmund Freud*, Vol. II, Basic Books, New York, 1955, p. 57.
17. Sigmund Freud, *An Autobiographical Study*, Norton, New York, 1935, p. 94.
18. A. A. Roback, *History of American Psychology*, Macmillan, New York, 1952, p. 287.
19. Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 57.
20. Quoted by Ralph Barton Perry, *The Thought and Character of William James*, Harvard Univ. Press, Vol. II, New York, 1955, pp. 122-23.
21. Freud, *An Autobiographical Study*, p. 95.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 194.
23. Freud, "The History of the Psychoanalytic Movement," in *Collected Papers*, Vol. I, Hogarth Press, New York, 1924, p. 315.
24. *Ibid.*

25. C. P. Oberndorf, *A History of Psychoanalysis in America*, Grune, New York, 1953, p. 136.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 233.
27. Brill, *Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud*, p. 3.
28. Lionel Trilling, *Freud and the Crisis of Our Culture*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1955, pp. 11-12.

CHAPTER 2

1. Robert Sears, *Survey of Objective Studies of Psychoanalytic Concepts*, Social Science Research Council, New York, 1942.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 133.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 22, 32, 37.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 42-43, 136.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 141, 143, 140.
6. For a detailed examination of this myth see Harry K. Wells, *Sigmund Freud: A Pavlovian Critique*, (Vol. II of *Pavlov and Freud*), International Publishers, New York, 1960, Chapter V.
7. Anna Freud, *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense*, Hogarth Press, 1937. (English translation).
8. Heinz Hartmann, "Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation," English translation included in D. Rappaport, *Organization and Pathology of Thought*, Columbia Univ. Press, New York, 1951.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 383.

CHAPTER 3

1. Bertram D. Lewin and Helen Ross, *Psychoanalytic Education*, International University Press, New York, 1960, pp. 47-52.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 50.
3. Lawrence S. Kubie, *Practical Aspects of Psychoanalysis*, International University Press, New York, 1950.
4. *Ibid.*
5. W. David Sievers, *Freud on Broadway*, Hermitage House, New York, 1955, p. 452.
6. George W. Albee, *Mental Health Manpower Trends*, Basic Books, New York, 1959, p. 158.

CHAPTER 4

1. For a full discussion of the science of higher nervous activity as it confronts Freudianism, see Wells, *Sigmund Freud: A Pavlovian Critique. op. cit.*

CHAPTER 5

1. Karen Horney, *New Ways in Psychoanalysis*, Norton, New York, 1939; *Self-Analysis*, Norton, New York, 1942; *Our Inner Conflicts*, Norton, New York, 1945; and *Neurosis and Human Growth*, Norton, New York, 1950.
2. Horney, *Our Inner Conflicts*, p. 12.
3. Horney, *New Ways in Psychoanalysis*, p. 7.
4. Horney, *Our Inner Conflicts*, pp. 11, 12.
5. Horney, *New Ways in Psychoanalysis*, pp. 7-8.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
7. Horney, *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time*, Norton, New York, 1937, p. viii.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 20-21, 19, 17.
9. Horney, *New Ways in Psychoanalysis*, pp. 8, 17.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 52.
11. This and the following quotations from *Ibid.*, pp. 60-87.
12. For this and the following arguments, see *Ibid.*, pp. 133-53.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 42-45.
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 154.
17. Horney, *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time*, p. xii.
18. Horney, *New Ways in Psychoanalysis*, p. 18.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 173.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 23-24.
21. Horney, *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time*, p. 71.
22. Horney, *New Ways in Psychoanalysis*, p. 24.
23. For a discussion of this tendency and its relation to psychoanalysis, see Wells, *Sigmund Freud, op. cit.*
24. Horney, *New Ways in Psychoanalysis*, p. 227.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
27. Horney, *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time*, p. 228.
28. Horney, *New Ways in Psychoanalysis*, pp. 292, 284, 206, 284, 34, 35.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 108.
30. Horney, *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time*, p. ix.

CHAPTER 6

1. Erich Fromm, *Escape from Freedom*, Farrar, New York, 1941, pp. 9, 13.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 43, 25.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 62-63.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 110, 112-13.
5. This and the following quotations from *Ibid.*, pp. 119-30.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 180.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 133, 134, 137.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 138.
9. Horney, *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time*, p. 289.
10. Fromm, *Escape From Freedom*, p. 136.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 180.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 189.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 180, 184.
14. Fromm, *The Sane Society*, Farrar, New York, 1945, p. 209.
15. Fromm, *Escape from Freedom*, p. 154.
16. Fromm, *The Sane Society*, p. 277.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 263-64, 265.
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 274, 284, 323, 225-26, 363.

CHAPTER 8

1. G. W. Albee, *Mental Manpower Trends*, pp. 25-26.
2. *Ibid.*

CHAPTER 9

1. Erich Fromm, *The Art of Loving*, Harper, New York, 1956, pp. 130-33.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 8-11.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 7-9.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 20-21.
5. Morton H. Hunt, *The Natural History of Love*, Knopf, New York, 1959.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 34-36.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 46.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 73.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 77.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 83, 87.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 131-33.

CHAPTER 10

1. Erich Fromm, *Psychoanalysis and Religion*, Yale Univ. Press, New Haven, 1950, p. 7.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 20-25.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
4. Fromm, *Man for Himself*, Rinehart, New York, 1947, pp. 42, 91.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 217-19.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 42.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 210.
8. Fromm, *Psychoanalysis and Religion*, p. 114.
9. Fromm, *Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis*, Harper, New York, 1960, p. 106.
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 126, 110, 126, 122, 128, 131, 132.
11. Fromm, *Psychoanalysis and Religion*, p. 93.
12. Fromm, *Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis*, p. 80.

CHAPTER 11

1. Fromm, *Man for Himself*, pp. 219, 91.

INDEX

INDEX

- Adler, Alfred, 22
 Alexander, Franz, 43
 Alienation, 111, 117, 120, 174;
 Fromm's theory of, 174-75;
 critique of Fromm's theory,
 175-79, 189
American Journal of Sociol-
ogy, 30
 American Neurological Associ-
 ation, 28
 American Psychoanalytic Asso-
 ciation, 28, 30, 48, 81
 Anaximander, 224
 Anthropology, 40-42
 Anxiety, 45, 117, 126, 150, 191
 Aquinas, St. Thomas, 183, 212
 Aristotle, 154, 185, 211, 213
 Assumptions of reformist psy-
 choanalysis, 150, 158
 Automaton-conformism, 124,
 125, 167
 Axelrod, George, 51

 Beard, Charles, 156
 Benedict, Ruth, 42
 Bergson, Henri, 98
 Blake, William, 183
 Bleuler, Eugen, 16, 21, 22

 Boas, Franz, 25, 42
 Brahmanic philosophy, 185
 Brill, A. A., life of, 11-24; pro-
 fessional predicament, 13-
 14; search for office therapy,
 14-17; pilgrimage to Paris,
 15; disillusionment, 15; at
 the Burghölzi Clinic, 16; con-
 version to psychoanalysis,
 17-18; self-test of Freud's
 theories, 19-20; dog-God
 case history, 21; established
 by a case history, 22; trans-
 lates Freud's works into Eng-
 lish, 23; brings Freudianism
 to America, 23-24; with
 Freud at Clark U., 24, 25,
 27, 31, 32
 Buddhism, 207
 Burghölzi Clinic, 16, 19, 22, 23
 Burr, Charles W., 31

 Camus, Albert, 190, 192
 Capitalism, Fromm on the na-
 ture of, 148-49, 166, 167, 172;
 and love, 172-194; and alien-
 ation, 174-79, 188
 Case histories, 21, 22

- Castration, 61
 Central Islip State Hospital, 11, 12
 Character analysis, 21
 Charcot, J. M., 13
 Christianity, 190-93, 199
 Clark University, 24, 25, 27
 Compromise, 45, 102
 Compulsive motivation, 96-106, 115, 116, 117-27, 137, 138
 Conditioned Reflex, 70-74, 98
 Contradiction, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 178, 185, 186, 187, 188
 Counseling, 60
 Democritus, 211
 Destructive compulsions, 125
 Dewey, John, 191
 Dialectical logic, 153, 154, 155, 156, 185, 187
 Dialectical thinking, Horney on, 94, 95, 96
 Displacement, 45
 Dream interpretation, 19, 20, 21, 22, 58, 59, 66, 98, 106, 120, 137
 DuBois, Cora, 42
 Dubois, Dr., 14
 Eckhart, Meister, 185
 Ego, secondary process of, 36-37, 44, 46, 47, 203
 Ego-defenses, 44, 45, 46, 77, 137, 138
 Emotion, 162, 164, 165
 Epicurus, 211
 Existentialism, 191, 207
 Faith, 189, 195, 204
 Ferenczi, Sandor, 22, 25
 Fetishism of commodities, 111
 Fixation, 91, 92
 Forel, August, 13
 Forgetting, 58, 61, 62, 66-75
 Formal logic, 153, 154, 155, 156, 186, 187
 Fourier, 132
 Free Association, 19, 20, 21, 22, 58, 59, 66, 98, 106, 120, 137
 Freud, Anna, 43, 44, 45, 106
 Freudianism, orthodox, 32
 Freud, Sigmund, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24; Freud in America, 24-29; and Wm. James, 26, 30, 32, 34, 35, 36, 42, 44, 45, 50, 58, 76, 81, 87, Horney's critique of, 84-96, 100, 101, 106, 107, 118, 133, 140, 146, 194, 200, 202
 Fromm, Erich, 35, 81, 107; sociological factor, 108-115; alienation, 111; psychological factor, 116-27; interrelation of sociological and psychological factors, 128-130; *The Sane Society*, Fromm's Utopia, 130-34, 136, 139, 145, 146, 157; his concept of capitalism, 150-57; on compulsive motivation, 158-67; theory of love, 171-89; theory of alienation, 174-75; and religion,

- Zen Buddhism and existentialism, 190-210; contribution to the new theology, 194-203; transformation of psychoanalysis into religion, 203-10; on human potentiality, 213, 214, 234, 235
 Functional mental illness, 12-14
 Green, Julian, 117
 God, 192, 193, 194, 196, 200, 201, 204
 Hall, G. Stanley, 24, 25, 28
 Hart, Moss, 51
 Hartman, Heinz, 44, 46, 47, 106
 Hegel, G. W. F., 155, 185
 Hellman, Lillian, 51
 Heraclitus, 185
 Historical materialism, 107, 191
 Holt, E. B., 25, 28
 Horney, Karen, 35, 45, 81-106; life of, 81-83; critique of Freud, 84-96; Horney's reformation of psychoanalysis, 96-106, 107, 136, 138, 139, 143, 158, 209
 Human potentiality, 209, 211-36
 Human predicament, 192
 Hypnotic sleep, 13, 14
 Hypnotic suggestion, 13, 14
 Hypnotism, 14
 Hysteria, 12
 Idea and emotion, 163, 164, 165
 Idea, 163, 164, 165
 Imagination, 226-27
 Instincts, 61, 62-66, 107
 Irrationalism, 157
 Id, 35, 40, 46, 167, 171, 194
 Infantile sexuality, 35, 38, 41, 43
 Isolation, 45
 Inge, William, 51
 Idolotry, 198, 199
 James, William, 25, 26, 27, 89, 94, 98
 Janet, Pierre, 12
 Jelliffe, S. E., 28
 Jones, Dr. Ernest, 24, 25, 27
Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 28
 Judaism, 199
 Judge Baker Guidance Center, 29
 Jung, C. G., 16, 21, 22, 23, 25
 Kabbalah, 185
 Kaffka, Franz, 117
 Kant, pragmatic reason, 13
 Kardiner, Abram, 42, 43
 Kennedy, Dr. Foster, 31
 Kierkegaard, Søren, 116, 193
 Kluckhohn, Clyde, 42
 Kraepelin, Emil, 11
 Kris, E., 44
 Lange, Carl, 89
 Lao-tse, 185
 Laurents, Arthur, 51

Lawrence, D. H., 183
 Libido theory, 89-90, 102
 Linton, Ralph, 42
 Locke, John, 212
 Logic, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 184, 185, 187, 224
 Love, 171-89; theory of, 171-74; five types, 171; critique of Fromm's theory of, 179-89, 227-33
 Lowenstein, R., 44
 Luce, Clare Boothe, 51
 Lucretius, 211
 Magic, 198
 Maimonides, 183
Maladie du siècle, 192, 195, 207
 Malinowski, Bronislaw, 42
 Marx, Karl, 107, 108, 111, 130, 131, 134, 146, 155, 185
 Masochism, 121, 122, 123, 128
 Mead, Margaret, 42
 Mechanistic thinking, 94, 95, 96
 Menninger Foundation, 29
 Menninger, Karl A., 43
 Mental illness, 12, 13, 16; line between mental illness and mental health, 20-21, 17, 49, 119, 159
 Meyer, Dr. Adolf, 11, 25, 27
 Miller, Arthur, 150, 151
 Mysticism, 194
 Neurasthenia, 12
 Neurologists, pattern set by Freud, 12, 25, 28
 Neurotics, ambulatory, 13

New York Journal of Psychoanalysis, 81
 New York Psychiatric Institute, 11
 New York State Commission on Lunacy, 16
 New York State Hospital, 11, 12
 Nietzsche, 98, 193
 Oedipus Complex, 25, 29, 32, 35, 39, 41, 43, 47, 48, 50, 87, 90, 91, 135, 149
 O'Neill, Eugene, 51
 Organic mental illness, 11-13
 Owen, Robert, 132
 Pan-sexualism, 87
 Paradoxical logic, 185, 186, 235
 Pathophysiology, 13; hiatus in, 17, 159
 Perception, 226
 Peterson, Dr. Frederick, 16
 Philosophy, 190; turn to analysis, 191-93
 Physiology, 13
 Plato, 211, 224
 Pleasure principle, 46
 Practitioner, medical, 13
 Practitioner, private office, 13
 Pragmatism, 13, 48, 91
 Prayer, 193
 Predetermination, 33, 87, 102
 Primal horde myth, 32, 40
 Prince, Morton, 13, 28
 Proudhon, 132
 Psychasthenia, 12

Psychiatrists, pattern set by Freud, 12, 25
 Psychiatry, 13, 21, 23, 24
 Psychic structures, 25, 107
 Psychoanalysis, 16, 17, 21, 22, 24, 27, 28, 31, 33; orthodox, 32-33; orthodox to revised, 34-35; revised, factors leading to, 36-43; revision, 44-47; classical, 47, 48-57; American Association of, 49-52; and the theatre, 50-51; sources of influence of, 49-57; alternative to classical, 58-76; future of classical, 75-77; Horney's critique of, 84-96; Horney's reformation of, 96-106; Fromm's reformation of, 115-27; major premise of, 119; reformation of, 135-47; forces leading to reformed psychoanalysis, 140-42; contradiction within reformed psychoanalysis, 142-47; two assumptions of psychoanalysis, 150-68; reconstruction of, 171-210; and Zen Buddhism, 184-87; and theology, 194-203; and religion, 203-10
 Psychoanalytic Society, 22, 29, 30, procedure of, 48-52; membership of, 50-52
 Psychology, 21, 24, 25
 Psychosis, 16
 Psychotherapeutic technique, 13, 14, 15
 Psychotherapists, 13
 Psychotherapy, 13, 48, 52, 53-54
 Putnam, J. J., 24, 25, 27
 Quackenbos, Dr. John D., 14
 Racial unconscious, 32, 33, 34, 35, 41, 45, 64, 65
 Rapaport, D., 44
 Rationalism, 191
 Rational motivation, 98
 Reality, denial of, 45
 Reality principle, 46
 Reaction formation, 45
 Reasoning, 223-25
 Re-education, 160
 Reflection theory of consciousness, 152, 153, 158, 162, 163, 165
 Religion, 190; turn to analysis, 191-93, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 208
 Repetition compulsion, 91
 Repression, 68, 69, 70-74
 Revelation, 204, 206
 Revision of psychoanalysis, factors leading to, 35; practical experience of analysts, 35-36; academic experimental psychology, 36-37; experimental investigation of psychoanalytical postulates, 37-40; comparative anthropology, 40-43, 43-47, 47-57, 76-77, 135

- Rivers, W. H., 42
 Roback, A. A., 26
 Roheim, Geza, 42
 Rush, Benjamin, 16
- Sachs, Dr. Bernard, 31
 Sadism, 125
 Salpêtrière, 15
 Sartre, Jean Paul, 192
 Satori, 207
 Schopenhauer, 98
 Science of higher nervous activity, 70-75, 159, 160
 Sears, Robert, 37, 38, 39, 40
 Sensory signalling, 70-74, 225
 Sickness unto death, 192
 Sidis, Boris, 13
 Sleep, hypnotic, 13, 14
 Socialism, utopian, 157; scientific, 157-58
 Social work, psychiatric, 54-55
 Soul, 194, 201, 206, 207, 210, 212
 St. Augustine, 212
 Sublimation, 102
 Sullivan, Harry Stack, 35, 45, 158, 209
 Super ego, 40
- Talking, 220-22
 Taoist thought, 185
 Theology, 189, 190, 192, 193;
 and psychoanalysis, 200, 209
 Therapy, 12, 21, 45, 58, 93, 131-32, 134, 159, 161-62
 Therapy, verbal, 13, 15
 Titchener, E. B., 25
 Training analysis, 30
 Trilling, Lionel, 31
- Unconditioned reflex, 62, 63
 Unconscious, 32-33, 34; symbolic language of, 41, 92, 162
 Unconscious motivation, 36, 96-106, 115, 116, 117-27, 137, 138, 171, 200, 201, 209, 235
- Vanderbilt Clinic Formulary, 12
- Walking, 214-20
 Wernicke, Karl, 11
 Weir Mitchell rest cure, 15
 West, James, 42
 White, W. A., 28
 William Alanson White Institute of Psychiatry, 107
 Williams, Tennessee, 149, 150
 Worship, 204
- Zen Buddhism, 184, 185, 186, 187, 189, 190, 207, 235

In Conflict with Freud. Horney, p 84.